

NOTES

Chapter One

1. James Hutchison Stirling, *The Secret of Hegel: Being the Hegelian System in Origin, Principle, Form, and Matter*. (Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1898).
2. The most influential version of this idea of Hegel as an important but unacceptable precursor to our world is Charles Taylor's *Hegel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975) along with his *Hegel and Modern Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), an adaptation of the longer *Hegel*. In Taylor's view, by constructing a metaphysics based on the idea of a universe posited by a Spirit whose essence is rational necessity, Hegel tried to combine the rational, self-legislating freedom of the Kantian subject with the expressive unity within man and with nature (that is, the Enlightenment conception of rationality with Romanticism). But this attempted synthesis, however grand, is dead. Part of the reason for this, in Taylor's view, is that Hegel seriously misunderstood the dynamic of modern life, thinking both that the forces of dissolution at work in modern life could be contained in the form of the rational constitutional state that he developed (in a new form of ethical life), and that his philosophy of nature would unify the empirical sciences. The dynamic of modern society, especially since the period in which Hegel wrote, has shattered Hegel's dream of a new form of ethical life, and his idea of unifying the sciences has been shattered by their own explosive growth. Hegel's importance for Taylor is that he posed what Taylor takes to be *the* modern question – how to unite radical autonomy with the expressive unity with nature – even though his solution is untenable. The value of studying Hegel, therefore, for Taylor is to study the last great attempt at an overall synthesis of the grand oppositions of modern life.
3. See ¶73, pp. 46–47; *Die Phänomenologie des Geistes*, hereafter referred to as *PG*, pp. 63–64.
4. See ¶76, pp. 48–49; *PG*, p. 65–66. Hegel notes: “By the former *assurance*, science would be declaring its power to lie simply in its *being*; but the untrue knowledge likewise appeals to the fact that *it is*, and *assures* us that for it science is nothing. *One* bare assurance, however, counts for as just as much as another.”
5. See ¶76, pp. 48–49; *PG*, pp. 65–66.
6. See ¶78, p. 49; *PG*, p. 67. Hegel notes that in a “science” (a *Wissenschaft*), one must have the general intention not “upon mere authority to give oneself over to the thoughts of others but to examine everything for oneself and to follow one's own convictions, or better still, to produce everything oneself and accept only one's own deed as what is true.”
7. See ¶78, p. 49; *PG*, p. 67. Hegel makes a play on doubt (*Zweifel*) and despair (*Verzweiflung*).
8. See ¶81, p. 52; *PG*, p. 70.
9. See ¶84, pp. 53–54; *PG*, pp. 71–72.

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10. See ¶78, p. 49; *PG*, p. 67. “Self-consummating skepticism” is *sich vollbringende Skeptizismus*.
11. Thus, early in his “Introduction,” Hegel speaks of “*determinate* negation” as signalling the breakdown of some account of what counts as knowledge. See ¶79, pp. 50–51; *PG*, pp. 68–69.
12. For Hegel, the kinds of reasons that we take as authoritative include not only formal but also substantive, material reasons. To capture this sense of “substantive” reason, I use the metaphor of “social space,” which I take from Jay Rosenberg’s neo-Kantian work, *The Thinking Self* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986). A social space in Rosenberg’s sense consists of a set of material and formal inferences. Hegel shares something like this view, since he thinks of these social spaces as having a logic – that is, as having an inferential structure, which can then be outlined by the dialectician. See also Willem A. deVries, *Hegel’s Theory of Mental Activity* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988) for a development of Hegel’s idea of self-consciousness along very similar lines to Rosenberg’s theory. (Both deVries and Rosenberg are very influenced by Wilfrid Sellars on these points.) I have also drawn some of the points from J.C. Evans’ discussion of the way in which the Kantian theory of subjectivity needs completing in his *The Metaphysics of Transcendental Subjectivity* (Amsterdam: Verlag R.R. Grüner, 1984) pp. 78–85, and his conclusion of that discussion, pp. 104–105, although Evans and I come to different conclusions on this. The difference between formal and material inference is roughly the following. The terms in a formal inference occur (in Quine’s phrase) vacuously; the status of the inference is not affected by which terms are entered. A material inference is one in which the terms do not occur vacuously; the substantive terms involved make a difference to the validity of the inference. An example will best illustrate the distinction. Consider the proposition, “If Los Angeles is west of Washington, then Washington is east of Los Angeles.” This statement is true, and it seems to be true in some kind of a priori manner. But how? It is not true as a purely formal logical inference unless one adds a suppressed premise, “For any x and for any y, if x is west of y, then y is east of x.” With the addition of this premise, the argument follows, and the necessity of the original proposition is only a function of the general necessity of the way in which conclusions follow deductively from premises. However, this way of explaining the force of the proposition begs the question, since if it is true, then we would then need to know in what manner the general proposition (the supposedly suppressed premise), “For any x and for any y, if x is west of y, then y is east of x,” is true. It might be taken to be analytic, to be true by virtue of the meaning of the words; however, the troubles with notions of analyticity are well known nowadays, since notions of analyticity presuppose the idea of there being determinate meanings, an idea that is as problematic as ideas get (and certainly not an idea that a Hegelian could accept). Or it could be taken as simply an unconditionally assertible truth, in which case one would have begged the question again. Sellarsians such as Rosenberg take this as partial evidence for its being therefore a marker of a *material* inference rule to the effect: “From x’s being west of y, you may permissibly infer that y is east of x.” The rule is material because its validity depends on the content of the terms (which distinguishes it from a formal inference rule, such as *modus ponens*).
13. Hegel’s emphasis on inference is underlined by his use throughout both the *Phenomenology* and his later Heidelberg and Berlin writings of the language of the logic of syllogistic inference to explain the conceptual transitions he makes. In

doing so, Hegel is, however, relying on the older logic of terms, not on the modern understanding of deductive logic as consisting of those rules of inference that are truth-preserving. In classical logic, the validity of the inference was explained by looking at the terms in the inference (the *Schluss*, the syllogism). For example, take the syllogism: (1) All men are mortal; (2) Socrates is a man; (3) Therefore, Socrates is mortal. “Mortal” is the *major* term. “Socrates” is the *minor* term. “Man” is the *middle* term. The middle term is said to “mediate” between the major and minor term. In his *Science of Logic*, Hegel argues that there are only three types of terms: particular, universal and individual terms. Thus, his claim that everything exhibits the structure of a syllogism amounts to the claim that everything can be described and analyzed in terms of concepts of particularity, universality, or individuality, and the roles these concepts play in various inferential connections. The logic of syllogisms is thus very important for understanding Hegel’s conception of *mediation*, since the concept itself is taken from the language of syllogistic logic. The term for mediation – *Vermittlung* – is derived from the idea of the *Mitte*, the middle term of a syllogism that mediates between the major and minor terms. Mediation is thus clearly for Hegel a *logical* process, not the *metaphysical* process that a long line of Hegel commentators have taken it to be.

14. In the literature on Hegel, this characterization of spirit is, of course, controversial. The more traditional interpretation of spirit sees it as some metaphysical entity, a kind of grand mind of which human beings as particular minds are somehow parts. Charles Taylor’s *Hegel* is probably the most influential version of this traditional interpretation in contemporary literature. Michael Inwood in his *Hegel* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983) offers a similarly metaphysical interpretation of spirit that differs from Taylor’s self-described “expressivist” version. But Hegel himself notes that “[s]pirit . . . is not an essence already finished prior to its appearances, an essence keeping itself back behind the mountains of its appearances but is only something actually true through the determinate forms of its necessary self-revealing – and is not . . . a soul-thing standing in only an external relation to the body but something internally bound up with the body through the unity of the concept.” §378, *Encyclopedia*.
15. On the theme of reassurance in Hegelian thought, see Robert Pippin, “‘You Can’t Get There from Here’: Transition Problems in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit”, in Frederick C. Beiser (ed.) *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). I have drawn on Pippin’s discussion of the way in which, for Hegel, subjects seek to reassure themselves of their independence in their mediated interactions with each other.
16. See ¶80, pp. 51–52; *PG*, pp. 69–70. Hegel notes: “The goal is as necessarily fixed for knowledge as the serial progression; it is the point where knowledge no longer needs to go over and beyond itself, where the concept corresponds to the object and the object to the concept.”
17. See ¶86, p. 55; *PG*, p. 73. Hegel there speaks of dialectic as the “experience (*Erfahrung*) that consciousness exercises on itself,” meaning that it has to do with the historical experience of having accounts undermine themselves, being replaced with better accounts that avoid the pitfalls of the earlier ones, and then falling prey to their own self-undermining skepticism.
18. A later contemporary of Hegel’s at Berlin, the jurist Karl Friedrich von Savigny, for example, argued that legal systems should be understood primarily as to how they express the spirit of a people, and that this spirit changes historically. There

can be no progress in history, only change; each form of a people's spirit is complete in itself. In von Savigny's view, there could thus be no deep, rational criticism of the law except in so far as it expressed or failed to express some given form of the *Volksgeist*. For a good overview of the rise of this form of historicism and the various political movements that sought moral legitimacy in given historical fact, see Georg G. Iggers, *The German Conception of History: The National Tradition of Historical Thought From Herder to the Present* (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1968). Talking about von Savigny in the context of the *Phenomenology*, is anachronistic, since it is not a confrontation with von Savigny that informs the use of history in the *Phenomenology*.

19. Consider Hegel's criticism of the historical school of law: "To consider particular laws as they appear and develop in time is a purely historical task. Like acquaintance with what can be logically deduced from a comparison of these laws with previously existing legal principles, this task is appreciated and rewarded in its own sphere and has no relation whatever to the philosophical study of the subject – unless of course the derivation of particular laws from historical events is confused with their derivation from the concept, and the historical explanation and justification is stretched to become an absolutely valid justification." *Philosophy of Right*, §3, Remark.
20. This is at least dialectic in the way it functions in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. In other works, such as the *Science of Logic*, it functions in an analogous way. In the *Logic*, the subject is how "thought" explains itself, and the movement there progresses in terms of how each new category of the *Logic* serves to let thought explain and justify itself as an inferential system. At each stage, because of contradictions and incoherences, thought is forced to move on until at the end of the logical progression (in the "absolute idea") it is supposedly capable of giving an account of itself and its inferential method that it managed to construct in order to reach that point at which it can reflexively give such an account of itself. But in each case "thought" gives an account of itself as grasping the object of thought exhaustively and then "finds" that its account generates a skepticism against itself. (Thus a Parmenidean account of thought grasping "pure being" generates on its own terms the denial of the claim it originally makes, that "thought" grasps pure being as different from "nothing.") At the end of the dialectical movement in the *Logic*, such dialectical "thought" is supposedly to have demonstrated that it is both self-subsuming (that all the various moves within the system are moments of itself) and self-explanatory (that it explains the structure of the system of thought in terms internal to the logical system, not in terms of its matching up with any kind of metaphysical reality).
21. Hegel mentions an example of such a contingency in his lectures on the philosophy of history when he discusses how in the decisive battle between the ancient Greeks and the Persians, "the interest of the world's history hung in the balance," indicating that he thought that had the Greeks lost, the type of account they initiated would perhaps never have been completed. See *Philosophy of History*, pp. 257–258; *Werke*, 12, pp. 314–315.
22. Part of the notorious style of the *Phenomenology* has something to do with the way in which later "formations of spirit" are supposed to complete the earlier forms. The later formations complete the earlier formations in that they supply what is necessary to answer or avoid the skeptical doubts raised within the earlier formations in their accounts to themselves. While the *Phenomenology* thus traces out a clearly *historical* progression, it is written almost entirely in the present tense,

since its narrative is written from the standpoint of the conclusion of the work – “absolute knowing” – which sees the historical progression more like a line of thought rather than a historical, temporal progression.

23. Thomas Nagel, *The View From Nowhere* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).
24. In commenting on the free-standing nature of such reflective practices, Hegel notes: “In these surroundings, thought is free and withdrawn into itself, free from all material, purely at home with itself. This pure being at home with itself belongs to free thought, to that disembarking into the open where nothing is below us and nothing is above us, and we stand in solitude with ourselves alone.” *Encyclopedia*, §31, Remark.
25. Robert Pippin in his *Modernism as a Philosophical Problem: On the Dissatisfactions of European High Culture* (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1991) fits Hegel into the wider context of the debate about modernity, particularly as that story runs from Kant through Hegel to Nietzsche and Heidegger and concerns the way in which the modern European community tries to understand the role of self-determination. My discussion of Hegel and modernity has been strongly influenced by Pippin’s account of the way in which the philosophical themes of self-determination play into a larger cultural development during this period.
26. In ¶178, pp. 49–50; *PG*, pp. 67–68. Hegel says, “The series of its formations which consciousness journeys through on this path is rather the complete history of the *cultivation and formation* (*Bildung*) of consciousness itself towards science.”
27. This is exposed in G.E. Mueller’s, “The Hegel Legend of ‘Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis,’ *Journal of the History of Ideas* 19 (1958), pp. 411–414. It is also discussed by Allen Wood in his *Hegel’s Ethical Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). pp. 3–4.
28. Much (really too much) has been made of Hegel’s use of the term, *Aufhebung*. There obviously is no natural term in English with which to translate *Aufheben*, and one must therefore make a clear self-conscious choice that will allow readers to make up their own minds as to what is being said without making the text unreadable. For that reason, “sublate,” apparently coined as a translation of the Latin term “tollere” is probably the best of the bad choices. Michael Inwood gives a thorough historical and philological account of the term “*aufheben*” under its usual translation as “sublation,” and discusses the ways in which the obsolete English term “sublate” is also inadequate in his *A Hegel Dictionary* (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell’s Publishers, 1992), pp. 283–285. Inwood suggests “to kick upstairs” as the most adequate rendering but notes that “it is too colloquial to win general approval.” The German term has a three sided meaning: (1) to raise up, (2) to preserve, and (3) to cancel (as in phrases like “Raise your hands up,” “Save a copy of the newspaper for me,” and “Your insurance policy has been canceled.”) It might also be rendered as “set aside,” which carries some of the ambiguity of *aufheben* (as when one sets aside some item to save it for someone else, and when one sets aside something in order to forget it). Hegel’s use of *aufheben* also explains how “immediacy” is for Hegel a relative term. All concepts are mediated in that their determinateness (what they are) is constituted by their inferential connections with other concepts. Once the various moments of a concept (which themselves are other concepts) are sublated (*aufgehoben*) into a coherent inferential structure, that concept can serve as a starting point and therefore be immediate. For an agent, a piece of knowledge can, moreover, be an *immediate* piece of knowledge if it functions as a basic principle or premise that has at some earlier

time been sublated into the agent's understandings. Interestingly, Hegel himself used the term *Integration* instead of *Aufhebung* in his lectures on the philosophy of right in 1819–1820 to make the point about how concepts are brought together: “*Die Sittlichkeit ist die Integration der beiden ersten Standpunkte, des einen durch den andern.*” (“Ethical life is the integration of the two former standpoints, the one through the other.”) Cited from *Hegel: Philosophie des Rechts: Die Vorlesungen von 1819/1820* (Edited by Dieter Henrich) (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1983).

Chapter Two

1. Hegel has a third target in these three introductory sections that is linked to the first two (to the subject/object model of knowledge and the idea that there are things we can know independently of any social practice) – namely, the Cartesian picture of a mind that can stand in a self-relation without in principle standing in any relation to anything else. Hegel tries to show that this Cartesian picture is also not a tenable conception, again because of considerations internal to such a conception itself; Hegel's anti-Cartesian thesis is that our awareness of ourselves and our awareness of the world are essentially bound together, such that it is not possible for us to know the contents of our own minds without knowing something about the world with which those minds are linked.
2. Hegel makes this point in ¶558, pp. 340–341; *PG*, pp. 397–398.
3. ¶90, p. 58, *PG*, p. 79.
4. ¶91, p. 59, *PG*, p. 80: “The individual (*der Einzelne*) knows a pure ‘This,’ or the individual item (*das Einzelne*).”
5. See ¶90, pp. 58–59, *PG*, p. 79–80.
6. ¶91, p. 58, *PG*, p. 79. Later in the *Phenomenology*, Hegel characterizes sense-certainty in the following way: “For the positive truth of sense-certainty is in its own self the *non-mediated* being-for-self of the concept itself as object and that too in the form of otherness – the positive truth that very consciousness is *simply certain* that it is, and that there are other actual things outside of it, and that in its *natural* being it, like these things, is *in and for itself* or *absolute*.” ¶558, p. 341, *PG*, p. 398.
7. See ¶92, p. 59; *PG*, p. 80.
8. Hegel makes this point in his own terms: “When we look carefully at this *pure being* which constitutes the essence of this certainty, and which this certainty pronounces to be its truth, we see that much more is involved. An actual sense-certainty is not merely this pure immediacy, but an *instance* of it. Among the countless differences cropping up here we find that the crucial one is that in sense-certainty, pure being at once splits up into what we have called the two ‘thises’, one ‘this’ as ‘I’ and the other ‘this’ as object.” ¶92, p. 59, *PG*, p. 80.
9. ¶93, p. 59, *PG*, p. 81: “But the object *is*: it is what is true, or it is the essence. It is, regardless of whether it is known or not; and it remains, even if it is not known, whereas there is not knowledge if the object is not there.”
10. See ¶96, p. 60; *PG*, pp. 81–82.
11. In an influential article on the topic, Charles Taylor makes much of Hegel's use of indexicals and interprets these passages as presenting a kind of Wittgenstein-Strawson type of transcendental argument about the use of terms and descriptions. See Charles Taylor, “The Opening Arguments of the *Phenomenology*,” in Alasdair MacIntyre (ed.) *Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays* (Garden City:

Doubleday & Co., 1972). pp. 151–188. This way of taking Hegel's arguments attributes a project to him that he himself clearly rejects. Hegel's argument is not an argument to the effect that "in order to use particular terms, I must be able to use general terms." It is that the claims to knowledge posed by "sense-certainty," "perception," and "the understanding" fail on *their own* terms. Hegel is not concerned to show here how in the taken-for-granted usage of our ordinary terms, certain types of relations of presupposition exist, such that using one set of terms presupposes the abilities to use others. In reading Hegel in this way, Taylor imposes on Hegel's argument a kind of latter day phenomenology that is foreign to Hegel's concerns. Taylor takes Hegel's arguments to turn on considerations about "what is undeniable in our experience," or "what we cannot do without in our experience" (considerations that have more to do with the approaches and concerns of twentieth century phenomenologists such as Merleau-Ponty than they have to do with Hegel's own phenomenology). The Hegelian project requires that his arguments state their own conditions; to rely on conceptions of what is "just there" or what "must be the case for our experience to be possible" would be for Hegel a form of dogmatism. Robert Pippin in his *Hegel's Idealism: the Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) integrates Taylor's points without making Hegel's argument dependent on any such "dogmatic" assumptions. I follow Pippin's general way of taking the opening arguments, although the details of the exposition here and Pippin's exposition differ greatly, in particular with regard to how close Pippin stays to Taylor's reconstruction while rejecting Taylor's overall basis for his exegesis.

12. ¶196, p. 60, *PG*, p. 82.
13. See Willem deVries, "Hegel on Reference and Knowledge," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* (26) pp. 297–307. In my view, deVries there also successfully answers those critics, such as Ivan Soll (in his *Introduction to Hegel's Metaphysics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), who attribute the view to Hegel that we cannot successfully refer by means of language to individuals.
14. In "Hegel on Reference and Knowledge" pp. 302–303, deVries lists four such similarities (although not in this order): "(1) A change in context can produce a change in reference. (2) The definite description, the _____, requires some completion with a predicate. So does this _____. (3) Both definite descriptions and demonstratives can have plural forms; names cannot. (deVries notes that Hegel himself does not pick up on this third point.) (4) Descriptive reference invokes a conceptual scheme allowing one to make certain inferences about the object; so does demonstrative reference, although the inferences licensed by demonstrative reference are meager. deVries introduces the idea of the *cognitive content* of a concept to explicate this feature. The measure of the cognitive content for a concept is its role in a scheme of inferences; a concept with little cognitive content will play a small role in only a few explanatory inferences; a concept with a greater number of conceptual connections to other concepts will play an important role in a number of illuminating explanatory inferences. Thus, concepts but not proper names have cognitive content, for proper names have no senses, and thus cannot be linked up to any other set of inferences. (Proper names can play a role in knowledge only if they are linked up with sentences used to form judgments.) It follows therefore that only predicates have cognitive content. Singular descriptive reference clearly has cognitive content, and, as one sees in the various similarities which demonstratives share with singular descriptive reference, demonstratives also have cognitive content. But the kinds of inferences that are li-

- censed by the use of demonstratives are of only the most minor sort, such as the ability to infer from the use of “now” to the idea that what is being talked about is a time. Demonstratives are thus the *limit case* of items having any cognitive content; they have as little as possible. In his discussion of Hegel’s later post-*Phenomenology* theory of mind, deVries argues that there too Hegel assimilates indexical reference to descriptive reference. See *Hegel’s Theory of Mental Activity*, pp. 90–92.
15. Hegel notes, for example, in his later *Encyclopedia*, §418: “The spatial and temporal individualities, here and now, as I determined the object of consciousness in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* . . . actually belong to intuition” Willem deVries also makes this point in his *Hegel’s Theory of Mental Activity*, p. 112, note 3.
 16. ¶97, p. 60, *PG*, p. 82: “It is as a universal too that we *express* (*sprechen* . . . *aus*) what the sensuous is. What we say is: *this*, i.e., the *universal this*; or it is, i.e., *being in general*. Of course we do not *represent* (*stellen* . . . *vor*) the universal this or being in general, but we *express* the universal. In other words, we do not strictly say what in sense-certainty we *mean*. But language, as we see, is the more truthful; in it we ourselves directly refute what we *mean* (*unsere Meinung*), and since the universal is the truth of sense-certainty and only language expresses this truth, it is just not possible for us ever to say of a sensuous being what we *mean*.”
 17. Johannes Heinrichs in his *Die Logik der (Phänomenologie des Geistes)* (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1974) uses what he takes to be the systemic connections between the *Phenomenology* and the later *Science of Logic* to argue that sense-certainty corresponds to the opening chapter in the *Logic* on “pure being,” which would show that we are dealing here with individual qualities, since that is in fact that with which the opening chapter on “pure being” is concerned. Sense-certainty would be therefore the awareness of pure being. The *Science of Logic* tells us that such a concept is impossible, since it is impossible to differentiate the concept of pure being from that of pure nothing. (Both are indeterminate, and hence no difference between them can be stated.) One should therefore expect the same kind of conceptual impossibility to show up in the consideration of sense-certainty; no *expressible* differences among the individuals can be found. Heinrichs’ point is buttressed by the following statement from the *Phenomenology*: “Again, therefore, the *this* shows itself to be a *mediated simplicity* or a *universality*. *Pure being* remains therefore the essence of this sense-certainty, since sense-certainty has demonstrated in its own self that the truth of its object is the universal. But this pure being is not an immediacy, but something to which negation and mediation are essential.” ¶¶98–99, p. 61, *PG*, p. 82. Heinrichs’ exposition suffers, however, by making the *Phenomenology*’s transitions dependent on those of the *Logic*, thus undermining Hegel’s claim that the *Phenomenology* is an autonomous work.
 18. ¶103, pp. 62–63; *PG*, p. 84: “Thus we reach the stage where we have to posit the *whole* of sense-certainty itself as its *essence*, and no longer only one of its moments . . .”
 19. ¶110, p. 66; *PG*, p. 88.
 20. This shows that there is no non-inferential or immediate knowledge, since it would have to be of pure individuals. However, Hegel continues to talk about immediacy in the rest of the *Phenomenology*. After the opening chapter on “Sense-Certainty,” however, “immediacy” takes on a relative meaning. It denotes from then on what are the starting points of the reasoning of the agents, what they take for granted. Thus, what appears to them as “immediate,” as what need not be

defended, what can be taken for granted, can be seen by us, the readers informed by accompanying commentator, as involving a complex series of embedded inferential connections.

21. The three pure essentialities for the *Phenomenology* are those of unity, difference and relation. See ¶363, p. 219, *PG*, p. 264.
22. ¶111, p. 67; *PG*, p. 89: “Perception takes that which exists (*das Seiende*) for it as a universal.”
23. See ¶112, pp. 67–68; *PG*, p. 90.
24. ¶112, p. 67, *PG*, p. 90: “Since the principle of the object, the universal, is in its simplicity a *mediated* universal, the object must express this as its nature in it. It does this by showing itself to be *the thing with many properties*. The wealth of sensuous knowledge belongs only to perception, not to immediate certainty, for which it played only a subsidiary role (*an der er nur das Beiheerspielende war*); for only perception contains *negation* – that is, difference or manifoldness, within its own essence”.
25. ¶113, p. 68, *PG*, p. 90: “Consequently, the sense-element is still present, but not in the way it was supposed to be in immediate certainty: not as the individual that is meant but as a universal or as that which will be determined as a *property*.”
26. See ¶113, p. 68; *PG*, pp. 90–91.
27. ¶113, p. 68; *PG*, p. 91, in which Hegel says that the thing is an “abstract universal medium . . . thinghood or pure essence.”
28. See ¶113, pp. 68–69; *PG*, p. 91.
29. ¶113, p. 68, *PG*, p. 91.
30. ¶121, p. 74; *PG*, pp. 95–96: “The thing is in this way raised to the level of a genuine ‘also,’ since it becomes merely an enclosing surface.” Charles Taylor in his “The Opening Arguments of the *Phenomenology*,” p. 169, claims that this introduction of the idea of “free matters” is a reference to “a concept connected with one of the false starts of physics of the late-eighteenth century, e.g., the attempt to account for heat by ‘calorific matter.’ ”
31. ¶114, p. 69; *PG*, p. 92.
32. ¶115, p. 69; *PG*, p. 92: “In these moments taken together the thing, as the truth of perception, is completed insofar as it is necessary to develop it here. It is (α) the indifferent, passive universality, the *also* of the many properties or rather *matters*; (β) negation likewise as simple; or the *one*, the *excluding* of opposed properties; and (γ) the many *properties* themselves, the relation of the two first moments – the negation, as it is related to that indifferent element, and in this relation expanding into a set of differences, the point of individuality in the medium of subsistence (*Bestehens*) radiating forth into plurality.”
33. See ¶117, pp. 70–71; *PG*, pp. 93–94.
34. “Things themselves are thus determinate *in and for themselves*; they have properties by which they distinguish themselves from one another.” ¶120, pp. 72–73; *PG*, p. 96.
35. This seems to be the point of his discussion in ¶119, p. 72; *PG*, p. 95: “So in point of fact, the thing is white only in *our eyes*, *also* tart to *our* tongue, *also* cubical to *our* touch, and so on. We get the entire diversity of these aspects not from the thing but from ourselves . . . We are thus the *universal medium* in which such moments separate themselves and are for themselves.”
36. ¶120, pp. 72–73; *PG*, p. 96: “It is, then, in truth the thing itself which is white, and *also* cubical, and *also* tart, and so on; in other words, the *thing* is the ‘also,’ the general medium, in which the many properties subsist externally to one another,

without touching or affecting one another, and without integrating (*aufzuheben*) one another; and, so taken, the thing is taken as the truth (*das Wahre*)."

37. See ¶¶118–119, pp. 71–72; *PG*, pp. 94–95.
38. ¶119, p. 72; *PG*, p. 95: "To begin with, then, I am aware of the thing as a *one* and have to keep it fixed in this true determination. If in the movement of perception something comes forth contradicting that, then it is known to be due to my reflection. Now, in perception various different properties also turn up, which seem to be properties of the thing. But the thing is a one; and we are aware in ourselves that this diversity, by which the thing ceases to be a unity, falls in us."
39. As Hegel puts it, the thing is "reflected into itself; it is for itself, but it is also for others." ¶123, pp. 74–75; *PG*, p. 97.
40. Hegel's term for the non-relational feature of the thing's oneness is the thing's "absolute character." ¶125, pp. 75–76; *PG*, p. 99.
41. ¶123, p. 74; *PG*, p. 97: "The thing is a *one*, reflected into itself; it is *for itself*, but it is also *for an other*; and, further, it is an other for itself *as* it is for an other. The thing is hence for itself and *also* for another, a doubly differentiated being (*gedoppeltes verschiedenes Sein*), but it is also *one*."
42. This is the upshot of the discussion in ¶124, p. 75; *PG*, p. 98, in which the thing's oneness as its "being-for-self" is contrasted with its makeup or constitution (its *Beschaffenheit*).
43. ¶127, p. 76, *PG*, p. 99: "This however is a difference which only lies in the words."
44. ¶127, p. 76; *PG*, p. 99: "With this, the last 'insofar' falls away; on the contrary, the object is in *one* and *the same* respect the *opposite* of itself: it is *for itself*, so far as it is *for another*, and it is *for another*, so far as it is *for itself*."
45. ¶130, p. 77; *PG*, p. 100: "But these two contradictory extremes are not merely *alongside each other* but in a single unity, or in other words, what is common to both, being-for-self, is burdened with opposition in general, i.e., it is at the same time *not* a being-for-self." ¶131, p. 77; *PG*, pp. 100–101: "These empty abstractions of individuality and a universality opposed to it, and of an essence that is linked with something unessential – a non-essential aspect which is necessary all the same – these are powers whose interplay is the perceptual understanding, often called 'sound common sense.'" In his piece, "Hegel on Reference and Knowledge," Willem deVries makes an illuminating comparison between Hegel's views of perceptual knowledge and Bertrand Russell's defense of the idea that we must be directly acquainted with things like universals in order for perceptual knowledge to be possible. See pp. 304–305.
46. In an influential article – "Predication and Hegel's Metaphysics," reprinted in Michael Inwood (ed.) *Hegel* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985). pp. 67–84 – Richard Aquila holds that Hegel's metaphysics, including his views on the relation of universals and particulars, presupposes his theory of predication, which, of course, is developed and worked out in the *Science of Logic*. If that is true, then by extrapolation, the arguments in the *Phenomenology* should presuppose the arguments about predication in the *Logic*. But if Hegel's project is to work on the terms that Hegel sets for it, then the arguments in the *Phenomenology* should not presuppose any arguments about predication at all; at best they should rather help to develop them. In my reconstruction of Hegel's arguments, I have tried to show how the argument in, for example, "Perception," does not depend on any theory of predication but simply on what it would take for those who claim that we have immediate perceptual knowledge to make good on that claim – that

- is, without presupposing anything except what the proponents of such a claim would themselves have to presuppose. Part of the point of my own exposition is to give an alternative to Aquila's views.
47. "Consciousness has not yet grasped the concept of the unconditioned as *concept* . . . consciousness is not yet *for itself* the concept, and consequently does not know (*erkennt*) itself in that reflected object." ¶132, p. 79, *PG*, p. 103.
 48. ¶132, p. 79; *PG*, p. 103: "In the dialectic of sense-certainty, seeing and hearing, etc. have been lost to consciousness; and, as perception, consciousness has arrived at thoughts, which it brings together for the first time in the unconditioned universal." See also ¶134; *PG*, pp. 103–104.
 49. See ¶¶134–135, pp. 80–81; *PG*, pp. 103–104.
 50. ¶136, p. 83; *PG*, p. 106: "The movement which previously displayed itself as the self-destruction of contradictory concepts thus here has *objective* form and is the movement of force, the outcome of which is the unconditioned universal as something *non-objective*, or as the *internality* (*Innres*) of things." In his *Encyclopedia* (§418, *Anmerkung*), Hegel says in reference to the corresponding section: "there the object is lowered or raised to being the *appearance* (*Erscheinung*) of an internality existing for itself (*für sich seienden Inneren*)."
 51. See ¶137, p. 83; *PG*, pp. 106–107.
 52. ¶136, p. 81, *PG*, p. 105: "In other words, the matters posited as independent immediately pass over into their unity, and their unity immediately passes over into its development, and this development again passes back over into its reduction. But this movement is what is called *force*. One of its moments, the dispersal of the independent matters in their being, is the *expression* of force; but force, taken as that in which they have disappeared, is *authentic* force, force which has been driven back into itself from its expression."
 53. ¶136, p. 82, *PG*, p. 105: "Force is the unconditioned universal which is equally in itself what it is *for an other*; or which contains the difference in it itself (*an ihm selbst*) – for difference is nothing else than being-*for-an-other*."
 54. *Encyclopedia*, §136, *Remark*.
 55. Part of Hegel's argument both in the *Phenomenology* and in the *Encyclopedia* is that the distinction of knowable expression and unknowable metaphysical force is untenable. In the *Encyclopedia*, for example, he notes: "One is accustomed to saying that the *nature of force* itself is *unknown* and only its expression is known. On the one hand, the whole *determination of content of force* is the same as that of the expression; the explanation of an appearance by a force is thus an empty tautology. What is supposed to remain unknown is therefore in fact nothing else than the empty form of reflection-in-self, by which alone the force is differentiated from the expression." (§135, my translation).
 56. Apparently because of his longstanding and idiosyncratic desire to argue that Newton had only restated Kepler's laws in mathematical form – and thus to vindicate the originality of his fellow Swabian, Kepler, against the Englishman, Newton – Hegel consistently misunderstood Newton's explanation of motion. Hegel thought Newton explained planetary motion as the result of the combination of two forces, centripetal and centrifugal forces, one pulling the planet away from its orbit (away from the star), the other pulling it into its orbit (toward the star). But Newton did not believe that, holding as he did there is only one force, centripetal, which, combined with the principle of inertia, accounts for the orbits. (One need not postulate a force to explain why something continues in a uniform rectilinear motion; one need only explain why it does not. One need only explain,

that is, why the planet continues in its orbit, not why it would otherwise go off in a uniform rectilinear path.) Hegel apparently held on to a more or less Aristotelian conception of matter and motion, according to which weight is an essential property of matter, and a moving body requires some force to cause it to move, its natural state being that of rest. These misconceptions reappeared in Hegel's later "Philosophy of Nature," part of his mature *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*. Hegel's mistakes in this regard as well as the intellectual influences of his time (including Newton's own ambiguous formulations of the idea of "force") that would have led Hegel to such a view are treated in William R. Shea, "Hegel's Celestial Mechanics" (pp. 30–44), and Franz H. van Lunteren, "Hegel and Gravitation" (pp. 45–53) in Rolf-Peter Horstmann and Michael J. Petry (editors) *Hegels Philosophie der Natur: Beziehungen zwischen empirischer und spekulativer Naturerkenntnis* (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett Verlag, 1986). For the ways in which Hegel attempted to conciliate the older view and what he understood of modern mechanics (which he valued quite highly), see Michael J. Petry's detailed commentary accompanying his translation of Hegel's philosophy of nature in: M.J. Petry, *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1970) Vol. I.

57. Johann Herder posited a very generalized metaphysical conception of force as the explanation of the determinateness of appearance. Hegel parenthetically discusses Herder's idea of force in his discussion of Jacobi in an early piece, *Faith and Knowledge* (*Glauben und Wissen*, in *Werke*, vol. 2, pp. 357–359). In Hegel's understanding, Herder posited a unitary primordial force (*Urkraft*) in place of Spinoza's substance. Hegel notes, "The concept of power, like the concepts of matter and thought, says Herder, develop into (i.e., are entangled in) a concept of a primordial force, all three, according to the Spinozistic system, collapsing into each other – the eternal primordial force, the force of all forces is only *one*." (p. 358) Hegel also remarks on this in his *Encyclopedia* version of the *Logic* when he discusses force. There he notes that Herder errs in understanding God as a force whose expressions can be known but who cannot be known himself. (§136) That Herder is at least one of the main objects of Hegel's criticism in the *Phenomenology* may be seen by comparing what Hegel says about those who hold such a view of force with what Herder says, for example, in his *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit*, in Herder, *Werke* (Frankfurt a.M.: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1989), vol. 6, pp. 167–168: "Either we must view these things as nature's playing (and the nature belonging to the kingdom of understanding never senselessly plays), or we will be driven to accept a *kingdom of invisible forces*, which stand in the very same precise context and dense transitions as we perceive in external structures. The more we come to know nature, the more we note these *indwelling forces* even in the lowest creations, moss, fungi, etc."
58. The argument about force soliciting itself and also not being an "entity" occurs in ¶137, p. 83, *PG*, p. 106–107 in a very dense paragraph, part of which goes like this: "Force as it has been determined, since it is represented as such or as reflected into itself is one side of its concept, but it is posited as a substantialized extreme and indeed is posited as falling under the determinateness of being a 'one' (*unter der Bestimmtheit des Eins*). Consequently, the *subsistence* of the developed matters is thus excluded from force and is something other than force. Since it is necessary that force *itself* be this subsistence, or that it *express* itself, its expression presents itself in this manner, that the other approaches it and solicits it. But, as a matter of fact, since its expression is *necessary*, what is posited as

another essence is in force itself. It must be taken back that force is posited as a one (*Eins*), and that its essence is to express itself as an other which approaches it externally. Force is rather itself this universal medium in which the moments subsist as matters; or, in other words, force *has expressed itself*, and what was supposed to be something else soliciting it really is force itself . . . The ‘being-one’ (*Einssein*) disappears, as it appeared, namely as an *other*; it is *force itself*, it is the force driven back into itself.” (Incidentally, this passage displays one of the ways in which Miller’s translation of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* can occasionally be misleading, since in it he translates “*vorgestellt*” as “conceived,” thus obliterating for the English language reader Hegel’s careful distinction between representational understanding and conceptual understanding.)

59. This idea of passive and active forces apparently comes from Leibniz. The idea had to do with reconciling the presumed “inertness” of matter with the idea of inertia. Leibniz saw the division as necessary because of his belief that bodies are not indifferent to motion but resist it in proportion to their size (since it obviously takes more force to move a large body than a small one.) See William R. Shea, “Hegel’s Celestial Mechanics.” p. 38.
60. Hegel develops this so-called formal argument in one paragraph, although, as it turns out, several paragraphs later he retracts it; the point of making such an argument, only to retract it within a few pages, is to illustrate how this kind of move to a supersensible determining ground for appearance logically develops to look for more basic and “deeper” grounds for the determinateness of appearance. Hegel makes the argument in ¶140–141; he retracts it in ¶148, pp. 89–90; *PG*, pp. 113–114.
61. This argument occurs in ¶140–141, p. 85; *PG*, pp. 108–110. I call it a “formal argument” because Hegel notes in ¶140 that the differences between the forces are differences of form and differences of content. The differences of content are those of being “force reflected into itself” (that is, being a “one”) and force as the “medium of the matters.” The difference of form is that between active and passive, soliciting and solicited. The formal difference, he notes, makes the forces independent of each other.
62. See ¶141, pp. 85–86; *PG*, pp. 109–110. Hegel there even whimsically notes that this conception of force is “the loss of reality (*Realität*); it has therein become something wholly other, namely this universality, which the understanding first or immediately recognizes as its essence and which proves to be its essence in its striving to be a reality (*an ihrer seinsollenden Realität*), in its actual substances.” As always, Hegel means by “essence” here “that which is authoritative for the understanding’s claims to knowledge.”
63. ¶143, p. 86; *PG*, p. 110.
64. Hegel uses the phrase, “curtain of appearance,” in ¶165, p. 102–103; *PG*, pp. 128–129.
65. See the first half of ¶143, pp. 86–87; *PG*, p. 110.
66. ¶144, p. 87; *PG*, p. 111: “. . . there now opens up above the *sensuous* world, which is the world of *appearance*, a *supersensible* world, which henceforth is the true world . . .”
67. See ¶147, p. 89; *PG*, p. 113.
68. ¶148, p. 90; *PG*, p. 114. Hegel also calls it the “simple difference,” because as a unity, it is different from *all* the multiplicity of appearance – that is, it is the “simple difference” because it expresses the difference between the “universal” (the unity) and the “particular” (the multiplicity of appearance).

69. ¶149, p. 91; *PG*, p. 115.
70. One obvious source for this for Hegel would have been Schelling's *System des transzendentalen Idealismus* published in 1800. In the section of that book entitled "Deduction of Matter," Schelling claims to deduce out of purely transcendental grounds the basic kinds of opposed forces necessary to "construct" matter. See Schelling, *Werke*, ed. by Manfred Schröter (Munich: E.B. Beck Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1927, vol. 2), pp. 440–450.
71. See ¶150, p. 91; *PG*, pp. 115–116.
72. "But this plurality is itself rather a defect; for it contradicts the principle of the understanding for which, as consciousness of the simple inner world, the true is the implicitly universal *unity*. It must therefore let the many laws collapse into *one* law, just as, e.g., the law by which a stone falls, and the law by which the heavenly bodies move, have been grasped as one law." ¶150, p. 91; *PG*, p. 115. Hegel's references are to the laws of attraction and to their relation to gravitation. (However, the reference here is perhaps also to Kant's construction of the concept of matter out of the laws of attraction and repulsion, a construction that Hegel criticizes in his *Science of Logic* and his "philosophy of nature.") See M.J. Petry's helpful notes to Hegel's discussion of Newton's laws in his translation and commentary on Hegel's philosophy of nature in M.J. Petry, *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1970).
73. See the closing sentence of ¶151, p.92; *PG*, p. 116: "The pure concept of law as universal attraction must, to get its true meaning, be grasped in such a way that in it, as the absolutely simple, the differences which are present in law as such themselves return again *into the internality (in das Innere) as a simple unity*. This unity is the inner *necessity* of the law." Once again, Hegel seems to be showing how the invocation of these metaphysical laws in the "philosophy of nature" of his day spuriously modeled itself on the way in which, for example, scientific mechanics had unified certain laws.
74. See M.J. Petry, *The Berlin Phenomenology*, (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1981). pp. 145–146 for examples of this.
75. See ¶153, pp. 93–94; *PG*, p. 118.
76. See ¶154, pp. 94–95; *PG*, p. 118–119, particularly the sentences: "The understanding *has* however the concept of *this difference-in-itself*, precisely in that the law on the one hand is the inner, the *existing-in-itself (Ansichseiende)*, but *in it (an ihm)* is at the same time that which is differentiated. That this difference is consequently *inner* difference is present in that the law is *simple* force or, as the concept of it, is thus a difference belonging to the concept (*Unterschied des Begriffes*). But this inner difference at first only falls in the understanding, and it is not yet posited as being in the thing (*Sache*) itself. It is thus its *own* necessity that the understanding expresses."
77. See the last half of ¶154 and the first half of ¶155, pp. 94–95; *PG*, pp. 119–120. Hegel there also notes that this is the same kind of spurious argumentation that first claimed that conceptual grounds require that there be at least two forces, only to find later that it needed to retract that argument, again on so-called conceptual grounds.
78. ¶156, pp. 95–96, *PG*, p. 120: "The understanding thus *learns* that it is a *law of appearance* itself, that differences arise which are no differences, or that which is the same(*das Gleichnamige*) repels itself from itself; and similarly, the differences are only such as are in truth no differences, which integrate (*aufheben*) themselves; in other words, that which is not the same (*das Ungleichnamige*) attracts

itself.” (Translating the term “*Gleichnamige*” is difficult; one of its meanings, however, is the mathematical sense of being the common denominator.) (Hegel is apparently referring in this passage to the law of electromagnetism, according to which similar poles will repel each other, and different poles will attract each other. This interpretation of the passage is given by Heinrichs, *Die Logik der (Phänomenologie des Geistes)*, p. 158.)

79. Compare this with one of Schelling’s basic theses: “Since these forces are forces of one and the same identical subject, nature, they must thus not be able to be merely relatively opposed to each other, they must be absolutely opposed.” §6 of his *Allgemeine Deduktion des dynamischen Prozesses oder der Kategorien der Physik*, published in 1800, cited in Schelling, *Werke*, vol. 2, p. 639. (my translation.) (The work cited was conceived by Schelling as an extension of the arguments of his *System des transzendentalen Idealismus*.)
80. ¶157, p. 96; *PG*, p. 121.
81. See Roger Chartier, “The World Turned Upside Down,” in *Cultural History*, transl. Lydia G. Cochrane (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988). pp. 116–126. The themes pursued in the images of the inverted world were not merely for entertainment value but had a moral point to them. Chartier, for example, discusses how themes concerning sex-roles appear (the wife goes hunting, the husband stays home to care for the children), and he speculates that the point of these images were to reinforce the prevailing social roles by giving the impression that women doing men’s tasks would be parallel to the hare hunting the hunter – that is, would be fully absurd. Donald Philip Verene in his *Hegel’s Recollections: A Study of Images in the Phenomenology of Spirit* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985) hypothesizes that Hegel takes the name from an obscure and unperformed play by Ludwig Tieck in 1797. (See pp. 50–53.) There is, however, no need to think that he got it from this play, since the term was already in wide use as the name for the type of engravings and as a popular term for things felt to be “crazy.”
82. Hegel was very taken with Kant’s antinomies and how he thought they displayed the limits of philosophy based on the “understanding.” Sally Sedgwick offers a detailed explanation and defense of Hegel’s understanding of the Kantian antinomies in her “Hegel on Kant’s Antinomies and Distinction Between General and Transcendental Logic,” in *The Monist*, 74, no. 3, 1991. pp. 403–420.
83. See ¶164, p. 102; *PG*, p. 127: “. . . but once again the understanding falls short of infinity as such, since it again apports to two worlds or to two substantial elements that which is a difference in itself – the self-repulsion of that which is the same (*des Gleichnamigen*) and the self-attraction of the unlike. To the understanding, the *movement*, as it is found in experience, is here a happening, and that which is the same and that which is unlike are *predicates*, whose essence is an existing substrate. What for the understanding is an object in a sensuous covering is for us in its essential formation as the pure concept.”
84. See ¶160, pp. 98–99; *PG*, p. 124. Hegel announces in the first sentence of this paragraph his conclusion: “From the representation thus of inversion, which constitutes the essence of one aspect of the supersensible world, we must eliminate the sensuous representation of fixing the differences in a different element of subsistence (*Elemente des Bestehens*); and this absolute concept of the difference must be presented and grasped as purely as inner difference, a repulsion from itself of that which is the same (*Gleichnamigen*) as that which is the same, and the equality (*Gleichsein*) of the unlike as unlike.” In other words, the oppositions

- which were taken to be features of things in themselves (for example, of “that which is the same” as dividing itself into two contrasting forces) are really features of “the understanding,” of the way in which it describes and contrasts things.
85. “Infinite” in Hegel’s sense (as he explains it, for example, in his *Science of Logic*) always refers to some self-enclosed “circle” of determinations such that an item’s conditions are all present. The opposite of “infinite” is “finite” – that is, having the determinateness of an entity come from outside this circle, as having its conditions outside of itself. For example, a finite syllogism would be one whose soundness depends on other syllogisms. “Infinite” also stands in Hegel’s parlance negatively for absence of determination by a metaphysical other and positively for the idea of self-determination. To be infinite in Hegel’s sense is thus not to be “boundless” but to be *self-limiting*. His major thesis is, of course, that only conceptual structures can be infinite in this sense. Only in a self-enclosed system of inferences is true “infinity” in this sense achieved. This point about Hegel’s sense of “infinity” is also made by Willem deVries, *Hegel’s Theory of Mental Activity*, pp. 193–194, although deVries ties this into a more metaphysical interpretation of Hegel’s thought than that given here.
86. Bound up with the view that our dealings with the world are mediated through these representations is the idea that the world is composed of substances and their accidents. This comes from reflecting on language as a representational *medium*. When that is done, the subject-predicate form of the proposition is then taken to be a representation – a *Vorstellung* – of a substance and an accident. For these reasons, Hegel thinks that ordinary reflection on language as a way of doing philosophy leads directly to the old metaphysics that he is trying to overcome. Hegel often expresses this idea somewhat misleadingly by saying that the proposition is inadequate for the expression of speculative thought, thus suggesting to some that he must be relying on some kind of dubious non-linguistic “intuition” to express some esoteric truth. However, by this he means that reflecting on the proposition as a *Vorstellung* of reality – something to which “the understanding” is prone – necessarily leads one to a substance/accident metaphysics. Both doctrines – the metaphysics of substance and accident and the idea that the subject/predicate proposition is a representation of reality – are riddled with incoherences and contradictions, which are developed both in the first three chapters of the *Phenomenology* and later in the section on essence in the *Science of Logic*. For example, if one reflects on what such a substance is, one is quickly led to the empty idea of an “I know not what”; if one reflects on how a subject term works, one is led to idea of terms that merely point to indeterminate individuals. Hegel’s point is to move us away entirely from thinking about language as a *Vorstellung* and rather to understand it in terms of its embodying *concepts* – that is, to understand ourselves as social concept-users – as participants in social practice – rather than as individual “representers.” By doing this, Hegel moves us away from understanding ourselves in terms of the dualisms of “Consciousness” (such as the dualism of “subject” and “object”) and instead to understanding ourselves in terms of *spirit* – that is, in terms of the essential self-understandings involved in social space. In *Wahrheit aus dem Begriff: eine Einführung in Hegel* (Frankfurt a.M.: Anton Hain, 1990), Rolf-Peter Horstmann makes a similar point about Hegel’s critique of the subject-predicate proposition having to do with his critique of representational thought (*Vorstellung*). But, so it would seem, Horstmann does not draw the conclusion that therefore we ought to give up a representationalist

model. (In making this point, I am playing on the distinction between the German word “*Vorstellung*” and the English word “representation.”) Horstmann takes Hegel’s project to be that of determining what “in truth” things are. The problem is that if one believes that the form of the judgment leads to a contradictory metaphysics, then one cannot rely on the judgmental form to produce a better metaphysics; but if one nonetheless has to express one’s ontological conclusions in propositional form, then one has a certain dilemma: “If one does not wish to simply leave the dilemma at that and thereby abandon philosophy’s claim to knowledge of what exists in truth, then with Hegel one has a possibility to solve that problem: one renounces the assumption of the ontological implications of the judgmental form (*des Urteils*), then clarifies the question of what objects “in truth” are and what “in truth” there is, and then develops a thesis about the connection between ontology and judgments.” (p. 40) Following this idea out, Horstmann argues that Hegel resolves this by developing a system in which “[t]hat which an object in truth is, is the concept of the object, not its representation (*Vorstellung*)” and “[c]oncepts must be thought of as unities of incompatible determinations, that is, as organismic (*Organismusartig*) and, to be sure, conforming to a model which asserts that the essential characteristic of organismic entities is what Hegel calls ‘subjectivity.’” (p. 75) This ingenious reading of Hegel (whose carefully worked out steps I am obviously leaving out), however, assumes that what Hegel is intending is a better *representation* of reality than a mere “representation” (*Vorstellung*) of it could produce. But, so I have argued here, Hegel is trying, especially in the first three chapters of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, to undermine *all* representationalist models. Language, judgements, and so on are all social means by which that peculiar organism, the human subject, deals with the world and with other subjects. Agents do not represent the world in any metaphysical sense of “representation”; rather, they deal with the world in terms of a complex self-understanding of where they fit into that world, both physically and socially. It is to the dialectic of those self-understandings (of spirit) that Hegel wishes to direct our philosophical reflections.

87. In his lectures on the history of philosophy, Hegel notes that the modern set of philosophical problems is dominated by a set of oppositions that philosophical theories seek to overcome or to reconcile. He mentions four such oppositions that play a central role in philosophical debate, which, he notes, do not play such a central role in ancient philosophy. They are (1) the existence of God and the concept of God; (2) the origin of evil, given God’s supposed omniscience and omnipotence; (3) freedom and necessity (which itself is divided into problems of freedom versus God’s omniscience, freedom versus natural necessity, and efficient versus formal causation); (4) the relation between mind and body. Hegel explains the domination of this kind of oppositional thought in modern philosophy as due to the influence of the Christian religion on the worldview of the moderns. It is with Christianity that these oppositions are either engendered or sharpened so that they become *the* philosophical problems of the culture. Likewise, the Christian promise of reconciliation (*Versöhnung*) is the basis for the philosophical community’s belief that some kind of resolution of these problems is the major task of philosophical thought in the modern period. Also for this reason, modern philosophical theories tend to divide along the lines of realism or idealism. See *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, Werke*, vol. 20, pp. 66–69.

Chapter Three

1. See ¶166, p. 104; *PG*, p. 133.
2. See ¶167, pp. 104–105; *PG*, p. 134: “The *being* appropriate to just attending to things (*Sein der Meinung*), the *individuality* and the *universality* set in opposition to it of perception, as well as the *empty internality* of the understanding no longer exist as essences but rather as moments of self-consciousness, i.e., as abstractions or differences which at the same time *for* consciousness itself are nothing or are no differences and are pure disappearing essences.”
3. See ¶167, p. 105; *PG*, p. 134: “It seems thus that the principal moment itself is lost, namely, the *simple independent subsistence* for consciousness. However, in fact, self-consciousness is the reflection out of the being of the sensuous and perceived world and essentially the return out of *being-other* (*Anderssein*).”
4. For a similar understanding of Hegel’s conception of self-consciousness, see Will-em deVries, *Hegel’s Theory of Mental Activity*, chapter 6, pp. 87–107.
5. Hegel’s description of organic life in ¶169, pp. 106–107; *PG*, p. 135–136 is short and extremely metaphorical, but I take this to be the gist of it. Even he notes the brevity of his characterization, and, perhaps surprisingly for the reader, thinks that it is quite enough. He remarks that at the beginning of that paragraph, “The determination of life as it has issued from the concept or the general result with which we enter this sphere is sufficient to characterize it without having further to develop its nature.”
6. See ¶171, p. 107; *PG*, pp. 137–138. In ¶173 and the first sentence of ¶174, p. 109; *PG*, pp. 138–139, Hegel also draws an analogy to the way in which life develops itself into genera and individuals and the way in which we develop a conception of the “I” in dealing with the world: the “I” is the “genus” of the various seemingly independent moments of consciousness.
7. I take this to be the argument of the first half of ¶168, p. 106; *PG*, p. 135.
8. See ¶174, p. 109; *PG*, p. 139.
9. This seems to be the argument of the first half of ¶175, p. 109; *PG*, p. 139.
10. It should be noted that the sense of “recognition” in the German term (*Anerkennung*) is not that of the psychological sense of recognition, such as that involved in recognizing an old friend walking down the street; it is the sense of recognition in the way that one state recognizes another, or the way in which we recognize somebody for his lofty achievements.
11. Hegel’s argument for this is extremely condensed, occurring basically in half of a paragraph; my account here is a reconstruction of the following: “On account of the independence of the object, therefore, it can achieve satisfaction only when the object itself performs the negation on it (*indem dieser selbst die Negation an ihm vollzieht*”); and it must perform the negation of itself in itself, for it is *in itself* the negative and must be *for* the other what it is. Since the object is in own itself (*an sich selbst*) negation, and therein is at the same time independent, it is consciousness. In the sphere of life, which is the object of desire, *negation* is present either *in an other*, namely, in desire or as a *determinateness* opposed to another indifferent form or as the inorganic universal nature of life. But this universal independent nature in which negation is present as absolute negation is the genus as such or the genus as *self-consciousness*.” ¶175, pp. 109–110, *PG*, p. 139.
12. See ¶176, p. 110, *PG*, pp. 139–140. This is a reconstruction of Hegel’s short three-point summary there of his argument for why self-consciousness can only be satisfied in another self-consciousness.

13. “Self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness.” ¶175, p. 110; *PG*, p. 139. (Hegel himself underscores the whole sentence.)
14. “A self-consciousness is *for a self-consciousness*. Only so is it in fact a self-consciousness; for only in this way does the unity of itself in its otherness (*Anderssein*) come to be for it . . . A self-consciousness, in being an object, is just as much an I as an object. With this, we already have before us the concept of *spirit*. What still lies ahead for consciousness is the experience of what spirit is – this absolute substance, which, in the complete freedom and independence of its opposites – namely different self-consciousnesses existing for themselves – is their unity: the *I* that is *We*, and the *We* that is *I*.” ¶177, p. 110, *PG*, p. 140. See also ¶178, p. 111; *PG*, p. 141: “Self-consciousness is *in and for itself* when and because it is in and for itself for an other; i.e., it is only as something recognized.”
15. See ¶178, p. 111; *PG*, p. 140. Hegel gives his most succinct definition of being-for-self (*Fürsichsein*) as the following: “If we determine being-for-self as *simple self-maintaining relation to itself* (*einfache sich erhaltende Beziehung auf sich selbst*), then its being-other (*Anderssein*) is simple *negativity*.” ¶291, p. 175; *PG*, p. 216.
16. See ¶179, p. 111; *PG*, p. 141.
17. See ¶180, p. 111; *PG*, p. 141.
18. These complexities are developed in ¶¶182–185, pp. 11–113; *PG*, p. 142–143.
19. In his lectures on the corresponding section of his *Encyclopedia* – published as *The Berlin Phenomenology* (translated and edited by M. J. Petry) (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1981) – Hegel comments explicitly on the way this account abstracts from all social relations: “At this present standpoint we have to completely forget the relationships (*Verhältnisse*) we are used to thinking about. If we speak of right, ethicality, love, we know that in that we recognize the others, I recognize their complete personal independence. We know too that I do not suffer on this account, but have validity as a free being, that in that the others have rights I have them too, or that my right is also essentially that of the other i.e. that I am a free person, and that this is essentially the same as the others also being persons with rights. Benevolence or love does not involve the submergence of my personality. Here, however, there is as yet no such relationship, for one aspect of the determination is that of my still being, as a free self-consciousness, an immediate and single one. In so far as the immediate singularity of my self-consciousness and my freedom are not yet separated, I am unable to surrender anything of my particularity without surrendering my free independence.” §431, p. 77.
20. See ¶186, p. 113; *PG*, p. 143, which begins with the statement: “Self-consciousness is at first simple being-for-self, identical with itself (*sichselbstgleich*) through the exclusion out of itself of everything *other*.”
21. See the last half of ¶186, p. 113; *PG*, pp. 143–144.
22. ¶186, p. 113; *PG*, p. 144.
23. This is how I understand what Hegel means when he says, ¶186, p. 113; *PG*, p. 143: “Each is indeed certain of its own self but not of the other, and therefore its own certainty of self still has no truth. For it would have truth only if its own being-for-self had confronted it as an independent object, or, what is the same thing, if the object had presented itself as this pure self-certainty.”
24. ¶187, p. 114; *PG*, p. 144: “. . . rather that in it is nothing present that would not be for it a disappearing moment, that it is a pure *being-for-self*.”
25. ¶187, p. 114; *PG*, p. 144: “And it is only through staking one’s life that freedom is won; only thus is it proved that for self-consciousness, its essence is not *being*, not

- the *immediate* manner in which it makes its appearance, not its submergence in the expanse of life . . .”
26. See ¶188, p. 114; *PG*, p. 145. There Hegel claims that in the death of one of the participants, “. . . they are cancelled out (*aufgehoben*) as *extremes* wanting to be for-themselves. But with this there vanishes from their interplay the essential moment of splitting into extremes with opposed determinatenesses; and the middle term collapses into a lifeless unity which is split into dead, merely existing (*seiende*) non-opposed extremes.” In this passage, Hegel is again, as he does throughout his system, relying on the model of the syllogism to explicate the argument he is making. The two self-conscious agents with their own subjective points of view are two “extremes,” like the major and the minor terms of a syllogism, and they could be mediated only by a third term (which, in the case, would be the “universal,” the objective point of view). But if they destroy the possibility of this “third term,” then they also destroy the possibility of any mediation between them. Therefore, the death of one of the participants cannot function as a resolution of the problem.
 27. See ¶189, p. 115; *PG*, p. 145. Hegel notes there that “. . . since they are at first unequal and opposed and their reflection into the unity has not yet been achieved . . .” I take the “reflection into the unity” as Hegel’s reference to the “universal,” that is, the impersonal point of view.
 28. I take this to be the point of Hegel’s talking about the slave’s working over and preparing things for the master in the last third of ¶190, p. 116; *PG*, pp. 146–147.
 29. This is Hegel’s argument in ¶191, p. 116; *PG*, p. 147, which he concludes by noting that the recognition achieved between master and slave is “one-sided and unequal.”
 30. See ¶192, pp. 116–117; *PG*, p. 147.
 31. Hegel says that the slave’s consciousness “at first appears as *external* to itself and not as the truth of self-consciousness.” This notion of its being “external” to itself is the Hegelian way of saying that the slave’s subjectivity – his subjective point of view – appears to be dependent on something outside itself (the master’s subjective point of view) for its criteria of what counts as a good reason for belief and action. ¶193, p. 117; *PG*, p. 147.
 32. In confronting his anxiety about his existence and the fear of death, the slave’s consciousness “. . . is therein inwardly (*innerlich*) broken up, it has throughout trembled within itself, and everything fixed has been shaken loose.” ¶194, p. 117; *PG*, p. 148.
 33. This is the point of the dense section in ¶195, pp. 117–118; *PG*, pp. 148–149. Hegel says that the master’s satisfactions are “vanishing” because they lack the element of “subsistence.” The slave’s work, on the other hand, is “detained vanishing.” Through the mediating activity of work, the slave acquires a being-for-self that is “external to him” in that work (that is, he sees that the natural things of the world count only to the extent that he forms them so that they count).
 34. In his lectures on this transition in the corresponding sections of the later *Encyclopedia*, Hegel finesses this a bit. In order to preserve his dominant social role in light of the slave’s growing independence, the master has to learn to give reasonable orders to the slave, thus implicitly recognizing the slave as an independent rational agent: “Whoever wants to command must do so reasonably, for only he who commands reasonably will be obeyed. . . . Command involves understanding how to avoid what is preposterous and absurd, and knowing what is universal

involves the renunciation of the singularity of self-consciousness.” *Berlin Phenomenology*, §435.

35. See ¶194, p. 117; *PG*, p. 148.
36. See ¶197, pp. 119–121; *PG*, pp. 151–152. Hegel claims in that section that such thinking is not a matter of *representing* things (not a matter of *Vorstellungen*) but is rather a matter of *concepts* (*Begriffe*). I take this difference to be that between merely asserting statements as representations of the world (“The figs are ripe”) and reflecting on what the ultimate standards are for whether something is to count as knowledge. The truth of *representations* is not something that the subject can determine; once he has decided on what is to count as a standard for deciding what is knowledge, he is not then free to say that he knows this and not that. But he is “free” in the way he can accept or reject what the standards are, and this is a matter of “concepts.”
37. See ¶199, p. 121; *PG*, p. 153: “As a universal form of the world-spirit, stoicism could only appear on the scene in the time of universal fear and slavery (*Knechtschaft*), but also at a time of universal cultivation, a cultivating which had raised itself all the way up to thought.”
38. In his lectures on the history of philosophy, Hegel is quite emphatic in stressing that for him the principle of stoicism is “[t]he *principle of thought*, that of *universality* itself, understood however as being determined within itself (*in sich*); thought is the criterion of truth, that which is determining.” *Werke*, vol. 19, p. 253. He notes the empirical and naturalistic orientation of many stoic philosophers, claiming that this is consistent with his own view of them: “This is the general idea (*allgemeine Vorstellung*) of the stoics. The stoics stick with the universal. It is a universal end: each individual is grasped in one $\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\zeta$, this is again grasped in a universal $\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\zeta$, which is itself the $\kappa\omicron\sigma\mu\omicron\zeta$.” (p. 266) Thus, “[T]he stoics held thereby the study of nature to be essential and *useful*, that we know (*erkennen*) the universal laws of nature, the universal reason, in order to know (*erkennen*) from them our duties, the law for people and to live in accordance with the $\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\zeta$, the laws of nature, to make ourselves correspond to those universal laws.” (p. 263) But Hegel attributes this part of stoicism (what he calls its physics) to other aspects of stoicism, particularly its logic and ethics. The highest good of stoic ethics was to live in accordance with nature, which for them is equivalent to living in accordance with reason. This is given a purely formal interpretation: “Thought should determine what is in accordance with nature; being in accordance with nature, however, is only that which is determined through the $\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\zeta$. This is wholly formal. For what is being in accordance with nature? The $\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\zeta$ – what is the $\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\zeta$? That which is in accordance with nature.” (p. 278). Thus, he plays up stoic *logic*, which he thinks shows what stoicism is really about, namely, the development of the formal determinations of thought. In fact, it was the skeptics who saw that from the stoic formal logic, nothing determinate followed. (See p. 276.)
39. See ¶200, p. 122; *PG*, p. 154: “To the question, *What is good and true*, it again gave for an answer the *contentless* thought: the true and the good shall consist in rationality. But this self-identity (*Sichselbstgleichheit*) of thought is only again the pure form in which nothing is determined.” Hegel uses the term *Sichselbstgleichheit* (self-identity) and its cognates almost always to mean, “lack of an apparent contradiction.” He notes, for example, in his lectures on the history of philosophy (when he is discussing the stoics): “Their criterion is however formal,

it is the principle of non-contradiction. In the absolute essence there is thus also no contradiction; it is identical with itself (*sich selbst gleich*) but thereby hollow." *Werke*, vol. 19, p. 273. Interestingly, in the lectures on stoicism, Hegel explicitly links this criticism of stoicism with Kant's philosophy, making several paranthetical comparisons between Kant's views and the stoics' views.

40. This kind of skepticism that Hegel is discussing should be distinguished from the more modern type of skepticism familiar to twentieth century Anglo-American philosophers. The latter form of skepticism generally concerns itself with whether anything external to the thinking subject's thoughts can be demonstrated. It is accepted that we have a non-inferential relation to the contents of our own minds – that we know the contents of our own minds with certainty – and it is then doubted if we can be said to know the existence of anything external to those contents with the same certainty. Hegel argues that this is not as thoroughgoing as the more ancient form of skepticism about which he is speaking in the *Phenomenology*, for it places one set of items outside of the sphere of doubt. The modern skeptic presupposes that our self-relation in terms of thinking and reflecting can have a determinateness that is independent of our relation to the world. Thus in so many versions of modern skepticism from Descartes to the latest journals, we have an imagined situation in which the content of our thoughts is said to stay the same while imaginatively the world is seen to vary. However, the dialectical, Hegelian point established in the sections on the subject/object model of knowledge and action is that we cannot identify the contents of our thoughts except in terms of some involvement with the world. Concretely, if we actually varied the world, we would also vary our own thoughts. Thus, for Hegel this more modern form of skepticism rests on the easily acquired illusion that comes from an individual reflecting on his own mental states – namely, the illusion that he has some kind of direct and immediate access to those states, and that those states and his reflection on them can serve as the ground of the determinateness of the appearing world (that we can construct the existence of physical objects or of other minds on the basis of these states). This is an illusion, because the authority of these "internal states" is, like all forms of authority, socially conferred. Their *apparent* immediacy does not consist in some kind of non-inferential relation between the "subject" and a peculiar "object"; it consists in the authority conferred on individual subjects by the community when it comes to talking about their mental states – the community allows such assertions to go unchallenged in ways that it does not allow reports on physical objects to go unchallenged. However, this is not Hegel's concern in this section, so we need not go into it here. Hegel makes this comparison between ancient and modern skepticism quite apparent in his treatment of skepticism in his lectures on the history of philosophy. For example, he notes, "Ancient skepticism must be differentiated from the *modern* form; we are only dealing with the former. The new skepticism is rather *epicureanism*; i.e. Schulze in Göttingen and others lay the foundations thusly: one must take sensuous being as true, what sensuous consciousness gives us; we must doubt everything else; what we attend to (*meinen*) is to be the final point." *Werke*, vol. 19, p. 360.
41. See ¶202, p. 123; *PG*, p. 155: "The differences which in the pure thinking of self-consciousness are only the abstraction of differences here come to be *all* the differences, and all differentiated being comes to be a difference of self-consciousness." In other words, the various "differences" or claims to knowledge that, for example, the stoic might feel confident in asserting are seen by the skeptic to be purely contingent, relative claims.

42. See ¶202, p. 123; *PG*, pp. 154–155: “Skepticism is the realization of that of which stoicism was only the concept, and it is the actual experience of what the freedom of thought is . . . It is clear that just as stoicism corresponds to the *concept* of the *independent* consciousness which had appeared as the relationship of master and slave, so skepticism corresponds to its realization as a negative attitude towards being-other (*Anderssein*), to desire and work.”
43. Hegel does not mention these “tropes” in the *Phenomenology*, but he greatly expands on this point in his lectures on the history of philosophy where he discusses the various tropes, that is, dialectical moves that skeptics generally make when presented with some claim to truth or certainty. (Hegel notes that he takes the tropes from the writings of Sextus Empiricus.) In classifying them, Hegel argues that the older tropes (for example, moves based on the idea that people of different cultures disagree about what is good or true) are more ad hoc and empirical: “We see in these moves that they really are not logical moves, they do not come from the concept, but rather proceed empirically – immediately against the empirical.” (*Werke*, vol. 19, pp. 384–385.) The other later tropes are, however, truly dialectical, in that they concern those positions that “assert something determinate as the absolute” (p. 393), and they then show the logical insufficiency of any such assertion. These try to show that any attempt to set something up as just *given* or simply *presupposed* is bound to fail on its own terms, since one can always make a case for the other side (if by nothing else simply assuming the contrary for the sake of argument). Thus, all those philosophies that presume some set of beliefs, and then simply draw the logical conclusions from them are shown to be deficient in that they can give no better reason for their own system than other contrary systems. In fact, these systems must always depend on the truth of certain beliefs that cannot be justified from within that system itself, and thus Hegel notes: “In these tropes is contained what is deficient in all metaphysics of the understanding.” (p. 394), and “[t]his is skepticism in general, the skeptical consciousness; its procedure is of the utmost importance, showing in everything immediately accepted that it is not fixed, that it is nothing in and for itself.” (p. 395) These characterizations of the skeptical tropes, of course, fit Hegel’s understanding of his own philosophy quite well. In the *Phenomenology*, Hegel refers to these various tropes which supposedly show the relativization of everything to something else in a somewhat oblique manner: “It contains nothing enduring in it and *must* vanish before thought, because that which has been differentiated (*das Unterschiedne*) is just this, not to be *in itself* (*an ihm selbst*) but to have its essentiality only in another. Thinking, however, is the insight into this nature of that which has been differentiated (*des Unterschiednen*); it is the negative essence as simple.” ¶204, p. 124; *PG*, p. 156.
44. See ¶202, p. 123; *PG*, pp. 154–155: Skepticism “is *in itself* the negative and must present itself as such.” Hegel also notes that the skeptic’s relativization of all claims to knowledge to a subjective point of view would seem at first to deny the subject’s freedom, since it would seem to be saying that the agent is simply subject to the contingencies of whatever presents itself to him. However, as he notes, the skeptic holds that it is the freedom of the agent to accept or reject these claims to knowledge, that no external standards other than standards that he himself accepts can count for him and that therefore the agent is “that which in the certainty of its freedom lets that which is given as other and real itself to disappear; not only the objective as such but its own behavior to it, in which it is made into something which counts as and is valid as something objective (*als gegenständlich gilt und*

geltend).. through which self-conscious negation it produces itself the *certainty of its freedom for itself*, generates an experience of it and raises it to truth.” ¶204, p. 124; *PG*, p. 156.

45. See ¶205, p. 125; *PG*, p. 157: “It owns up to being a wholly *contingent, individual* consciousness – a consciousness which is *empirical*, which is oriented according to what has no reality for it, which obeys what is for it not an *essence*, which does those things and brings to actuality what has no truth for it . . . it also, on the contrary, converts itself again into that which is universal self-identity.”
46. Hegel speaks of the skeptical consciousness’s “identity with itself” (*Sichselbstgleichheit*), which is Hegel’s own way of referring to something’s being non-self-contradictory. (See ¶205, p. 125; *PG*, p. 157.) He is thus characterizing the skeptical position as seeming (at this point in his dialectical development of it) to be fully rational – that is, to be free from internal contradictions.
47. See ¶207, pp. 126–127; *PG*, pp. 158–159: “This *unhappy* consciousness, *divided within itself (in sich entzweite)* must therefore, because for it this contradiction of its essence is *one* consciousness, ever have in one consciousness also the other consciousness, and thus it is immediately driven out of each consciousness when it thinks it has arrived at victory and at the peace of unity.” Hegel’s conception of the “unhappy consciousness” may be compared with the distinction of the subjective and the objective point of view made by Thomas Nagel in his *The View From Nowhere*. In identifying the two points of view as two opposing points of view for which there can be no unity, Nagel in effect takes the standpoint of the “unhappy consciousness” to be insurmountable, since it is the expression of a metaphysical feature of the nature of consciousness. Nagel argues that all philosophical problems arise out of the attempt to overcome or explain away this insurmountable opposition. Hegel’s point, for which the *Phenomenology* is an extended argument, is that the objective point of view is itself *socially constructed* and may or may not be in conflict with the subjective point of view, depending on the historical context about which one is speaking. The complete opposition between the two points of view that is so characteristic of the “unhappy consciousness” is thus for Hegel a feature of the way in which a particular form of life is structured and not a metaphysical fact about the nature of consciousness.
48. See ¶208, pp. 126–127; *PG*, p. 159.
49. See ¶209, p. 127; *PG*, pp. 159–160: “Here then is present a struggle against an enemy, against whom a victory is really a defeat, where one side achieves victory only to lose itself in its opposite.”
50. See ¶210, pp. 127–128; *PG*, p. 160: “*This unity itself becomes for him at first* such that in it the *difference* of both is still the dominant element.”
51. Hegel speaks of the “unchangeable’s receiving the formation (*Gestalt*) of individuality.” ¶212, p. 129; *PG*, p. 161. In his lectures on the history of philosophy, he seems to equate the rise of the “unhappy consciousness” with the ascension of neoplatonism in philosophy in Alexandria, which itself followed the heyday of skepticism in Roman life. Out of skepticism, which expresses the alienating aspects of Roman life comes the “unhappy consciousness” – at one point Hegel says: “Roman power is the real skepticism.” (*Werke*, vol. 19, p. 404.) Speaking of stoicism and skepticism (along with Epicureanism, which is not discussed in the *Phenomenology*), Hegel notes: “The flowering of these philosophies falls in the Roman world, where out of the external, dead world, out of the abstraction of the Roman principle (of the republican principle and the despotism of the emperor) spirit had fled within itself – *out of* an existence which could give no satisfaction for it *into* an

intellectuality. This is a complete *unhappiness*, a dividedness of the *world* within itself." *Werke*, vol. 19, p. 402. (The "intellectuality" of which he speaks is the neo-platonic speculation about the good and the eternal so adeptly represented for him by Plotinus).

52. In his lectures on the history of philosophy, Hegel notes of the actuality of the world for the people living at the end of the Roman period: "The people finding themselves in that actuality have here completely forgotten (*verlernt*) their seeing and hearing, in general forgotten their sense of actuality and the present. The sensuously true does not count for them any more, and they are constantly engaged in deception; for they are incapable of an apprehension of anything actual because it has lost all meaning for their spirit. Others abandon the world, because they can no longer find anything in it and find what is real only within themselves. As all gods are gathered up into *one* pantheon, all religions collapse into *one*. It is this, that self-consciousness – an actual person – is the absolute essence. What the absolute essence is, is now revealed to him: it is a person, not yet mankind (*der Mensch*) or self-consciousness in general." *Werke*, vol. 19, p. 407.
53. This seems to be what Hegel is obliquely referring to in ¶212, p. 129; *PG*, pp. 161–162.
54. In ¶210, Hegel discusses the way in which the "unchangeable" (the universal point of view) appears in relation to the agents who take themselves to be fully contingent agents incapable of arriving at the truth. At first, it appears that the "truth" (the world as seen from the objective point of view) is simply given to contingent finite agents. This is laid out in terms of three moves (the "unchangeable" as opposed to them, then as taking on the form of an individual person and then as thereby reconciling itself with them). ¶¶211–212 develop those moves and the problems attendant on them. ¶214 begins to develop a similar triadic set of moves for the agents to assume for themselves the task of taking on the universal point of view.
55. This seems to be the point of the somewhat difficult section, ¶216, pp. 130–131; *PG*, p. 163. Hegel there alludes to skepticism and stoicism as something that the "unhappy consciousness" has transcended. Stoicism is too abstract in its insistence on the formalities of reason, and skepticism is just the awareness of the contradictory position to which stoicism's pretended assumption of the universal point of view leads. (That is meant by Hegel as a logical point: He is not saying that historically skepticism was developed out of specific reactions to stoic texts, but that the standpoint of skepticism is such that it can be seen as embodying in more self-conscious form the contradiction to which stoic accounts lead.) The "unhappy consciousness" however now tries for a more concrete union of the two conflicting points of view by virtue of some kind of mystical union with the "One" or with God. In his lectures on the history of philosophy, Hegel discusses this. (See *Werke*, vol. 19, pp. 411–412.) Hegel argues in those later lectures that out of the experience of the Roman world, of which skepticism as the consciousness of the contingency of everything was the complete expression, comes the retreat into the purely intellectual world of the neo-platonists, who conceive of a non-temporal realm that metaphorically descends into the temporal itself. It is only logical that their followers would take that idea and use it to interpret the appearance of Jesus as a real manifestation of the unchangeable in the world of contingency. It is then also logical that people would attempt to accomplish by their own spiritual efforts a reunion with this unchangeable realm. Hegel's point is that the obscurities and darkness of such views is to be attributed to the transformation in

ideas which they are trying to accomplish. As he notes, “This is progress which spirit in its self-consciousness accomplishes; this is not only restricted to philosophical development. It is also a complete turn (*Umschlagen*) in world history, in that which is mysterious, in that which is innermost; in philosophy it must necessarily happen in the same way.” (*Werke*, vol. 19, p. 408.) Later he notes: “The relation of people to God is determined now as orders of saints, cults, but in particular as philosophy, with the express consciousness that the purpose is to belong to this intelligible world, that the individual ought to make himself capable of doing that, of being in accordance with it.” (*Werke*, vol. 19, p. 417.) But he notes that at least as this is worked out in Plotinus, one misses any really clear conceptual articulation of these issues, finding instead only “words . . . which in fact say nothing” and so-called “logical developments which are completely arbitrary.” (See *Werke*, vol. 19, p. 463.)

56. In the lectures on the history of philosophy, Hegel notes: “This last stage which we have had, was that return of self-consciousness into itself, this infinite subjectivity without objectivity, skepticism, this purely negative comportment against all external existence, knowledge, against everything determinate, valid, firm, true . . . It is notable that the stoic and the epicurean system has the same result and goal; but in skepticism this externalization of everything determinate is completed and with that is posited the completed memory, making-inner (*Errinerung, Innerlichmachung*).” *Werke*, vol. 19, p. 404.
57. Hegel concludes ¶216 by noting: “However it is not *for it*, that its object, the unchangeable, which for him essentially has the shape (*Gestalt*) of individuality, is *it itself*, that it itself is the individuality of consciousness.” p. 131; *PG*, p. 163. That is, the “unhappy consciousness” takes the objective point of view, which it identifies as the *true* point of view, as something different from itself, something in terms of which it must transform itself.
58. Hegel makes a play on the words for thinking, *Denken*, and for devotion, *Andacht*. ¶217, p. 131; *PG*, p. 163.
59. In the lectures on the history of philosophy, Hegel notes: “This idea that the absolute essence is not alien for self-consciousness, that nothing is the essence to him in which he does not have his immediate self-consciousness – we now see this principle appearing as the universal of the world spirit, as the universal faith and knowledge of all people.” *Werke*, vol. 19, pp. 404–405.
60. See ¶217, p. 131; *PG*, p. 164.
61. See ¶218, p. 132; *PG*, pp. 164–165.
62. See ¶218, p. 132; *PG*, pp. 164–165.
63. See ¶219, p. 132; *PG*, p. 165. In the lectures on the history of philosophy, Hegel is more blunt, and he also attributes this early medieval view of the world to representational thought: “An intelligible world had thus fastened itself to people’s representation (*Vorstellung*) in the same way as their actuality, as a land lying far away, which is actually represented as the land which we see, peopled and inhabited but which to us is somewhat as if it were hidden by a mountain . . . rather it is the highest negativity therein – the contradiction of actuality and that other world. This intellectual world expresses the nature of the real absolute essence.” *Werke*, vol. 19, p. 512.
64. See ¶220, pp. 133–134; *PG*, pp. 165–166.
65. See ¶222, pp. 134–135; *PG*, pp. 166–167.
66. See the first part of ¶222, pp. 134–135; *PG*, pp. 166–167.
67. See ¶225, pp. 135–136; *PG*, pp. 168–169.

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68. See ¶226, p. 136; *PG*, p. 169.
69. See ¶227, p. 136; *PG*, p. 169, in which Hegel once again invokes the figure of the syllogism to show that he is trying to make a logical point and not simply a sociological or purely historical observation. The mediator-priest plays the metaphorical role of the middle term in a syllogism, mediating between the major term (the universal, the divine) and the minor term (the individual, the participant in the “unhappy consciousness”).
70. See ¶229, p. 137; *PG*, p. 170.
71. See ¶230, pp. 137–138; *PG*, p. 170–171.

Chapter Four

1. See Otto Pöggeler, “Die Komposition der Phänomenologie des Geistes,” in Hans Friederich Fulda and Dieter Henrich (editors), *Materialien zu Hegels (Phänomenologie des Geistes)* (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1973). pp. 329–390.
2. See Robert Pippin’s helpful brief on the literature on this in his “‘You Can’t Get There from Here’: Transition Problems in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit”, in Frederick C. Beiser (ed.) *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). pp. 52–57. One of the major grounds for some of this skepticism is the similar transition in the later *Encyclopedia* version of the *Phenomenology*, which, like the 1807 *Phenomenology*, moves from “Consciousness” to “Self-consciousness,” but which, unlike the 1807 *Phenomenology*, then makes a transition to something called “Universal Self-Consciousness,” (which is the same term that Kant uses to describe the ground of all knowledge in §16 (B132) of his “Transcendental Deduction” in the *Critique of Pure Reason*). From “Universal Self-Consciousness,” the dialectic then makes its transition to “Reason.” The *Encyclopedia* version also leaves out all the historical detail of the “Reason” section of the 1807 *Phenomenology*, thus seemingly adding weight to the idea that Hegel himself abandoned the specific way in which the 1807 *Phenomenology* presented its material, preferring instead to present the historical material in the lectures on art, religion, and the history of philosophy as part of the “system.” Nonetheless, in structure these two transitions are similar: both move to a conception of the structure of “reason” as involving a unity of the subjective and the objective. Moreover, the *Encyclopedia* is self-consciously *not* a work of philosophical history; it is concerned with reconstructing the current (roughly, 1817–1831) status of our way of thinking about the world. As such a “system,” it still presupposes the philosophical-historical treatment of the *Phenomenology* to explain how it is possible that we came to be the kinds of agents for whom such a “system” would be possible. There is thus no reason to see any great gap between the two enterprises, since the later “system” builds on the earlier *Phenomenology*. The idea that the later “system” is in some fundamental way different from and discontinuous with the earlier *Phenomenology* has helped to perpetuate the myth of a young (perhaps even revolutionary) ironic, lively Hegel who stands opposed to an older, rather official and officious, stuffy, self-important Hegel. There is no doubt that Hegel’s views matured and that some of his views changed, but it is also clear that Hegel never abandoned the *Phenomenology*; indeed, he was even working on a revision of it at the time of his death.
3. See ¶231–232, pp. 140; *PG*, pp. 175–176.
4. This shows more concretely how the *Encyclopedia* version of the *Phenomenology* and the 1807 version are not at odds with each other. The *Encyclopedia* version

moves from “Self-Consciousness” to “Universal Self-Consciousness” for the same reasons that the 1807 version moves through stoicism, skepticism, and the unhappy consciousness – namely, to develop a conception of a shared point of view among the agents (that is, the idea of universal self-consciousness) out of the problems of coordinating the two subjective points of view in the dialectic of master and slave. This idea of a shared point of view that is instanced in each agent’s own subjective point of view is, of course, the same conception of reason that the 1807 *Phenomenology* develops. But since the phenomenology of the *Encyclopedia* plays a different role than the phenomenology of the 1807 book – the *Encyclopedia* version contents itself with the development of the subject/object conception of consciousness as part of an overall theory of mental activity – it has no need to go into the history of the development of the modern point of view, since it already presupposes that modern point of view, reconstructing as it does the complex inferential structure of modern life’s self-understanding.

5. Compare, for example, Hegel’s remarks in his lectures on the history of philosophy where he claims that after the reformation philosophy is able to take the two different directions of realism and idealism: “In that first direction, observation turns now foremost to physical nature, from the observation of which one extracts the universal, the laws, and on this basis grounds one’s knowledge. This type of experience and observation was called and is still called philosophy, the type of the finite sciences which proceed through observation and inference, or what is now called the *sciences exactes* . . . In its infinity the idea itself is here itself not the object, not known, but, on the contrary, the object is its determinate content. This latter is raised up into the universal, law – the universal taken up into its intelligible (*verständigen*) determinateness out of observation (Kepler)” *Werke*, vol. 20, p. 66. He also points out there more succinctly than he does in the *Phenomenology* how this puts a new emphasis and importance on the secular: “We thus see that the finite, the inner and outer present, is grasped in experience and through the understanding is raised up to the universal; one wants to get to know the laws, the forces, i.e., to transform the individual of perception into the form of universality. The worldly wants to be judged in a worldly way; the judge is the thinking understanding.” p. 63.
6. In his later lectures on the philosophy of history, Hegel was also much more clear in attributing part of the origin of this different self-understanding to the newly discovered interest in antiquity, which produced an interest in the humanities; to the flowering of the arts in the renaissance; and to contingent events such as the discovery of the Americas (the “new world”) and the development of the technology of printing. The intellectual advances of modern science, Hegel argues, are unintelligible outside of that matrix of other cultural developments. See *Philosophy of History*, pp. 408–411; *Werke*, vol. 12, pp. 488–491. In his lectures on the history of philosophy, Hegel credits Francis Bacon with much of the development of the intellectual ideas of this period. With Bacon, Hegel says, we find “. . . reason’s trust towards itself and towards nature, that if it turns itself in a thinking manner to nature, it will find the truth in it because they are in themselves in harmony.” (*Werke*, vol. 20, p. 77.) Bacon’s formulation of the experimental and inductive methods of science, whatever their shortcomings may be, is thus for Hegel of the greatest importance in understanding this transition: “Of Bacon can one say, as Cicero said of Socrates, he took philosophy down to worldly things, into people’s houses.” *Werke*, vol. 20, p. 78. Hegel’s oblique references to Bacon’s inductive methods in the *Phenomenology* are in ¶250, pp. 151–152; *PG*, pp. 190–

191. (The language used there in the *Phenomenology* is very similar to that used in his discussion of Bacon in his lectures on the history of philosophy, including the reference to induction as inference according to analogy)
7. This emerges clearly in Hegel's treatment of Bacon in his lectures on the history of philosophy, in which he says: "And without the education (*Ausbildung*) of the experiential sciences for themselves philosophy could have come no further than the ancients." *Werke*, vol. 20, p. 80.
8. See ¶¶245–246, pp. 147–150; *PG*, pp. 185–188.
9. See ¶249, p. 151; *PG*, pp. 189–190.
10. Hegel's discussion of scientific observation thus plays a crucial part in the section on "Reason." Part of the structure of modernity, especially in its Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment phase, relies on its claim that its institutions and practices can be legitimated by *reason*, not by appeal to tradition or authority (especially church authority). As Kant clearly saw, the determination therefore of what counts as "reason" is crucial for modern life. The implicit social importance of the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the *Critique of Practical Reason* has to do with Kant's attempt to determine what can be rationally authoritative and what therefore can count as valid for modern culture. How one determines the link between science and reason is crucial to that debate, and Kant made it a central part of his theoretical philosophy. Hegel's point is that the reliance on reason cannot be itself simply a "given"; that reliance, as well as reason itself, is part of a historical *project*, part of a development of reflective social practice and its various attempts to affirm for itself and reassure itself about what can count for it as authoritative. Moreover, Hegel sees no reason to identify the procedures of science with the procedures of rationality itself, as he tries to show in the chapter on "Reason."
11. Describing Hegel's views as non-modern is, of course, no argument against them. Hegel's own arguments in favor of this non-modern view have to do with his attempts to show that this non-modern view is in fact presupposed by the practices and results of modern science. That is, Hegel wishes to argue that the kind of necessity for which classical mechanics strove would be impossible to have without some kind of presupposition of weight as an essential feature of bodies. Thus, Hegel tried to show not only that the classical view of nature was *compatible* with modern science but that modern science as science actually *presupposes* such a view in the accounts that it tries to give of itself. Hegel is not simply trying to preserve intact the older conception of nature in the face of modern scientific developments; in making his arguments, he also tries to show how the ancient view must be amended in order to fit in with what he understands to be the key concepts and findings of modern mechanics and physics. His arguments on this, however, betray certain key misunderstandings of what is at work in various key concepts in the Newtonian program; his mistakes in this regard thus undermine his claim that the Newtonian program must incorporate parts of the ancient view of nature in order for itself to work *as science*. On this point, see the earlier mentioned critiques of Hegel's understanding of classical mechanics voiced by William R. Shea, "Hegel's Celestial Mechanics" (pp. 30–44), and Franz H. van Lunteren, "Hegel and Gravitation" (pp. 45–53) in Rolf-Peter Horstmann and Michael J. Petry (editors) *Hegels Philosophie der Natur*.
12. See ¶¶251–252, pp. 152–154; *PG*, pp. 191–192. In his lectures on the history of philosophy (again in the section concerning Bacon) Hegel also makes this point: "The other formal deficiency which all empiricists share is that they believe that they are sticking only with experience; they remain unaware that in their taking

- up of these perceptions they are doing metaphysics (*metaphysizieren*). Man does not stand pat with the individual, and he cannot do this. He seeks the universal; these are thoughts, even if they are not concepts. The most striking thought-form (*Gedankenform*) is force; one has the force of electricity, of magnetism, of weight. Force is universal, not perceptible; the empiricists indulge in such determinations fully uncritically and without cognizance." *Werke*, vol. 20, p. 84.
13. See, for example, Wilfrid Sellars' discussion in "The Language of Theories," in his *Science, Perception and Reality* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), pp. 106–126.
 14. See ¶290, pp. 174–175; *PG*, pp. 213–214.
 15. This point is made by Willem deVries in his "The Dialectic of Teleology," in Willem A. deVries (editor) *Philosophical Topics* (vol. 19, no. 2), pp. 51–70. He also distinguishes functional from intentional teleology by arguing that intentional teleology can be a one-time event (for example, going to the bookstore in order to buy a book by Hegel): "... but whereas the intentional model attributes purposiveness directly to event-tokens, in functional teleology, event-tokens must inherit their purpose directly from their respective event-types. My heart is beating now in order to circulate my blood only because it is generically the case that hearts beat in order to circulate blood." p. 62.
 16. See ¶255, pp. 154–156; *PG*, pp. 193–194.
 17. See ¶¶256–257, pp. 156–157; *PG*, pp. 195–196.
 18. See ¶¶265–266, pp. 160–161; *PG*, pp. 199–201. See also Dietrich von Engelhardt's very helpful presentation of Hegel's philosophy of biology as it appears in his mature philosophy of nature in his "Die biologischen Wissenschaften in Hegels Naturphilosophie," in Horstmann and Petry, *Hegels Philosophie der Natur*, pp. 121–137.
 19. See ¶276, p. 166; *PG*, pp. 205–206.
 20. See ¶279, pp. 167–168; *PG*, pp. 207–208.
 21. See ¶295, pp. 178–179; *PG*, p. 219. It is unclear that Hegel held on to this view after the *Phenomenology*, tending in his mature Berlin philosophy of nature to see the distribution of species as following from basic forces which themselves arise from the relation between geology and biology; he also thought that these forces arranged themselves conceptually into triplicities. See Trevor H. Levere, "Hegel and the Earth Sciences," in Horstmann and Petry (eds.) *Hegels Philosophie der Natur*, pp. 103–120.
 22. See ¶295, pp. 178–179; *PG*, p. 220: "It is thus that *consciousness* has for the middle term between universal spirit and its individuality or sense-consciousness the system of formations (*Gestaltungen*) of consciousness as a life of the spirit ordering itself into a whole – the system that we are considering here, and which has its objective existence (*gegenständliches Dasein*) as world history. But organic nature has no history; it falls from its universal, from life, directly into the individuality of existence and the moments of simple determinateness and individual animation (*Lebendigkeit*) united in this actuality produce the process of becoming merely as a contingent movement, in which each is active in its own part and the whole is maintained."
 23. See ¶298, p. 180; *PG*, p. 221–222.
 24. See ¶305, p. 183; *PG*, p. 225.
 25. See ¶309, p. 185; *PG*, p. 227. This is how I take what Hegel says there about there being no law-governed connection between *self-consciousness* and "actuality."

26. See ¶324, p. 195; *PG*, p. 238.
27. See ¶322, pp. 193–195; *PG*, pp. 236–237: “The true being of a person is rather *his deed*; in it, individuality is actual, and it is that which integrates (*aufhebt*) what is interpreted (*das Gemeinte*) in both of its aspects . . . It [the deed] *is* this, and its being is not only a sign, it is on the contrary the ‘real thing’ (*die Sache selbst*). It *is* this, and the individual person is what *it is*.”
28. See ¶334, pp. 201–202; *PG*, pp. 244–245.
29. See ¶314, p. 188; *PG*, pp. 230–231. Alasdair MacIntyre is also helpful in bringing out this aspect of Hegel’s argument, in his “Hegel on Faces and Skulls,” in Alasdair MacIntyre, (editor) *Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1972). pp. 219–236.
30. See the last few sentence of ¶344, pp. 208–209; *PG*, pp. 252–253: “Consciousness will no longer *immediately find* itself but rather generates itself through its activity. It itself is to itself the end of its doings, whereas as an observer it had only to do with things.”
31. “To begin with, this active reason is aware of itself merely as an individual (*eines Individuums*) and as such must demand and produce its actuality in an other.” ¶348, p. 211; *PG*, p. 256.
32. This is in the sections of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* called “Pleasure and Necessity,” ¶¶360–366, pp. 217–221; *PG*, pp. 262–266.
33. As Hegel puts it, this kind of individuality “brings to realization (*bringt zur Ausführung*) the pure individuality in which it appears . . . It takes hold of life much as a ripe fruit is plucked, which readily offers itself to the hand that takes it.” ¶361, p. 218; *PG*, pp. 262–263.
34. See ¶362, p. 218; *PG*, p. 263. This rather dense paragraph seems to be a re-description of the whole movement of Faust in terms of the categories of the Hegelian *Phenomenology*. Faust sees the other as “his own selfhood (*Selbstheit*),” he “achieves . . . his consciousness of his realization in a consciousness appearing as independent, achieves his intuition of the unity of both independent self-consciousnesses.” That is, Faust finds that instead of having merely used Gretchen, he comes to care for her. Faust conceives of himself as “this individual essence existing for-itself” but he finds instead the “unity of himself and the other self-consciousness,” finding himself therefore in a shared point of view, the “universal.”
35. See the first half of ¶363, pp. 218–219; *PG*, p. 263–264. Hegel notes that the emptiness of this self-conception is such that he can only draw on the “pure essentialities” of unity, difference and relation to determine what it is he will do; or in other words, there are at best formal but no material limits to his willing.
36. “Ich kann die Bande des Rächers nicht lösen, seine Riegel nicht öffnen. – Rette sie! – Wer war’s, der sie ins Verderben stürzte? Ich oder Du?” From Goethe’s *Faust*, the section called, “*Trüber Tag*,” “Dismal Day.”
37. This point is entirely lost to Werner Becker, in his *Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes* (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1971), who is intent on interpreting the book from a more metaphysically idealistic view of German idealism in general so that “each determinateness of an existing object or an objective state of affairs is produced through subjectivity, i.e., occurs through subjective concepts.” p. 26. In taking Hegel like this, Becker makes Hegel, oddly enough, into a subjective idealist. Thus, on Becker’s understanding, Hegel must necessarily overlook the tragedy of Faust and Gretchen, since (on Becker’s view) he could only take the

- theme of the chapter on Faustian individualism to have to do with the “I’s” narcissistically satisfying itself. This, of course, is the standpoint that Hegel is actually criticizing. See Becker, pp. 104–105.
38. Mephistopheles cynically remarks in a stage whisper after he has convinced Faust to drink the potion, “*Du siehst mit diesem Trank in Leibe/Bald Helenen in jedem Weibe.*” (You’ll soon see with this drink in your body/Helen [of Troy] in every woman.)
 39. See ¶364, p. 220; *PG*, p. 265.
 40. ¶365, pp. 220–221; *PG*, pp. 265–266.
 41. This is in the sections of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* called “The Law of the Heart and the Insanity (*Wahnsinn*) of Self-Conceit”, ¶¶367–380, pp. 221–228; *PG*, pp. 266–274.
 42. Although the prototype perhaps of all sentimentalist works is the novel *Pamela* by Samuel Richardson (1740) with its virtuous heroine fending off a long series of unwanted advances (perhaps more so than the earlier *Manon Lescaut* of 1731 by Antoine Prévost), the phrase itself, “the man of feeling” is taken from a work by Henry Mackenzie, called (appropriately) *The Man of Feeling*, published in 1771, a very popular book in its day, the hero of which “weeps on almost every page, and is bound to bore or annoy the modern reader with sententious moralizing and maudlin melancholy.” Peter Gay, *The Enlightenment: An Interpretation: The Science of Freedom* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1969), p. 44. (Gay argues that the “man of feeling’s” weeping is the “harbinger of a more rational, humane social policy . . . humanity, to paraphrase, Hegel, has its cunning.” pp. 44–45.) It is, however, important to note that the appropriate subjects of this kind of emotional response included both men and women. Witness Lady Louisa Stuart’s reaction to her first reading of *The Man of Feeling* at fourteen: she was “secretly afraid lest she should not cry enough to gain the credit of a proper sensibility.” Quoted in Colin Campbell, *The Romantic Ethic and the Spirit of Modern Consumerism* (London: Basil Blackwell, 1987), p. 141.
 43. See Leonard Krieger, *Kings and Philosophers: 1689–1789* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1970), pp. 143–152 (“The Orthodox Revival and the Cult of Sentiment”). A good short description of the influence of the pietist movement in Germany on German thought is also found in James J. Sheehan, *German History: 1770–1866*. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), pp. 176–177.
 44. Self-consciousness “knows that it has the *universal* or *law immediately* within itself, and because the law is *immediately* present in the being-for-self of consciousness, it is called the *law* of the *heart*. This form is *for itself*, as *individuality* (*Einzelheit*), essence like the previous form.” ¶367, p. 221; *PG*, p. 266.
 45. See ¶¶367–368, p. 221; *PG*, p. 266.
 46. The reference is no doubt to Pascal’s well known aphorism: “We know the truth not only through our reason but also through our heart. It is through the latter that we know first principles, and reason, which has nothing to do with it, tries in vain to refute them.” *Pensées*, translated by A.J. Krailsheimer (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1966), p. 58 (No. 110, Lafuma edition).
 47. Jansenism was a seventeenth century movement within Catholicism that styled itself as a revival of Catholic Augustinianism and that sought to purify the Catholic faith. It professed doctrines about the frailty of man and of predestination that came close to those of Protestant Calvinism. Nonetheless, it also stressed the immediacy of religious experience and the way in which such personal, emotional experience cannot be undermined by reason. They also displayed a full emotional

fury in the way in which they attacked their opponents. The Jansenists attracted some of the better scientific minds of the time – such as Blaise Pascal – to their ranks, and they educated people such as d'Alembert, who later wrote a tract that went against Jansenist interests (*Sur la Destruction des Jésuites en France*). For the Jansenists, the real enemy were the Jesuits with their doctrines of free will, their allegiance to the international papacy, and what the Jansenists saw as their lax interpretation of the requirements of Christian morality. The Jansenist emotionalist fury was turned full force on the Jesuits. Nonetheless, the Jesuits had a remarkable, although perhaps not entirely desired, influence in the form of the Jesuit-trained students that emerged from their schools: Voltaire, Diderot, Malesherbes, Helvétius, and Turgot. Robespierre was also a Jesuit product. See Peter Gay, *The Enlightenment: An Interpretation: the Science of Freedom*, pp. 505–506. (Gay notes that “[t]hroughout Catholic Europe, the Jesuits trained their most intransigent enemies.”) In the eighteenth century, Jansenism became a more powerful and somewhat reactionary doctrine. The rise of Jansenism as a political force, however, was crucial in the development of the doctrine of *rights*. The king of France, Louis XIV, banned the Jansenists. However, unlike the less fortunate protestant Huguenots, who had nobody to defend their interests when they were expelled from the country by Louis, the Jansenists had many powerful members of the Parisian *Parlement* on their side, and the Jansenists were thus able to make the issue of whether they were to be tolerated into a question of whether the king (with his Jesuit advisors) was a despot. The Jansenists, who saw their abbey at Port-Royal des Champs razed in 1709 on the orders of Louis were, however, to triumph over the Jesuits in 1762 with the king's banning the Jesuit order from France. On the complicated story of the relation between the Jesuits and the Jansenists, see Dale Van Kley, *The Jansenists and the Expulsion of the Jesuits from France: 1757–1765* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975). The particular appeal to the “heart” and the kind of fury that the Jansenists exhibited in their political activities are no doubt part of the inspiration for Hegel's chapter on the “Law of the Heart.”

48. See ¶370, p. 222; *PG*, p. 267: “This individuality therefore directs its energies to getting rid of this necessity which contradicts the law of the heart, and also the suffering caused by it . . . What it realizes is itself the law, and its pleasure is therefore at the same time the universal pleasure of all hearts.”
49. See the last half of ¶372, p. 223; *PG*, p. 269.
50. See ¶371, pp. 222–223; *PG*, p. 268.
51. See the first half of ¶372, p. 223; *PG*, p. 268.
52. See ¶373, p. 224; *PG*, pp. 269–270.
53. See ¶374, pp. 224–225; *PG*, p. 270.
54. See ¶375, p. 225; *PG*, pp. 270–271.
55. Hegel has been taken to be making an allusion to Baron D'Holbach's idea that this corruption is conceived as “a perversion invented by fanatical priests, gluttonous despots and their minions, who compensate themselves for their own degradation by degrading and oppressing others, a perversion which has led to the nameless misery of deluded humanity.” ¶377, p. 226; *PG*, p. 272. He makes the same allusion later in the *Phenomenology* at ¶542, p. 330; *PG*, p. 386, where he is there alluding to D'Holbach's criticism of religion in general. The reference in ¶377, however, is perhaps ironically aimed at the Jansenists, since D'Holbach was an avowed atheist who was opposed to clerics of all kind. Although its theology was a self-styled Augustinianism, the Jansenist movement had nonetheless paved the

way for the later anti-clericalism of the Enlightenment because of their hatred of the Jesuit clergy and their identification with Gallicanism (taking the side of the church as the national church of France in opposition to the “internationalist” papacy). The Jansenists tended to underwrite the idea that the clerics (the Jesuits) were corrupt, that the king was a despot (since he had banned the Jansenists), and that the clergy (the Jesuits) should be limited in their influence on government. See Dale Van Kley, *The Jansenists and the Expulsion of the Jesuits From France*, pp. 234–237. Thus, the Jansenist criticism of Jesuit clerics could be seen to lay the groundwork for D’Holbach’s attack on clerics in general. In any event, D’Holbach’s sally against the priesthood and the depraved nobility was only a repetition of a well known indictment given by a curé, Jean Meslier, who left behind a testament saying the same thing, in which he also uttered his famous wish that “all the great ones of the earth, all the nobles, should be hanged and strangled with the guts of the priests.” Quoted in Paul Hazard, *European Thought in the Eighteenth Century: From Montesquieu to Lessing*, (Cleveland: Meridian Books, The World Publishing Company, 1963), p. 55. Meslier’s testament was widely circulated in a version edited by Voltaire in eighteenth century France, and Hegel could well have known of it.

56. See ¶377, p. 226; *PG*, p. 271: “The heartthrob for the welfare of humanity therefore passes into the ravings of an insane self-conceit, into the fury of consciousness to preserve itself from destruction.” Hegel also comments on this in his lectures on the philosophy of history: “The most ingenuous souls, the most innocent natures were in the most melancholy manner guided to the most secret workings of their hearts in order to observe them truly. This duty was combined with that of its opposite: man should also know that the good spirit dwells in him . . . Mankind was driven into interiority (*ins Innerliche*), into that which is abstract, and that which was spiritual was held to be different from the worldly. That lively consciousness of the subjectivity of mankind, of the interiority of his will brought with it the belief in *evil* as a great power of the worldly . . . The belief in this abstract, special power of the worldly – in the devil and his cunning – occasioned an infinite number of *trials for witchcraft* both in Catholic and Protestant countries.” *Philosophie der Geschichte*, pp. 505–506; *Philosophy of History*, pp. 425–426.
57. See Leonard Krieger, *Kings and Philosophers: 1689–1789*, p. 147.
58. “And to have this entire affection or integrity of mind is to live according to Nature, and the dictates and rules of supreme wisdom. This is morality, piety, and natural religion.” The Earl of Shaftesbury, “*An Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit*,” (1711), reprinted in Jerome Schneewind, *Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). Vol. II, p. 498.
59. See ¶383, p. 230; *PG*, p. 276.
60. See ¶381, p. 228; *PG*, p. 274.
61. See Norman Hampson, *The Enlightenment* (New York: Penguin Books, 1968). Chapter 3: “Human Nature: Man and Society”, p. 100.
62. See ¶382, pp. 229–230; *PG*, pp. 275–276.
63. See the second half of ¶382, pp. 229–230; *PG*, pp. 275–276.
64. In ¶383, p. 230; *PG*, p. 276, Hegel speaks of the “weapons” that each side uses in this struggle.
65. See ¶384, p. 230; *PG*, pp. 276–277. Hegel claims that while this is for the virtuous consciousness the “*end (Zweck)*,” in the ‘way of the world’ it is *that which is internal (als Inneres)*.”

66. See ¶384, p. 230; *PG*, pp. 276–277. Hegel notes that the Good exists “for an other, as something that is not in and for itself,” meaning that these dispositions are not apparently already in the “hearts” of the egoists (they are not “for him”) but exist in the eyes of the “champion of natural virtue.” The “champion of natural virtue” posits these as *having to be* there within the egoist, given the theory that the “champion of natural virtue” has about the world and about human nature, even if the egoist himself cannot find them. (Thus, they are “abstractions,” theoretical terms posited to explain something.)
67. See ¶385, p. 231; *PG*, p. 277.
68. See ¶386, pp. 223–232; *PG*, pp. 277–278.
69. As Hegel puts it, “What is *in-itself* is at first the *abstraction of essence vis à vis actuality*.” ¶389, p. 233; *PG*, p. 279.
70. See ¶389, p. 233; *PG*, pp. 279–280. Thus, Hegel refers to the “champion of natural virtue’s” purpose as “the abstract non-actual essence,” that is, a theoretical term posited simply in order to shore up his other beliefs. This “essence” is as Hegel puts it, “not true but rather is only *for consciousness*,” meaning that the champion of natural virtue takes this to represent something actual and experientiable when in fact it is only a theoretical term that he introduces in order to make his other beliefs hold together.
71. That someone like the Earl of Shaftesbury’s conception of virtue was far removed from the aristocratic virtues of the ancient Greeks is displayed in a letter that Shaftesbury wrote to a friend: “All fame is not alike. There is as much difference as between noise and music . . . But the fame that arises from the consent and harmony of wise and good men is music and a charm irresistible to a heroic soul. The fame of nobility, high station, warlike feats or conquests, make not a single note in the symphony. What love was ever gained by these? What hearts were ever won in this manner?” Quoted in Peter Gay, *The Enlightenment: An Interpretation: the Science of Freedom*, pp. 48–49. This fits in with the enlightenment’s general condemnation of Homeric heroes and medieval aristocratic warriors as miscreants.
72. See ¶390, p. 233–234; *PG*, pp. 280–281.
73. See ¶394, p. 236; *PG*, pp. 283–284.
74. See ¶395, pp. 236–237; *PG*, p. 284.
75. See ¶396, p. 237; *PG*, pp. 284–285.
76. This is treated by Hegel in the section, “The Spiritual Kingdom of Animals and Deception, or the ‘Real Thing’ (*die Sache Selbst*)” ¶¶397–418, pp. 237–252; *PG*, pp. 285–301.
77. See Erich Auerbach, *Mimesis: the Representation of Reality in Western Literature* (transl. by Willard Trask) (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1953), pp. 323–326. Auerbach there discusses how the *honnête homme* plays a key role in the plays of Molière, particularly in the way in which this ideal of a non-noble “gentleman” plays off against the older ideals of aristocracy.
78. In a later passage having to do with the ideals of aristocracy and the *courtier* of the courts of absolutist French kings, Hegel says, “The sincere (*ehrlich*) consciousness takes each moment as an enduring essentiality and is the uncultivated thoughtlessness, not knowing that what it is just as much doing the inverse.” 521, pp. 316–317; *PG*, pp. 371–372.
79. See ¶396, p. 237; *PG*, pp. 284–285: “[T]he element in which individuality sets forth its formation (*Gestalt*) has the significance solely of taking up this formation; it is the daylight in which consciousness wants to display itself.”

80. See Karl Joachim Weintraub, *The Value of the Individual: Self and Circumstance in Autobiography* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978).
81. This is the chapter heading in the *Phenomenology* before ¶394, p. 236; *PG*, p. 283.
82. “Accordingly, individuality appears on the scene as an original determinate nature: *original*, for it is in-itself; originally determinate, for the negative moment is present in the in-itself, and this latter is thus a quality.” ¶398, p. 238; *PG*, p. 285.
83. See ¶401, pp. 239–401; *PG*, pp. 287–289.
84. See the second half of ¶401, pp. 240–241; *PG*, p. 288.
85. Rousseau’s explanations of these events are well-known but still extraordinary: “If I were one of those low-born men, deaf to the gentle voice of Nature, a man in whose breast no real feeling of justice and humanity ever arose, this hardness of heart would have been quite easy to explain. But my warm-heartedness, my acute sensibility, the ease with which I formed friendships, the hold they exercised over me, and the cruel wrench when they had to be broken; my innate goodwill towards my fellow men; my burning love for the great, the true, the beautiful, and the just; my horror of evil in every form, my inability to hate, to hurt or even to wish to; that softening, that sharp and sweet emotion I feel at the sight of all that is virtuous, generous, and lovable: is it possible that all these can ever swell in the same soul along with depravity which, quite unscrupulously, tramples the dearest of obligations underfoot? No, I feel, and boldly declare – it is impossible. Never for a moment in his life could Jean-Jacques have been a man without feelings or compassion, an unnatural father. I may have been mistaken but I could never be callous.” *The Confessions of Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, translated by J.M. Cohen (London: Penguin Books, 1953) pp. 332–333. This is in part a complaint against Voltaire’s charge of immorality against him, which shocked Rousseau; see Karl Weintraub, *The Value of the Individual*, p. 297.
86. See ¶403, pp. 241–242; *PG*, pp. 289–290.
87. See ¶404, p. 242; *PG*, p. 290, in which Hegel relates this to the overall theme of the section on “Reason.”
88. See ¶407, p. 244; *PG*, pp. 291–292.
89. Rousseau, for example, complains often of people possessed of evil hearts who are out to discredit him because of their own depraved natures. Rousseau’s suspicions (perhaps paranoia) about those around him which appear throughout the *Confessions* (such as his living under an assumed name in France for a while in the fear that Hume was searching for him) are well known. To take, however, one example of this, consider the passage at the end of Book Eight of the *Confessions*, when he tells why he must write the book: “But the attempts made by my powerful oppressors, who dread the truth, to destroy every trace of it, compel me to make every effort consonant with the strictest justice and the most scrupulous fairness, in order to preserve them . . . But since my name is fated to live, I must endeavor to transmit with it the memory of that unfortunate man who bore it, as he actually was and not as his unjust enemies unremittingly endeavor to paint him.” *Confessions*, p. 373.
90. See ¶406, p. 244; *PG*, p. 292.
91. Thus, Hegel says that it does not matter which side (work or “inner self”) is called “concept” and which is called “reality,” since each will be opposed to the other in this way. See ¶406, p. 244; *PG*, p. 292.
92. See ¶407, pp. 244–245; *PG*, pp. 292–293.
93. The phrase, *die Sache selbst*, is nearly impossible to translate. A *Sache* (thing) is

not, Hegel stresses, a *Ding* (a thing): “The *Sache selbst* (the thing itself) expresses thus the *spiritual* essentiality in which all these moments are integrated (*aufgehoben*) as counting for themselves – therefore only counting as universal – and in which the certainty consciousness has of itself is an objective essence, a *thing* (*Sache*), an object born out of self-consciousness as its *own*, without ceasing to be a free authentic object. The *thing* (*Ding*) of sense certainty and perception now has its meaning for self-consciousness only through self-consciousness; on this rests the difference between a *thing* (*Ding*) and a *thing* (*Sache*).” ¶410, p. 246, *PG*, pp. 294–295. A *Sache* in Hegel’s sense is a thing in the most general sense: a poem, a thought, a mental process, a symphony and a joke could all be a *Sache*; but they would not be things (*Ding*) of perception. A *Sache* is also the *point* of something, as in the injunction, “get to the point.” It can also be a “matter” in the sense of “how the matter stands.” (See also Michael Inwood’s discussion in his *A Hegel Dictionary* of the various meanings of the term, *Sache selbst*, and its relations to the term, *Ding*.)

94. See ¶409, pp. 245–246; *PG*, pp. 293–294.
95. See ¶411, pp. 246–247; *PG*, pp. 295–296. Hegel there speaks of the *Sache selbst* as the “universal,” which is present in all the individual moments and binds them together as moments of one whole. It is also, he says, “simple essence,” and it is the “simple, abstract *Sache selbst*,” meaning that for this type of self-conception, the “real thing” is a very general, not terribly determinate concept of what does bind all these elements together, and it is something postulated as having to be there in order for this conception to be able to give a reasonable account of itself.
96. See ¶412, p. 247; *PG*, p. 296. Compare this with, for example, Rousseau’s well known opening to the *Confessions*: “So let the numberless legion of my fellow men gather round me, and hear my confessions. Let them groan at my depravities, and blush for my misdeeds. But let each one of them reveal his heart at the foot of Thy throne with equal sincerity, and may any man who dares, say, ‘I was a better man than he.’” p. 17. *Ehrlich* is rendered by Miller and others as “honest,” but “sincere” seems better to capture what Hegel is up to here, especially with regard to the comparison with Rousseau.
97. See ¶414, p. 248; *PG*, p. 297.
98. Emmanuel Hirsch claims that the phrase may be taken from a passage in Hölderlin’s novel, *Hyperion*, in which he discusses being among the learned (*Gebildeten*) in such a way “as if human nature had been dissolved into a manifold of the animal kingdom”. See Emmanuel Hirsch, “Die Beisetzung der Romantiker in Hegels Phänomenologie” reprinted in Hans Friederich Fulda and Dieter Henrich (eds.) *Materialien zu Hegels (Phänomenologie des Geistes)* (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1973). p. 273, note 53.
99. Rousseau, *Confessions*, p. 17.
100. See Karl Weintraub, *The Value of the Individual*, p. 308.
101. See ¶417, pp. 250–251; *PG*, pp. 298–300.
102. See ¶418, pp. 251–252; *PG*, pp. 300–301.
103. See ¶418, pp. 251–252; *PG*, p. 300.
104. This well known passage occurs in ¶17, pp. 9–10; *PG*, p. 19: “In my view, which can be justified only by the exposition of the system itself, everything turns on grasping and expressing the true not only as *substance* but equally as *subject*.” The passage about the “I” being a “We” occurs in ¶177, p. 110, *PG*, p. 140.
105. See Ernst Cassirer’s discussion of the point of Kant’s comparison of Rousseau to

Newton in his *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment* (translated by Fritz C. A. Koelln and James P. Pettegrove) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951). pp. 153–160.

106. ¶420, p. 253; *PG*, p. 302.
107. I am referring to the sections, “Reason as Legislative” and “Reason as Testing Laws.” ¶¶419–437, pp. 252–262; *PG*, pp. 301–312.
108. One obvious reason for construing some of these passages as criticisms of Kantian moral philosophy has to do with Hegel’s choice of examples. Hegel discusses, for example, the commandment about stealing property, and he argues that the commandment against stealing property already presupposes that there is an institution of property with its associated rights. He then argues that although it is perfectly consistent to claim that there should be such an institution, it is also perfectly consistent to say that there should be no property. Hence, the principle of non-contradiction will not settle the issue of whether we should have an institution of property. The same example of property occurs in his lectures on the history of philosophy at a point at which Hegel is explicitly discussing Kant; it is thus fair to conclude that Kant is at least one of the targets of the criticism in this section.
109. The Hegelian inspired critique of Kant as a formalist in the theory of knowledge is elegantly developed by Robert Pippin in his *Kant’s Theory of Form* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).
110. In the lectures on the history of philosophy, Hegel is clear on this: “Kantian philosophy is theoretically the enlightenment methodically worked out, namely, that what can be known is not that which is true, but, on the contrary, that which is only appearance.” *Werke*, 20, p. 333.
111. ¶233, pp. 140–141; *PG*, p. 176. The same phrase appears in Hegel’s lectures on the history of philosophy when he is discussing the transitional period from early modern to enlightenment philosophy. See *Werke*, 20, p. 266.
112. ¶420, p. 253; *PG*, p. 302: “Its object counts for it likewise as the true, for it unites self-consciousness and being in a single unity. It [the true] counts as the *absolute*, for self-consciousness cannot and does not want any more to go beyond this object, for in it, it is with itself (*bei sich selbst*); it [self-consciousness] *cannot*, for it [the object] is all being and all power; it does not *want* to, for it [the object] is the *self* or the will of this self.”
113. Hegel’s description of the way in which the Enlightenment saw an immediate unity between happiness, nature, reason and sentiment – the way in which it was poised between a conception of spirit as normative and a conception of spirit as natural – is developed in ¶¶419–428, *PG*, pp. 301–306, under the title “Legislative Reason.” He characterizes this Enlightenment faith in the unity of reason, nature, and sentiment as follows: “The object is on its own (*an ihm selbst*) *real* as object, for it contains on its own (*an ihm*) the difference of consciousness; it divides itself into organically related groupings of people (*Massen*) which are the *determinate laws* of the absolute essence. These organically related groupings of people, however, do not obscure the concept, for the moments of being and pure consciousness and of the self remain enclosed within it – a unity which constitutes the essence of these overarching groupings of people and which in this difference no longer lets these moments step apart from one another.” ¶420, p. 253; *PG*, p. 302. (I translated *Massen* as “organically related groupings of people” in order to capture the sense, as the *Wahrig Deutsches Wörterbuch* has it, of

- its meaning as “a multiplicity of people who have partially or wholly given up their individuality in favor of the whole.”)
114. See Paul Hazard, *European Thought in the Eighteenth Century: From Montesquieu to Lessing*, p. 316. Hazard claims that the term “optimism” first appears in 1737.
 115. David Hume, *Treatise on Human Nature*, p. 415. In other Enlightenment figures (particularly Diderot), the skepticism about the scope of reason’s powers was curiously combined with the corresponding faith in observing reason to solve various epistemological, social and moral problems. Peter Gay argues that this was the result of those Enlightenment figures’ attempt to create a new “passionate naturalism,” a doctrine that would avoid the rigidities of past Christian doctrine and what they regarded as its profound anti-rational tendencies. See Peter Gay, *The Enlightenment: An Interpretation: the Science of Freedom*, pp. 187–207. (For his claim about “passionate naturalism,” see p. 204.)
 116. This conception about the way in which the Kantian subject spontaneously “takes” things up in a certain way is skillfully set forth in Robert Pippin, “Kant on the Spontaneity of Mind,” *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 17, 1987, pp. 449–476.
 117. Curiously, Hegel discusses Kant’s theoretical philosophy (although, again, only in passing and very obliquely) in the introductory chapter to the section on “Reason.” (§§231–239, pp. 139–145; *PG*, pp. 175–182), not in the chapters on “Reason as Lawgiver” and “Reason as Testing Laws,” in which the emphasis is on Kant’s moral theory.
 118. Kant says in §16 of the 1787 (B) edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*: “It must be possible for the ‘I think’ to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible, or at least would be nothing to me.” Hegel comments in his *Science of Logic* that “It is one of profoundest and truest insights to be found in the *Critique of Pure Reason* that the *unity* which constitutes the nature of the *concept* is recognized as the *original synthetic unity of apperception*, as the unity of the *I think*, or of self-consciousness.” *Science of Logic*, p. 584; *WdL*, II, p. 221. He paraphrases (to the point of bad quotation) some lines from Kant (§16, B137) to make his point: “Consequently it is this *unity of consciousness* which alone constitutes the relation of the representations with the object and therewith their *objective validity* and on which rests even the *possibility of the understanding*.” (*Science of Logic*, *Ibid.*)
 119. It is not a logical, or “analytic” truth that the “I” that thinks one thought is the same “I” that thinks another thought. (For example, from the statements that “Someone ate my porridge,” and “Someone sat in my chair,” one cannot infer that it was the *same* person who did both. It is therefore a “synthetic” truth that one person – say, Goldilocks – did both things.) Therefore, the statement that “the I that represents X is the same I that represents Y” is itself a “synthetic” truth, and, as being necessary, is a synthetic a priori truth.
 120. In the introductory section of the chapter on “Reason,” Hegel remarks of the Kantian philosophy that it failed in what it set out to do when Kant claimed to arrive at a determinate list of twelve categories by taking the derivation of them to come out of the table of judgments found in logic textbooks and some basic principles of his own system: “But to pick up the plurality of categories again in

some way or other as a welcome find, taking them, e.g., from the various judgments, and complacently accepting them so, is in fact to be regarded as an outrage on science. Where else should the understanding be able to demonstrate a necessity, if it is unable to do so on its own itself (*an ihm selbst*), which is pure necessity?" ¶235, pp. 142–143; *PG*, p. 179. Hegel's basic charge seems to be that Kant should have been able to derive the categories and even the necessity for the manifold simply out of the synthetic unity of apperception itself. Kant argued that the "analytic unity of apperception" ($I = I$) *requires* a synthetic unity of apperception. That is, if the subject is spontaneously to be able to identify itself as the same "I," then it *requires* a set of different representations; that the subject is the same subject over time requires that he have a set of different representations such that the subject can spontaneously identify himself as the "I" that thinks X as identical with the "I" that thinks Y. Thus, from the synthetic unity of apperception (*the category*, in Hegel's parlance), we should be able to derive all the categories, and ultimately the necessity for the synthetic unity of apperception itself.

121. See ¶236, p. 143; *PG*, pp. 179–180 in which Hegel discusses what he takes to be the difficulties inherent in the Kantian dualism of appearances and things in themselves and in Kant's doctrine of individuals as given in intuition: "Individuality is the transition of the category out of its concept to an *external* reality, the pure *schema* which is both consciousness and because it is individuality and a unit excluding others from itself (*ausschliessendes Eins*) is a pointing towards (*das Hindeuten*) an other. But the other of the category is merely the *other categories mentioned at first*, namely, *pure essentiality* and *pure difference*; and in this category, i.e., just in the positedness of the other or in this other itself, consciousness is just as much itself." Hegel also speaks of the "negativities" here, indicating that in his mind, the Kantian philosophy generates its own problems within the terms that it sets for itself. In ¶237, p. 143; *PG*, p. 180, Hegel speaks of the "restless movement to and fro" between the idea of the thing in itself as something that consciousness posits as a necessary condition of knowledge and as something that is taken as not posited by consciousness but independent of it. In ¶238, pp. 144–145; *PG*, pp. 180–181, Hegel claims that the dualism between consciousness and the thing-in-itself is untenable precisely because it fails to make good on the kinds of claims it makes for itself. In ¶239, p. 145; *PG*, pp. 181–182, he claims that the reason for Kantian (and Fichtean) idealism's failure (the contradiction involved in talking about unknowable things in themselves) is that it "asserts the *abstract concept* of reason as that which is true," which leads it to an equally abstract conception of reality. The reason behind that charge, not mentioned in ¶239, is that it relies on a conception of representations as lying within the subject's mind, a conception which in turn leads to skepticism about the knowability of things in themselves.
122. Hegel is probably referring obliquely to Kant's idea of the "fact of reason" (among other things) in his discussions in the introductory chapters of the section on "Reason" in which he is almost certainly discussing Kant and Fichte. He speaks of (Kantian and Fichtean) idealism simply as giving an "assurance" (*Versicherung*) that what it says is true without giving a full set of reasons to underwrite this "assurance." See ¶¶234–235, pp. 141–143; *PG*, pp. 177–179.
123. It should be noted that "appearance" is given a specific sense as the necessary way in which the world could appear to minds having the dual structure of "intuitive faculty and conceptual faculty," and is to be distinguished from "appearance" in

the sense of “what appears to our particular human mind with its empirical structure of sensibility and understanding.”

124. Hegel is therefore not simply trying to show that the Kantian philosophy is at odds with what he regards as the “true” account of morality and knowledge. Such a rejection of Kantian theory would be unacceptable for Hegel, given the terms he sets for his own theory. Thus, Hegel’s criticism cannot lie, as David Hoy says in his “Hegel’s Critique of Kantian Morality,” *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 6 No. 2 (1989), p. 221, in the claim that “[F]or Hegel Kant’s reflective procedures imply the wrong phenomenology of moral experience.” Hegel cannot consistently with his own project simply juxtapose the “correct” phenomenology of moral experience to the “mistaken” Kantian account. He must show how the Kantian account breaks down on the terms that it, not Hegel’s alternative “phenomenology,” sets for it. As Hegel explains in the *Science of Logic*: “Further, the refutation must not come from outside, that is, it must not proceed from assumptions lying outside the system in question and inconsistent with it. The system need only refuse to recognize those assumptions; the *defect* is a defect only for him who starts from the requirements and demands based on those assumptions . . . The genuine refutation must enter into the opponent’s power and meet him on his own ground (*sich in den Umkreis seiner Stärke stellen*); no advantage is gained by attacking him where he is not.” *Science of Logic*, pp. 580–581; *WdL*, II, pp. 217–218. As Hoy notes elsewhere, “In present day parlance, Hegel is showing how the theory and practice of Kantian morality deconstructs itself.” (p. 220)
125. See ¶429, pp. 256–257; *PG*, p. 306. This paragraph contains an oblique set of references to the transition from the Enlightenment to its completion in Kantian philosophy. Hegel there speaks of how the universality of the “substance” (the presupposition of the harmony of nature, sentiment and reason that had guided much Enlightenment thought) had failed to generate the content which it had claimed to be able to do, and how this is now taken up as “pure *consciousness*” (that is, the Enlightenment ideas become transformed by Kant into a theory of subjectivity), and that this “pure consciousness” is the *Sache selbst*, the “real thing,” that which is authoritative for us as determining what counts as a good reason for belief and action. He then argues that this conception of pure consciousness is capable of testing the various claims to knowledge by submitting them to its own autonomously established criteria – or, in his words, “it is *formal* universality, to which the determinate content can measure up, since in that universality, the content is considered only in relation to itself,” thus indicating that he is talking about Kant’s idea of the categorical imperative as being a formal criterion of the validity of a maxim. He then claims, without argument, that this can only be a testing of content (for example, a maxim formed out of some occurrent desire, such as “I shall wear my trousers rolled”) in terms of whether it is internally non-contradictory – whether, as he says, it forms a “tautology.”
126. See ¶432, p. 259; *PG*, p. 309: “In both the moments just considered . . . the positing of immediate determinateness in the ethical substance and then the knowledge of them as to whether they are laws have been sublated.”
127. See ¶435, p. 260; *PG*, p. 310.
128. See ¶434, p. 260; *PG*, pp. 309–310. On Rousseau’s critique of the Enlightenment, see Judith Shklar, *Men and Citizens: A Study of Rousseau’s Social Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
129. Hegel hints at this argument in ¶¶434–435, p. 260; *PG*, pp. 309–310, in which

he talks about how the idea of reason as legislative and reason as testing laws are each one-sided. In ¶436, pp. 260–262, *PG*, pp. 310–311, he sketches out what such a unification of the two one-sided moments would look like.

Chapter Five

1. See ¶438, p. 263; *PG*, p. 313: “Reason is spirit, when its certainty of being all reality has been raised to truth, and it is conscious of itself as its world, and of the world as itself . . . But essence existing *in* and *for itself*, which at the same time represents itself as actually consciousness and as itself, is *spirit*.”
2. See ¶438, p. 263; *PG*, p. 313: “But this determination of the category, of being-for-self opposed to being-in-itself, is equally one-sided and is a sublating (*aufhebendes*) moment. The category is determined thereby for consciousness as it is in its universal truth, as an essence existing *in-and-for-itself*.”
3. See ¶439, p. 264; *PG*, p. 314: “This substance is just as much the universal undertaking (*Werk*) created by the action of all and each as their unity and equality, for it is the *being-for-self*, the self, the doing (*das Tun*). As *substance*, spirit is unwavering upright (*gerechte*) equality-with-self; but as *being-for-self*, it is a fragmented essence, self-sacrificing and gracious (*gütige*), in which each accomplishes his own undertaking, rends asunder the universal being, and takes from it his own share.”
4. Hegel expresses this in his later *Philosophy of Right* in speaking of the ethical order (*Sittlichkeit*) with reference to *Antigone*, the same example used in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*: “If we consider ethics from the objective standpoint, one can say that in it the ethical person is for himself incognizant (*sei sich unbewusst*). In this sense, *Antigone* declares that no one knows from where the laws come: they are eternal. That is, they are that which exists in and for themselves (*die an und für sich seiende*), determinations that flow from the nature of the thing (*Sache*).” ¶144, *Remark*.
5. Hegel quotes some lines from *Antigone* in two separate places in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* to make this point: “They are not of yesterday or today, but everlasting, / Though where they came from, none of us can tell” (¶437, p. 261, *PG*, p. 311); paraphrased later as “*sure and unwritten law of the gods, that eternally lives, and no one knows whence it came*.” (¶712, p. 431, *PG*, p. 497.) Hegel’s quotation is apparently his own free translation from the Greek (and this of course is a translation of Hegel’s free translation).
6. See ¶444, p. 266; *PG*, p. 317.
7. This development occurs in two chapters of the *Phenomenology*. In the chapter called “The ethical world. Human and divine law, man and woman,” Hegel develops what he takes to be the best case for that view of Greek life as perfectly consistent and harmonious which was so deeply felt by some of his contemporaries. In the following chapter, “Ethical action. Human and divine knowledge, guilt and destiny,” he develops what he takes to be the internal contradictions in the positive image of Greek life sketched out in the preceding chapter.
8. Hegel puts it this way in his later Berlin lectures on the philosophy of history: “That which is substantial in law, what is an affair of state, the universal interest is what is essential to the individual; but it is this only as mores (*Sitte*) in the mode of objective will, so that morality in the authentic sense, as the interiority of conviction and intention, is not yet present. The law is there, and in terms of its content, it is a law of freedom and rationality, and it is valid in terms of its

immediacy, because it is the law. Just as the natural element is present in beauty as the sensuous element, in ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) the laws have the mode of necessities of nature (*Naturnotwendigkeit*).” *Werke*, vol. 12, p. 308.

9. See ¶447, p. 267; *PG*, pp. 318–319.
10. In the lectures on the philosophy of history, Hegel notes: “We can assert of the Greeks in the first and true formation of their freedom that they had no conscience; with them the custom prevailed of living for the fatherland without further reflection. The abstraction of a state, which for our understanding is what is essential, was unknown to them. Rather, to them the end was the living fatherland: this Athens, this Sparta, this Temple, these altars, this mode of living together, this circle of citizens, these mores (*Sitte*) and customs. To a Greek, the fatherland was a necessity, without which he could not live.” *Werke*, 12, p. 309.
11. See ¶447, p. 267; *PG*, p. 319.
12. See ¶448, pp. 267–268; *PG*, p. 319.
13. See ¶462, pp. 277–278; *PG*, pp. 329–330.
14. See ¶449, p. 268; *PG*, p. 319.
15. See ¶450, p. 268; *PG*, pp. 319–320.
16. In his lectures on the philosophy of history, Hegel noted: “If we wish now to summarize what the *Greek spirit* is, we find that the fundamental determination of it is that freedom of spirit is conditioned by and is in essential relation to a natural prompting (*Naturerregung*). Greek freedom is prompted through an other; it is thereby free through the stimulation’s being transformed and produced out of itself. This determination is the middle term between a people’s lack of self (*Selbstlosigkeit*) (as we saw in the Asiatic principle, in which the spiritual and the divine only exist in natural modes) and the infinite subjectivity as pure certainty of itself, of the thought that I am the basis for everything that is valid. The Greek spirit as the middle term begins from nature and inverts it into a posit (*Gesetzsein*) out of itself; this spirituality is not yet absolutely free and not yet complete from itself (*vollkommen aus sich selbst*), not yet the prompting of itself.” *Werke*, 12, p. 293.
17. See ¶450, p. 268; *PG*, pp. 319–320.
18. See ¶¶451–452, pp. 268–271; *PG*, pp. 320–323.
19. See ¶453, pp. 271–272; *PG*, p. 323.
20. See ¶455, pp. 272–273; *PG*, pp. 323–324.
21. See ¶457, pp. 274–275; *PG*, pp. 325–326.
22. Without the incorporation of some ideal of “free individuals” into its picture, Greek life might look as if it were *lacking* in some important feature which modern life has, in which case it would not be the allegedly superior alternative which it is supposed to be. Those who extol the virtues of Greek life would then have to admit that actually they are faced with the choice between Greek harmony, with its lack of free individuality, and modern life, caught in its alienation but nonetheless having a place within its social space for such individuals.
23. Hegel makes this explicit in his lectures on the philosophy of history: “This makes the Greek character into *beautiful individuality*, which is brought forth from spirit when it restructures the natural into an expression of itself . . . It is not free self-determining spirituality but naturalness cultivated into spirituality – spiritual individuality.” *Werke*, 12, p. 293.
24. See ¶457, pp. 274–275; *PG*, pp. 325–327.
25. In developing the best case for the Greek form of life that he can make, Hegel also tries to show how this idealized version of Greek life can be understood to be

- fulfilling those *desiderata* of modern life which he treated in the chapters on “Reason”, without its having modern life’s problems of self-justification. See ¶461, pp. 276–277; *PG*, pp. 328–329.
26. See ¶465, pp. 279–280; *PG*, pp. 331–332.
 27. See ¶472, pp. 284–285; *PG*, p. 337.
 28. See ¶470, p. 284; *PG*, p. 36.
 29. See ¶475, pp. 287–288; *PG*, pp. 339–342.
 30. See ¶478, p. 291; *PG*, p. 343: “This therefore counts henceforth as an essence existing *in and for itself*. To be so *recognized* is its substantiality. But it is an *abstract universality* because its content is *this rigid unyielding self*, not the self that is dissolved in substance.”
 31. See ¶480, p. 291; *PG*, p. 344.
 32. In his lectures on the philosophy of history, Hegel puts it this way: “After the sense of patriotism, which was the dominant impulse of Rome, was satisfied, corruption breaks out among the masses in the Roman state; through contrasting events, the magnitude of individuality in it becomes stronger in both intensity and means. We see from now on the opposition (*Gegensatz*) contained in Rome itself beginning to stand out in another form, and the epoch that concludes the second period is the second mediation of the opposition. We earlier saw this opposition in the struggle of the patricians against the plebeians; now it is in the form of particular interests against the patriotic disposition itself, and the feeling (*Sinn*) for the state no longer holds this opposition in a necessary equilibrium.” *Werke*, 12, p. 373.
 33. See ¶481, p. 293; *PG*, p. 345.
 34. Hegel notes in his lectures on the philosophy of history: “What was thus present for consciousness for such people was not the fatherland or any such ethical unity; they were pointed to giving themselves singly and alone over to fate and to achieving a complete indifference to life, which they then sought either in freedom of thought or in immediate sensuous enjoyment . . . for the systems of that time, stoicism, epicureanism and skepticism, although in themselves opposed to each other, were aiming at the same thing, namely to make spirit in itself indifferent to everything which reality offered.” *Werke*, 12, p. 384–385.
 35. In his lectures on the philosophy of history, Hegel notes: “We have seen subjective interiority (*Innerlichkeit*) as the universal principle of the Roman world.” *Werke*, 12, p. 342. In another place in those lectures he says, “We saw the Romans start with the principle of abstract interiority, which is realized as personality in private law.” p. 384.
 36. Hegel broke from almost all of his contemporaries in seeing modern life as arising in principle at the end of antiquity with Christianity. Unlike those who saw history as falling into three periods – antiquity, the Middle Ages, and the modern world – Hegel saw the so-called “Middle Ages” as continuous with modern life in its insistence on the newly discovered role of human subjectivity and self-reflection that emerges with ancient antiquity. Like Nietzsche after him, he saw Christianity as the point at which history took its turn toward modern life. Hegel of course gave this a positive interpretation, in contrast to Nietzsche’s rather negative view of the matter.
 37. See ¶483, pp. 293–294; *PG*, p. 346.
 38. See ¶487, pp. 296–297; *PG*, p. 350. Hegel calls these two realms of freedom of reflective thought and the alienated social world “pure consciousness” and “actuality.”

39. See ¶¶488–489, pp. 297–299; *PG*, pp. 350–352. Hegel also mentions Diderot's dialogue, *Rameau's Nephew*, in this context to distinguish the "type" of which he is speaking. His point is that by the eighteenth century in France, the idea of being a "type" of person had come to be seen as a point of derision – one was supposed to be an "individual," not a "type." Or, to put it another way, one's autobiography was supposed to be more Rousseauian, to be the autobiography of a unique individual and not the retelling of some more general story.
40. The German term that Hegel uses, "*Bildung*," carries the meanings of both formation (from the verb *bilden*, to form) and education. To become cultivated is to become *gebildet*, that is, "cultured" and "formed." The English term, "culture," is derived originally also from the idea of cultivation. Originally one was said to "culture" crops in the sense of cultivating them, and later one was said to cultivate one's mental faculties (that is, to "culture" them).
41. See ¶491, pp. 299–300; *PG*, p. 353.
42. See ¶493, pp. 300–301; *PG*, p. 354. Hegel speaks there of the "unchangeable essence" (meaning that set of practices that defined nobility) and the "passive spiritual essence" (meaning the individual who gives himself over to the "universal" standards of what it means to be cultivated), which by doing so gives itself over to "being for others" (honor in the eyes of others) and thereby becomes an individual, described by Hegel as a "becoming a being-for-himself (*Fürsichwerden*)".
43. See Orest Ranum's account of the ideals of European and particularly French aristocracy in his *Paris in the Age of Absolutism* (New York: Wiley, 1968). pp. 132–166.
44. Hegel's discussion here is somewhat anachronistic, since at least for the feudal period there is no *state* proper to which the aristocrat could be attached, something of which Hegel was well aware. (He makes a point of it in his later lectures on the philosophy of history.) However, Hegel seems to be using "state" here in a sense to mean something more general like "political community," which can take the form of the modern "state" or the form of a set of feudal relationships.
45. Quoted from Helen Gardner (ed.), *The Metaphysical Poets* (London: Penguin Books, 1957). p. 232.
46. Hegel sees both the aristocrat and the bourgeois as aspects of *Bildung*, cultivation and educative self-formation. He quite abstractly and obscurely describes the way in which the spirit of *Bildung* (the way in which European life accounts for itself in this period) in ¶492, p. 300; *PG*, pp. 353–354, in which he speaks of the way in which this form of life divides into "organically related groupings of people" (*Masse*) that represent the apparently contradictory accounts that people in this period give of themselves, with spirit itself serving as the unity that binds these accounts together in that this "spirit" consists of similar accounts of the same form of life, which, however, to themselves seem very different.
47. See ¶495, p. 302; *PG*, pp. 355–356.
48. See ¶496, pp. 302–303; *PG*, pp. 356–357.
49. See ¶498, p. 304; *PG*, pp. 357–358.
50. See ¶499, p. 304; *PG*, p. 358. Hegel says that one has "being-for-self" as a principle, and the other has "being-in-itself" as a principle. That is, one takes a good reason as having to do with the *subjective* point of view (being-for-self); the other takes a good reason as having to do with the *objective* point of view (being-in-itself).
51. See ¶¶500–501, p. 305; *PG*, pp. 358–359.
52. See ¶500, p. 305; *PG*, pp. 358–359.

53. ¶503, p. 306; *PG*, p. 360.
54. The “privileges” were that set of laws relating to the estates of early modern Europe that expounded what was due to members of that estate; needless to say, there was great dispute as to the origin and legitimacy of these laws, as to whether they were natural, traditional or issued by the prince. In the later accounts, “privileges” came to be distinguished from “rights” in the sense that the “privileges” were considered *in principle* to apply only to members of a certain estate, whereas “rights” were considered to apply in principle to all people.
55. This seems to be the point of the condensed discussion in ¶506, pp. 307–308; *PG*, pp. 361–362.
56. See Orest Ranum’s account of this transition in chapter eight, “The Last Heroes” of his *Paris in the Age of Absolutism*, pp. 8–151.
57. Hegel explains this move from the Valois to the Bourbon aristocracy in ¶508, pp. 308–309; *PG*, pp. 362–363. He there speaks of language as the “*existence* of the pure self as a self; in it the *individuality* of self-consciousness as existing for-itself as such steps into existence, so that it is *for an other*.” All other forms of expression (the wearing of fashionable clothes, the adoption of certain mannerisms, etc.) are such that the (noble) self can refuse to identify with them. On this account, the noble cannot be “distinguished” as a noble by such externalities. It is only in his *speaking* in the proper way that the true self (as a noble self) can be *taken to be* such by others. But the detached self that stands back and reflects on his self-presentations to others cannot therefore be wholly absorbed by these others. As Hegel notes, not entirely perspicuously: “In that he has been *noted* (*vernommen*) has his *existence* itself immediately *faded away* . . . and his existence is just this: as a self-conscious *now*, not to be present (*da zu sein*) as he is present, and, through this disappearance, to be present” – or, in other words, to be a detached, reflective self who presents himself to others, but who, as detached, cannot identify himself with the interpretations that these others put on him and who thereby immediately distances himself from all such interpretations.
58. See ¶509, p. 309; *PG*, p. 363. Hegel refers to the agents as “moments” of this spirit, indeed as the “self-knowing category,” which for him is shorthand for the Kantian synthetic unity of apperception. His point seems to be that the creation of the “pure self” in European aristocratic culture was the social condition that set the stage for the Kantian articulation of the conception of the self-determining subject. Only when the subject had been “purified,” as he puts it here, into the abstract conception of simply a thinking, acting *subject* could the Kantian philosophy be possible.
59. Hegel admired *Le Cid* (1636), which had been the sensation of its day in Parisian aristocratic circles. He speaks approvingly of the way the “collision of love and honor plays a brilliant part” in the play. *Aesthetics*, Vol. I, p. 241; *Werke*, 13, p. 312.
60. ¶511, pp. 310–311; *PG*, pp. 364–365.
61. Hegel says in ¶511, pp. 310–311; *PG*, pp. 364–365 that “. . . through that it raises the individuality, which otherwise is only something supposed (*Gemeintes*), into its existing purity in its giving the monarch his own *name*; for it is only the name in which the *difference* of the individual from all others is not merely *supposed* but on the contrary is made actual by all.”
62. See ¶512, pp. 311–312; *PG*, pp. 365–366.
63. See ¶516–517, pp. 313–314; *PG*, pp. 367–368.
64. Hegel’s treatment of this part of the account occurs in the section of the *Phenome-*

- nology titled, "The Spiritual Kingdom of Animals." In ¶521, pp. 316–317; *PG*, pp. 371–372, he makes reference to the idea of the "sincere consciousness," which was the logical development of the account offered in the "spiritual kingdom of animals."
65. *Rameau's Nephew* also makes reference to the debate about polyphonic music which had circulated in European circles in Hegel's youth. (This occurs in the discussions about melodies that are suited for the singing voice and the way this was not realized in the "older" music that showcased complicated harmonic effects.) Rousseau was one of the most well known opponents to the "older," polyphonic music, calling it "the remains of barbarism and bad taste that only persist, like the portals of our gothic churches, to the shame of those who have the patience to construct them." [In his *Lettre sur la Musique Française*, quoted in Arthur Loesser, *Men, Women and Pianos: A Social History* (New York: Dover Publications, 1954), p. 87.] The nephew in the story also opposes himself to polyphonic music, the music of which his uncle, Rameau, had been one of the masters. Like Rousseau, the nephew prefers a simple melody that "fits the words" because he takes it to be more "natural" than the complex polyphonic compositions of the previous generations and therefore to be a more complete expression of the "natural soul." Part of the object of Diderot's attack in *Rameau's Nephew* is this eighteenth-century conceit of the "natural" person, who expresses his common natural "humanity" (in this case by playing only simple melodies with little accompaniment), especially since this is put in the mouth of a completely "non-natural," self-consciously self-constructed individual such as the nephew (the antithesis of a "natural soul"). Diderot is implicitly making an analogy with the simplicity of "natural" tunes, and the clarity of "natural" ideas of virtue. On the accounts given by some in his day, both should be easily recognizable by a "natural soul." However, the "pure self" who is the nephew cannot then have any good reason for endorsing the natural melodies, except the nihilistic one that such an account is the best one to give to those equally "pure selves" who like to tell themselves that they are only being "natural" in their musical and ethical tastes. At one point in the dialogue, the "I" says: "When I pronounce the word 'tune' I have no clearer idea than you and most of your kind when you say 'reputation, blame, honor, vice, virtue, modesty, decency, shame, ridicule.'" *Rameau's Nephew* (transl. L.W. Tancock) (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1966), p. 98. Hegel would have most likely recognized those passages as being critical of Rousseau, even though his own taste in music apparently also ran to the simple. In visiting Vienna, Hegel did not once hear either Schubert or Beethoven, feasting himself instead on some farces, theatrical pieces and Italian operas – he actually judged Rossini's *Barber of Seville* to be superior to Mozart's *Figaro*! Concerning Hegel's visit to Vienna, see Horst Althaus's biography of Hegel, *Hegel und die heroischen Jahre der Philosophie* (Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1992), p. 438. On the strengths and deficiencies of Hegel's understanding of music and his preference (like Diderot himself) for music accompanied by texts rather than purely orchestral music, see Stephen Bungay, *Beauty and Truth: A Study of Hegel's Aesthetics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 133–141.
66. In ¶523–524, pp. 318–319; *PG*, pp. 373–374, Hegel discusses the dialogue in a way that will be unintelligible to those who have not themselves read the dialogue. The most directly relevant pages in *Rameau's Nephew* (Tancock's translation) for Hegel's discussion are pp. 122–123 and p. 108, which has to do with the discussion of someone's being a "type," an *Espèce* – which itself has to do with the way in

which Hegel thinks that this type of “cultivation” has led to the formation of the modern concept of individuality.

67. See ¶526, pp. 320–321; *PG*, p. 375.
68. See ¶540, pp. 328–329; *PG*, pp. 384–385.
69. See ¶541, p. 329; *PG*, p. 385. Hegel notes at the end of the paragraph: “Pure insight, however, is at first without content and is rather the pure disappearance of it; but by the negative movement towards what is negative to it, it will realize itself and give itself a content.”
70. See ¶542, p. 330; *PG*, p. 386.
71. See ¶543, p. 330; *PG*, p. 386.
72. See Immanuel Kant, “What is Enlightenment?” (transl. by Lewis White Beck) in Lewis White Beck (ed.) *Kant: Selections* (New York: Macmillan, 1988). pp. 462–467. Hegel speaks of the Enlightenment’s attempt as that of making “faith’s” self-consciousness having “only to become this *for-itself*.” ¶544, p. 331; *PG*, p. 387.
73. Hegel refers is to the way in which unbelief spread like wildfire in the sophisticated urban setting of Paris during the Enlightenment by comparing it to a “silent expansion or to the *diffusion*, say, of a perfume in the unresisting atmosphere.” He also calls it a “penetrating infection.” See ¶545, p. 331; *PG*, p. 387. In that paragraph, he also makes oblique reference to the ways in which the religious establishment tried to stop the spread of Enlightenment and how these attacks therefore just made things worse for the proponents of “faith” – for example, the clerical counterattackers produced their own sets of satirical plays on the *philosophes*, mirroring the way in which the *philosophes* had produced works lampooning religion, the result of which was to intensify the atmosphere of satirical criticism which in turn fueled the dynamic of the *philosophes*’ movement even more. (Hegel may have garnered his knowledge of these things from the discussions of them in *Rameau’s Nephew*.)
74. See ¶548, pp. 333–334; *PG*, pp. 389–390. Hegel says somewhat darkly that “[a] pure insight it is without any content; the movement of its realization consists in its becoming itself its content, since an other cannot become its content because pure insight is the self-consciousness of the category.” Hegel is referring back here to his discussion at the end of the chapter on “Reason” concerning Kant’s conception of the synthetic unity of apperception as the principle in terms of which the various grounds of knowledge are to be derived. The Enlightenment project of basing everything on “pure insight” is, so he is circuitously saying, *implicitly* a demand for a self-originating principle (like that of the synthetic unity of apperception). Thus, he says that “its completion has consequently this sense, that it is to know (*erkennen*) the content that was at first objective to it. Its result becomes . . . an insight which knows the absolute negation of itself as its own actuality, knows itself or its self-knowing concept” – that is, the Enlightenment project of constructing a “pure insight” finds itself completed in Kantian philosophy. In its Kantian, idealist form, it is more able to reassure itself that its own skepticism is not warranted; in that way, it comes to be “absolute negation,” self-reassurance that its own skeptical doubts can be answered.
75. See ¶549, pp. 334–335; *PG*, pp. 390–391.
76. Hegel makes a subtle terminological shift in ¶549, p. 335; *PG*, p. 391 to indicate that it is the German pietists, and particularly Zinzendorf’s “Brethren” that he has in mind. He says: “But the absolute essence of faith is essentially not the *abstract* essence, which would lie beyond the faithful consciousness; rather, it is the spirit of the religious community (*Gemeinde*), it is the unity of the abstract essence and

of self-consciousness.” In the next sentence, however, he says, “That it be this spirit of the community (*Gemeine*) requires as a necessary moment a doing (*das Tun*) on the part of the community (*Gemeine*).” The shift from *Gemeinde* (community, usually religious) to *Gemeine* is significant, since the latter term is used nowadays almost exclusively to denote Zinzendorf’s Herrnhut brethren. In Hegel’s time, the term had a slightly broader meaning, but it is plausible that Hegel shifts terms from one sentence to the next to indicate that he is referring to a particular type of religious community.

77. See ¶549, p. 335; *PG*, p. 391: as Hegel puts it, the *account* that the pietist community gives of how one is to know God (the absolute essence) “. . . is not the only ground of the essence; rather it is only a moment. The essence is at the same time in and for itself.”
78. See ¶550, pp. 335–336; *PG*, pp. 391–392.
79. See ¶554, pp. 337–338; *PG*, p. 394–395.
80. See ¶556, pp. 339–340; *PG*, pp. 395–396.
81. See ¶557, p. 340; *PG*, pp. 396–397. Hegel calls this conception of God a “vacuum, to which no determination, no predicate can be attached.” In that paragraph, Hegel also sarcastically notes that “pure insight” – the idea that what counts as authoritative is only that which a detached individual (detached ironically or by listening to the voice of reason) can come to hold – must also hold that whatever content *it* has comes from its “negative,” that is, from “pure insight’s” generating skeptical attacks on religion on the basis of the way in which religion had typically accounted for itself, it tries to reassure itself that it is therefore not an empty practice as it accuses “faith” of being. Hegel identifies the deist God as the “*être suprême*” in ¶562, p. 343; *PG*, p. 400.
82. Hegel’s discussion in ¶557 parallels Voltaire’s writings on superstition. Voltaire notes: “Almost everything that goes beyond the worship of a supreme being, and the submission of one’s heart to his eternal commands, is superstition.” Quoted in Peter Gay, *The Enlightenment: An Interpretation: The Rise of Modern Paganism*, p. 396. (The quote comes from Voltaire’s entry on superstition in his *Dictionnaire Philosophique*.)
83. See ¶558, pp. 340–341; *PG*, pp. 397–398. Hegel notes: “Being *grounded* on the insight of the nothingness of all the other formations of consciousness, and hence of everything beyond sense-certainty, this sense-certainty is no longer mere opinion (*Meinung*) but rather absolute truth.”
84. See ¶¶559–560, pp. 341–342; *PG*, pp. 398–400. Hegel’s contentions in these paragraphs have to do with the abstract relations between the knowledge that “sense-certainty” claims to give us and the way things are in themselves. On the one hand, the things of nature are considered to be known by observing reason as they are in themselves, yet on the other hand, nature is so constructed that it exhibits an order (a weakly *divine* order for deists) such that all the parts contribute to the whole.
85. See ¶561, p. 343; *PG*, p. 400.
86. See ¶560, pp. 342–343; *PG*, pp. 399–400.
87. See ¶563, pp. 343–344; *PG*, pp. 400–401. Hegel speaks somewhat indirectly here, claiming that faith has the “divine right” of “absolute self-identity (*Sichselbstgleichheit*) or of pure thought,” whereas the Enlightenment has the “human right . . . of non-identity (*Ungleichheit*).” The idea of “non-identity” with which Hegel is arguing here has to do with his general conception of “negativity” as the way in which skeptical doubts are generated. A set of beliefs that takes itself to be in

order, to have no contradictions within itself, is said to have “self-identity” or “self-equality”, as *Sichselbstgleichheit* might be translated. Hegel’s idea is that something has self-identity (such as $A = A$) when it has no internal contradictions or incoherences. When skeptical doubts are generated out of the way it takes itself (as opposed to those skeptical doubts that are imposed from outside, by views simply different from it), it is said to have “non-identity,” in that the original set of views now finds that it is embroiled in contradictions. It is of course Hegel’s thesis that all views (except the final, absolute viewpoint) generate skeptical doubts when they are reflected upon; they all are endowed with “negativity,” and they all produce their “determinate negations,” the specific doubts oriented toward those particular types of views. He calls this in ¶563 the “right of self-consciousness,” by which he means that such skepticism can arise only when a form of life has developed a social practice whose function is to give an account of our reasoning accounts, that is, when the form of life has become “self-conscious.” He continues this line of argument in ¶564, p. 344; *PG*, p. 401.

88. See ¶565, pp. 344–345; *PG*, pp. 401–402. Hegel claims the “Enlightenment itself . . . is just as little enlightened about itself . . . The Enlightenment is only this movement, it is the yet incognizant activity of the pure concept.” In ¶574, pp. 349–350; *PG*, pp. 407–408, Hegel makes the same claim: the Enlightenment as the “self-alienated concept . . . does not recognize the *same essence* of both sides, of the movement of self-consciousness and of its absolute essence – it does not recognize the *same essence* of that which in fact is its substance and existence (*Bestehen*).”
89. See ¶568, pp. 346–347; *PG*, p. 404.
90. See ¶572, pp. 348–349; *PG*, pp. 405–406.
91. See ¶574, pp. 349–350; *PG*, pp. 407–408. Hegel says that as “absolute concept,” the Enlightenment “posits that movement [of abstractions] over and against itself as the *essence*,” that is, it *takes* its own claims (the inferential links or “movements” among the various abstractions it makes) not as self-authenticating but as requiring authentication by a metaphysical “other,” and it is led to take itself in this way because of its particular representationalist self-construal of what would count as an authentication of itself. It thus sets its own criteria for legitimation of itself as lying outside of itself: “it posits the being-other (*Anderssein*) or the determinateness on it (*an ihr*).” It is significant that Hegel says that this otherness is posited as is “*an ihr*,” not “*an sich*” or “*an sich selbst*,” I take him to be signaling there that the kind of authentication of the claim to knowledge is *taken* to be outside of the social practice of the claim-making activity itself.
92. See ¶578, pp. 351–352; *PG*, pp. 409–410. Hegel notes there that the conceptions of God, Nature, or Matter are thus equivalent to the concept of “pure being,” the most abstract of all abstractions and the conception which so clearly has a “negativity” within itself (in the sense that any attempt to think about it automatically produces a whole series of paradoxes).
93. See ¶¶579–580, pp. 353–354; *PG*, pp. 410–412. Hegel argues that what is common to this kind of deism and materialism is “pure thought thinking itself,” which he quite metaphorically calls a “simple rotary (*achsendrehende*) movement” that divides itself into different “moments,” depending on which case it is trying to make.
94. See ¶580, pp. 353–354; *PG*, pp. 411–412.
95. See ¶580, pp. 353–354; *PG*, pp. 411–412. Hegel says that pure insight “is the

- consciousness of this *metaphysics*, but not yet the comprehension (*Begreifen*) of it; it has not yet come to the *unity* of *being* and of the *concept* itself.”
96. See ¶581, p. 355; *PG*, p. 413: “This insight is thus itself a *true knowing*, and self-consciousness has equally immediately the universal certainty of itself, its *pure consciousness* in this relationship in which, therefore, *truth* as well as the present and *actuality* are united. The two worlds are reconciled and heaven is transplanted to earth below.”
97. ¶582, p. 355; *PG*, p. 414.
98. See Robert Pippin’s discussion of Rousseau’s conception of self-determination and its pivotal role in the modern conception of self-determination in his “The Modern World of Leo Strauss,” *Political Theory*, 20, 1992, pp. 448–472.
99. See ¶584, pp. 356–357; *PG*, p. 415.
100. ¶585, p. 357; *PG*, p. 416: “In this absolute freedom, therefore, all estates (*Stände*) which are the spiritual essences into which the whole is articulated are abolished; the individual consciousness that belonged to any such estate and willed and fulfilled itself in it has set aside (*aufgehoben*) its limitation; its end (*Zweck*) is the general end, its language universal law, its work the universal work.”
101. See ¶588, p. 358; *PG*, p. 417: “Universal freedom, which would have separated itself in this way into its constituent parts and by the very fact of doing so would have itself into an *existent* substance, would thereby be free from *particular* individuality, and would apportion the *plurality* of *individuals* to its various constituent parts.”
102. See ¶589, p. 359; *PG*, p. 417: “Neither by the mere idea of obedience to *self-given* laws which would assign it to only a part of the whole, nor by its being *represented* in law-making and universal action, does self-consciousness let itself be cheated out of *actuality*, the actuality of *itself* making the law and accomplishing not a particular work but the universal work itself. For where the self is merely *represented* and is present only as an idea (*repräsentiert und vorgestellt*), there it is not *actual*; where it is represented (*vertreten*) by proxy, it is *not*.” Hegel (perhaps also following Rousseau) might be alluding to Hobbes’ idea that “And because the sovereignty is either in one man, or an assembly of more than one . . . there can be but three kinds of commonwealth. For the representative must needs be one man, or more: and if more, then it is the assembly of all, or but of a part.” *Leviathan*, 121. Rousseau says: “I therefore maintain that since sovereignty is merely the exercise of the general will, it can never be alienated, and that the sovereign, which is only a collective being, cannot be represented by anything but itself.” *On the Social Contract*, Book II, Chapter I; translated and edited by Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1983), p. 29.
103. See ¶589, p. 359; *PG*, p. 418: “Just as the individual self-consciousness does not find itself in this *universal work* of absolute freedom as existing substance, so little does it find itself in the *deeds* proper and *individual* actions of the will of this freedom. Before the universal can perform a deed it must concentrate itself into the one of individuality and put at the head an individual self-consciousness; for the general will is only an *actual* will in a self, which is a one. But thereby all other individuals are excluded from the entirety of this deed and have only a limited share in it, so that the deed would not be a deed of the *actual universal* self-consciousness.”

104. See ¶591, p. 360; *PG*, p. 419: “The government is nothing else but the self-established focus, or the individuality, of the general will. The government, which wills and executes its will from a single point, at the same time wills and executes a specific order and action. On the one hand, it excludes all other individuals from its act, and on the other hand, it thereby constitutes itself a government that is a specific will, and so stands opposed to the general will; consequently, it is absolutely impossible for it to exhibit itself as anything else but a *faction*. What is called government is merely the *victorious* faction, and in the very fact of its being a faction lies the direct necessity of its overthrow; and its being government makes it, conversely, into a faction and guilty.”
105. ¶591, p. 360; *PG*, p. 418.
106. See ¶593, p. 361; *PG*, p. 420: “Absolute freedom as *pure* self-equality of the general will thus has within it *negation*; but this means that it contains *difference* in general, and this again it develops as an *actual* difference. For pure *negativity* has in the self-equal general will the element of subsistence or the *substance* in which its moments are realized . . . These individuals who have felt the fear of death, of their absolute master, again submit to negation and difference, arrange themselves in the various spheres (*Massen*), and return to an apportioned and limited task, and thereby to their substantial actuality.”
107. This is Eric Hobsbawm’s point about the cult of Napoleon constituting what he calls the first secular myth of the modern world. See Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution: 1789–1848* (Markham: Penguin Books Canada Limited, 1962). pp. 98–100.
108. See ¶596, p. 364; *PG*, p. 423.
109. That Hegel’s understanding of German idealism as completing the French Revolution “in thought” was not just idiosyncratic to him but was also shared by most of the other figures in German idealism is argued by Dieter Henrich in his essay, “Französische Revolution und klassische deutsche Philosophie: Überlegungen zur Bestimmung ihres Verhältnisse” in Dieter Henrich, *Eine Republik Deutschland* (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1990) pp. 71–101.
110. In *Eine Republik Deutschland*, Dieter Henrich argues that German culture remained largely unaffected by the court culture that shaped so much of French life. Its culture was shaped more by village pastors who espoused an unaffected form of life. This fits in well with Hegel’s account of the way in which German pietism prepared the way for a completion in thought of the social revolution in France.
111. See ¶599, p. 365; *PG*, pp. 424–425, where Hegel speaks of the immediacy of the moral worldview’s giving way to “negativity” and thereby needing an account of itself – in other words, of pietism giving way to Kantian philosophy.
112. Later, after the defeat of Napoleon and the seeming end of the French Revolution, this idea, which had preceded the Revolution, gathered further momentum, and it helped to extend the “moral worldview” in Germany. Interestingly, Hegel claimed (no doubt rashly) to have predicted the later 1812 downfall of Napoleon in these sections of the *Phenomenology* written around 1807. In a letter written to his friend Niethammer in 1814, he said (quoting his *Phenomenology*): “There are great things that have happened around us. It is a terrible spectacle to see an enormous genius destroy himself . . . Incidentally, I have, as I like to praise myself, predicted the whole upheaval. In my work (completed on the night before the battle of Jena), I said on p. 547, “absolute freedom (it was previously depicted; it is the purely abstract, formal freedom of the French

republic, which, as I showed, came out of the Enlightenment) leaves its self-destroying actuality and passes over into *another land* (I had there one *land* in mind) of self-conscious spirit where, in this non-actual world, freedom has the value of truth. In the thought of this truth spirit refreshes itself in so far as it *is* and *remains thought* and knows this being enclosed in self-consciousness as the perfect and complete essence. There has arisen the new formation of spirit, that of moral spirit.” (quoted in Heinrichs, *Die Logik der Phänomenologie des Geistes*), p. 357, note 208). The quoted passage is from the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, ¶595, p. 363; *PG*, p. 422. In saying that Germany accomplished in thought what the French had done in practice, Hegel is also possibly referring to a belief at the time that Germany had created a culture without a political base to it – what the later nationalist Gustav Freytag called the “miraculous creation of a soul without a body.” (Quoted in James J. Sheehan, *German History: 1770–1866*, p. 145.) In any event, though, Hegel did not think that pietism was the coherent expression of this new self-understanding of self-determining agency, even though it did share with it the idea of turning inward to subjectivity to find therein the springs of thought of action and thus was part of the general “moral worldview.” Hegel shared Kant’s personal antipathy to pietism, as both were themselves burdened by it in their youth. Hegel was, alas, not so prescient in his failure to predict the continuing force of pietist nationalist sentiment as a component of the movement of reaction in the 1820’s in Prussia, a development which was to be the basis of so much personal nervousness for him during his sojourn in Berlin from 1818 to 1831. On that, see John Edward Toews, *Hegelianism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980). pp. 245–248. Nonetheless, he maintained a kind of historical optimism that the incoherence of the pietist form of self-understanding would eventually have to give way to the force of modern institutions and the logic of the forms of self-understanding that best explicated what they were about.

113. See ¶603, p. 367; *PG*, p. 427: “Both of these, the pure thought and sensuousity of consciousness, are *in itself One consciousness*, and it is precisely pure thought for which and in which this pure unity is.” See also ¶602, pp. 366–367; *PG*, pp. 426–427.
114. See ¶600, pp. 365–366; *PG*, p. 425.
115. See ¶602, pp. 366–367; *PG*, p. 426–427. Hegel notes that “*individual conviction* and the knowledge of it constitute an absolute moment in morality.”
116. For example, Kant says in his *Doctrine of Virtue* that in the laws of virtue, the categorical imperative is taken more specifically: “Only that in ethics, this is thought as the law of your own will, not of will in general, which could also be the will of another.” *Metaphysik der Sitten* (ed. by Karl Vorländer) (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1966). p. 229.
117. In ¶602, pp. 366–367; *PG*, p. 426–427, Hegel notes that it “lies in the concept of morality . . . it is a demand of reason.”
118. Hegel’s development of the various postulates of the moral worldview along with these passages’ overall resemblance to the Kantian moral project might suggest that we take them as reconstructions of Kant’s arguments for the postulates of practical reason. However, Hegel’s postulates have only very general family resemblances to Kant’s postulates of practical reason, and there is thus little point in comparing the two. Hegel’s point is to reconstruct the “moral worldview” in general. Kenneth R. Westphal offers a very close comparison of the relevant Kantian texts and doctrines with the Hegelian counterclaims in his

- “Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Moral World View,” in Willem A. deVries (editor) *Philosophical Topics*, 19, 2 (1991), pp. 133–176. Westphal claims, convincingly, that “Hegel lets Kant have his arguments and focuses on his conclusions and the world view they articulate. He argues that Kant’s conclusions form an inconsistent set and that some of his conclusions are themselves incoherent. Consequently, be the arguments what they may, they must be faulty.” (p. 137) Westphal argues that Hegel is thereby justified in calling these things “postulates,” even though they have little to do with what Kant specifically labeled the postulates, since they concern what Kant’s philosophy must posit in order to make the claims it does. (See pp. 137–138) However, the target in several of these sections seems not only to be Kant per se, but also Fichte, whom Hegel considered as having taken the Kantian program to its logical conclusion. Westphal disagrees, claiming that it is fair to see Kant as the sole object of attack. However, at least in some cases, it is clear that it must be Fichte of whom Hegel is speaking. For example, in ¶626, p. 380; *PG*, pp. 440–441, Hegel says of “morality” in the moral worldview: “But it is the essence of morality to be only the *perfectly pure*; imperfect morality is therefore impure or is immorality.” This is clearly a reference to Fichte’s doctrine (and certainly not Kant’s!) that an action motivated by anything else than duty is immoral. Allen Wood points out the decidedly non-Kantian aspects of Fichte’s theory of morality in his “Fichte’s Philosophical Revolution,” *Philosophical Topics*, 19 (1991), pp. 1–28, see esp. pp. 16–18. For the case that Fichte is at least the partial object of criticism, see Johannes Heinrichs, *Die Logik der (Phänomenologie des Geistes)*, p. 372, note 229 and pp. 374–375. Westphal’s overall argument, however, rests on the view that the *Phenomenology*’s “method” is to explain some given domain of phenomena, and it criticizes other theories when they fail to explain that domain; he notes that Hegel wishes to examine views internally, which he takes as “examining how well that view accounts for the phenomena within its intended domain.” (p. 142) Thus, in his view, Hegel’s criticism of Kant has to be with whether Kant’s proposed revision of our experience of morality really fits the phenomena in question. This downplays too much, however, the element of *negativity* in Hegelian philosophy, of seeing not how accounts “fit” the phenomena but of how accounts generate within their own terms skepticism about themselves.
119. In ¶602, pp. 366–367; *PG*, p. 426–427, Hegel concludes by saying that the “existence thus demanded – that is, the unity of both – is therefore not a wish nor, regarded as an end, one whose attainment were still uncertain; it is rather a demand of reason, or an immediate certainty and presupposition of reason.”
 120. In his “Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Moral World View,” Kenneth Westphal makes this point against some recent neo-Kantian attempts at revising Kantian ethical thought to include non-Kantian elements. See pp. 160–165.
 121. Hegel makes these references in ¶603, pp. 367–368; *PG*, pp. 427–428.
 122. ¶603, pp. 367–368; *PG*, pp. 427–428. Hegel notes: “. . . for in it is contained the opposition through which the self is consciousness, or is first really an actual self and at the same time a universal.”
 123. Hegel notes that formally this is the same problem as confronted the Greek form of life in terms of the conflicts between the various “powers” of that which was known and the unknown laws of the netherworld, although the specific nature of the problem is much different. See ¶604, p. 369; *PG*, p. 429.
 124. See ¶604, p. 369; *PG*, p. 429

125. Hegel says that they must be seen as “existent in and for themselves” instead of being relative to something else. ¶604, p. 369; *PG*, p. 429
126. See ¶606, p. 370; *PG*, p. 430.
127. See ¶626, p. 380; *PG*, pp. 440–441. This point is also made by Kenneth Westphal, in his “Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Moral World View,” pp. 153–157.
128. Hegel speaks of this union of the personal and the impersonal points of view as leading to a conception of the “master and ruler of the world” as being necessary to “produce the harmony of morality and happiness” in ¶606, p. 370; *PG*, p. 430.
129. See ¶606, p. 370; *PG*, p. 430. Hegel says that this point of view is a “consciousness . . . in which the universal and the particular are purely one.”
130. See ¶607, p. 371; *PG*, pp. 430–431.
131. See ¶609, p. 371; *PG*, p. 431.
132. See ¶611, p. 372; *PG*, p. 432. Hegel says that the “moral worldview” is only a “thinking, not comprehending” account. For it to be a “comprehending” account would be for it to recognize the “negativities” (the ways in which the account undermines itself) and the necessity to develop a new, integrated account which resolves those dilemmas.
133. See ¶612–614, pp. 372; *PG*, pp. 432–433.
134. See ¶616, p. 374; *PG*, p. 434.
135. See ¶617, p. 374; *PG*, p. 434–435.
136. See ¶618, p. 374–375; *PG*, p. 435–436.
137. See ¶619, p. 375–376; *PG*, p. 436–437.
138. See ¶620, p. 376; *PG*, p. 437; ¶623, p. 378–379; *PG*, p. 439.
139. See ¶622, pp. 377–378; *PG*, p. 437–438. Hegel notes: “. . . the self-conscious sensuousness which ought to be sublated is exactly this mediator (*Mitte*) between pure consciousness and actuality.”
140. See ¶622, pp. 377–378; *PG*, p. 437–438. Karl Ameriks in his “Kant and Hegel on Freedom: Two New Interpretations,” *Inquiry*, 35, 219–232, argues that recent attempts at saving Kant’s theory of freedom by invoking the “two aspect” account of action fail. The “two aspect” account, brilliantly articulated by Henry E. Allison in both his *Kant’s Transcendental Idealism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983) and his *Kant’s Theory of Freedom* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), holds that, for example, in knowledge “the ideality of space and time rests just in their being epistemic conditions of our experience, and not in their being in any ontological contrast to some more fundamental set of noumenal things or properties.” (Ameriks, p. 221). In practical philosophy, the “two aspect” view holds that we need not describe action either as the result of noumenal willing or of a causal series; we can describe our actions as spatio-temporal events, *and* we can describe our actions in terms of the reasoning that justifies the action. These latter modes of description are not competing accounts of action, since the same action may be described both ways. Ameriks holds that this way of taking Kant will fail to get Kant out of his dilemmas, since “either this adoption [of a maxim] is solely a temporal act, and then, with a non-noumenal metaphysics, it is absolutely determined after all; or else the Kantian must move back to a noumenal ground to save the claims of freedom.” (Ameriks, p. 222.)
141. This seems like an extraordinary, *ad hominem* charge against Kant and the Kantians. Kenneth Westphal in his “Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Moral World View,” pp. 145–146 defends Hegel on this point. Westphal notes that Hegel

bases this on his argument that it is mildly incoherent to say, as many do, that the wicked prosper and the virtuous languish, since on Kantian grounds, we have no good way to distinguish the virtuous from the wicked (that is, to distinguish those who are really trying from those who are not). Since there is no good way to make the distinction, if the distinction is made, it must be made arbitrarily. What better explanation is there of this arbitrary division except that some people are envious are those who are happier?

142. ¶631, p. 382–383; *PG*, p. 443–444.
143. See ¶631, pp. 382–383; *PG*, pp. 443–444.
144. See ¶634–635, pp. 385–386; *PG*, pp. 446–448.
145. See ¶638, p. 387; *PG*, p. 449: “. . . it regards itself as the *in-itself* or *essence*; but as conscience, it apprehends its *being-for-self* or its self . . . a simple *self*, which is just as much *pure* knowing as it is a knowing of itself as *this individual* consciousness. Consequently, this self constitutes the content of what was previously the empty essence.”
146. See ¶640, p. 388; *PG*, p. 450: “Conscience is what is communal to the self-consciousnesses, and this is the substance in which the deed has subsistence and *actuality*, the moment of becoming *recognized* by others.” See also ¶641; *PG*, p. 451.
147. See ¶641, pp. 388–389; *PG*, p. 451.
148. See ¶646, p. 393; *PG*, pp. 455–456.
149. See ¶647, pp. 393–394; *PG*, p. 456.
150. See ¶650, p. 395; *PG*, pp. 457–458.
151. ¶652, p. 395; *PG*, p. 458: “Here again we see *language* as the existence of spirit. Language is self-consciousness existing *for others*, self-consciousness which as such is immediately present at hand, and as *this* self-consciousness is universal. It is the self that separates itself from itself, which as pure $I = I$ becomes objective to itself, which in this objectivity equally preserves itself as *this* self, just as it coalesces directly with other selves and is *their* self-consciousness. It takes itself just as it is taken by others, and the taking is just existence which has become a self.”
152. See ¶653, pp. 395–396; *PG*, pp. 458–459.
153. See ¶652, p. 395; *PG*, p. 458.
154. See ¶656, pp. 397–398; *PG*, pp. 460–461.
155. See ¶655, p. 397; *PG*, p. 460.
156. See ¶656, pp. 397–398; *PG*, pp. 460–461.
157. ¶656, p. 398; *PG*, p. 461.
158. The term was common in the eighteenth century and in Hegel’s own day. The phrase, “the beautiful soul” was also used by a number of writers with which Hegel would have been familiar – for example, by Schiller in his essay, “Über Anmut und Würde,” by Goethe in *Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre*, and by Rousseau in his novel, *La Nouvelle Héloïse*, which concerns a romantic, religious community of “beautiful souls.”
159. The connection between Hegel’s idea of the beautiful soul and Rousseau’s conception of the *belle âme* is laid out by Jean Starobinski in his *Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Transparency and Obstruction* (translated by Arthur Goldhammer) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).
160. See ¶658, p. 400; *PG*, p. 463: “The hollow object it has itself produced now fills it therefore with a consciousness of emptiness. Its activity is a yearning which, as

it becomes an object devoid of essence, merely loses itself, and, transcending this loss and falling back on itself, finds itself only as something lost. In this transparent purity of its moments, as an unhappy so-called *beautiful soul*, its light dies away within it (*verglimmt sie in sich*), and it vanishes like a shapeless vapor that dissolves into thin air." It is clear from what Hegel says in the paragraph on Novalis in his later lectures on the history of philosophy that it is indeed Novalis whom Hegel had in mind in his discussion of the decline of the beautiful soul. He says of Novalis in the paragraph on him in the lectures: "Subjectivity exists in a lack but is driven towards something solid and thus remains a *longing*. This longing of the *beautiful soul* is presented in Novalis's writings. This subjectivity persists as longing, does not come to substantiality, dies out like an ember (*verglimmt in sich*), and holds itself solidly to this standpoint – the weaving and plotting of lines within itself; it is interior life and the ladenness with minutia (*Umständigkeit*) of all truth. The extravagance of subjectivity often becomes madness; it abides in thoughts, so it is caught in a vortex of the reflecting understanding, which always is negative against itself." *Werke*, 20, p. 418. In his later lectures on aesthetics, Hegel says of Novalis, "Novalis, for example, one of the nobler minds who felt himself to be in this standpoint, was driven into a void with no determinate interests, into this dread of actuality, and was wound down as it were into a spiritual consumption. This is a longing which will not let itself go in actual action and production, because it is frightened of being polluted by contact with finitude, although all the same it has a sense of the deficiency of this abstraction within it." *Aesthetics*, I, p. 160; *Werke*, 13, p. 211. (Novalis died of consumption, i.e., tuberculosis, in 1801.)

161. See the *Philosophy of Right*, §140. In the section on "Irony" in his introduction to his lectures on aesthetics, Hegel claims that the romantic conception of irony had its roots in the works of Friedrich von Schlegel. "This had its deeper roots in one of its aspects in Fichte's philosophy, in so far as the principles of this philosophy were applied to art . . . Now so far as concerns the looser connection of Fichte's propositions with one tendency of irony, we need in this respect emphasize only the following points about this irony, namely, that [*first*] Fichte sets up the *I* as the absolute principle of all knowing, reason and cognition – an *I* remains throughout abstract and formal. *Secondly*, this *I* is therefore in itself just simple, and, on the one hand, every particularity, every determinateness, every content is negated in it – since everything is submerged in this abstract freedom and unity – while on the other hand, every content which is to count for the *I* is only posited and recognized (*anerkannt*) by the *I* itself . . . But in that case, the *I* can remain lord and master of everything, and in no sphere of ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*), law, things human and divine, profane and sacred, is there anything that would not first have to be posited by the *I*, and therefore could not equally well be destroyed by it . . . Now *thirdly*, the *I* is a *living*, active individual, and its life consists in making its individuality for itself as for others, in expressing itself, and bringing itself into appearance. For every man by living tries to realize himself and does realize himself . . . Moreover this virtuosity of an ironical-artistic life apprehends itself as a *divine genius* for which anything and everything is only a creation lacking an essence (*wesenloser Geschöpf*) to which the creator, knowing himself to be disengaged and free from everything, is not bound, because he is just as able to destroy it as to create it. In that case, he who has reached this standpoint of divine genius looks down from his high rank on all

other men, for they are declared to be dull and limited, inasmuch as law, ethical life, etc. still count for them as fixed, essential and obligatory. So then the individual, who lives in this way as an artist, does give himself relations to others; he lives with friends, lovers, etc.; but by his being a genius, this relation to his own determinate actuality, his particular actions, as well as to what is universal in and for itself, is at the same time null; he behaves to all of it ironically . . . This then implies that not only is there to be no seriousness about law, ethical life, and truth, but that there is nothing in what is lofty and best, since, in its appearance in individuals, characters, and actions, it contradicts and destroys itself and so is ironical about itself." *Aesthetics*, I, pp. 65–67; *Werke*, 13, pp. 93–97.

162. Hegel calls the former non-ironic standpoint a "universal consciousness" and the latter ironic standpoint an "individual consciousness". See ¶660, p. 401; *PG*, p. 464.
163. See ¶660, p. 401; *PG*, p. 464: "For the consciousness which holds firmly to duty, the first consciousness counts as *evil*, because of the disparity between its *being within itself* (*Insichseins*) and the universal; and since, at the same time, this first consciousness declares its action to be in conformity with itself (*als Gleichheit mit sich selbst*), to be duty and conscientiousness, it is held by the universal consciousness to be *hypocrisy*." After this passage, Hegel refers to the ironist consciousness as the "evil consciousness," assuming for the point of his exposition the point of view of the non-ironist consciousness.
164. See ¶663, pp. 402–403; *PG*, pp. 465–466.
165. See ¶664, p. 403; *PG*, p. 466.
166. See ¶665, pp. 403–404; *PG*, pp. 466–468.
167. See ¶666, p. 405; *PG*, p. 468.
168. See ¶667, pp. 405–406; *PG*, pp. 469–470.
169. Emmanuel Hirsch in his "Die Beisetzung der Romantiker in Hegels Phänomenologie" (1924, reprinted in Hans Friedrich Fulda and Dieter Henrich (editors) *Materialien zu Hegels (Phänomenologie des Geistes)*, pp. 245–275, argues that the hard-hearted moralist is none other than Hegel's old friend, Hölderlin. This same line is defended by Moltke Gram in his "Moral and Literary Ideals in Hegel's Critique of the "Moral World-View" " in *Clio*, 7. No. 3, 1978, pp. 375–402. (There is no citation of Hirsch in Gram's piece, showing that Gram comes to this conclusion independently of Hirsch.) Gram especially argues against the idea that Hegel could have had Schlegel in mind as the hard-hearted moralist, since he argues that such a view would completely misrepresent Schlegel's concept of irony. But, if my reconstruction is correct, then Schlegel would not be the *hard-hearted* moralist at all; Schlegel would be clearly the *romantic ironist*. If we assume for the sake of argument that we must then find some other literary model for the hard-hearted moralist, it would seem to me that it would not be, as Gram suggests, Hölderlin (who is more of a beautiful soul like Novalis), but Rousseau, the archetypal romantic moralist who both condemns the evils of his age while pretending always to be outside of it, and all the while taking part in it.
170. See ¶671, p. 409; *PG*, p. 472: "The reconciling Yes, in which the two I's fall away from their opposed *existence*, is the *existence* of the *I* which has expanded into a duality, which therein remains identical with itself, and in its complete externalization and opposite possesses the certainty of itself: it is the appearing God in the midst of those who know themselves as pure knowledge."

Chapter Six

1. In the *Phenomenology*, however, unlike the later “system,” art and religion are compounded into one topic, and philosophy is not treated as a separate subject. Instead, we have a concluding chapter on “Absolute Knowledge.” The clear distinction of the three types of practice of “absolute reflection” is central to Hegel’s later work as articulated in his Berlin *Encyclopedia*. As such these reflections on the essential self-identity of the members of the community (and consequently on their highest interests) can be seen from two aspects: (1) they can be seen from the standpoint of how they articulate the central core beliefs of a form of life; and (2) they can be seen as individual social institutions and formations, expressing only a particular point of view. Philosophy takes itself to be concerned only with the former, not the latter. But why these three forms? In his later mature system, Hegel strangely insists on employing the categories of subjective spirit (those used in his philosophical psychology) in order to classify the three forms of absolute reflection. Thus, art is intuition (*Anschauung*), religion is taken as representation (*Vorstellung*), and philosophy corresponds to thought (*Denken*). The three forms of absolute reflection thus correspond to the three basic ways in which mentality operates. (Willem deVries, *Hegel’s Theory of Mental Activity* gives an excellent account of these three forms of mentality or subjective spirit). However, as Stephen Bungay in his *Beauty and Truth* argues, this seems mistaken from a Hegelian point of view. Bungay notes, for example, that Hegel often argues that some art is connected with representation (*Vorstellung*). Moreover, the modes in the “Psychology” designate not psychological modes of access to a common object (as art, religion and philosophy are said to do) but different forms of spirit. Moreover, absolute spirit is supposed to move on the level of what in the *Science of Logic* is called the “Concept,” not on the level of the “Psychology.” Thus, the division of absolute spirit into its form should follow the way in which concepts are divided. As an alternative, Bungay proposes that we see the distinction in the following way: Since the content of absolute spirit is self-reflection, we should see (1) in *art* that content is *universal*; (2) in *religion* that content is *particular* – that is, different according to socio-historical context; (3) in *philosophy* it is *individual* since universal themes are understood in a particular way. The difference would thus mirror the difference between universal, particular and individual concepts. See Bungay, *Beauty and Truth*, pp. 31–34.
2. See ¶672, p. 410, *PG*, p. 473: “In the previous formations (*Gestaltungen*) . . . religion as consciousness of *absolute essence* as such has indeed made its appearance, although only from the *standpoint of the consciousness* that is conscious of absolute essence; but absolute essence *in and for itself*, the self-consciousness of spirit, has not appeared in those forms.”
3. To speak of *symbols* here might be misleading, since Hegel uses the term “symbol,” in a very special way in his *Aesthetics* to denote the kind of art that one finds in Egypt. I am using “symbol” in its more contemporary, non-Hegelian sense here.
4. See ¶673, p. 410, *PG*, p. 473.
5. See ¶673, p. 410, *PG*, p. 473: “But the supersensible, the eternal, or whatever else it may be called, is devoid of self; to begin with, it is only the universal, which is a long way yet from being spirit that knows itself as spirit.”
6. See ¶675, p. 411, *PG*, p. 474: “. . . the supersensible, *empty* beyond which is neither to be known nor feared it knows neither as a self nor as a power.”

7. See ¶673, p. 410, *PG*, p. 473: “The immediate existence of *reason* which for us issued from that pain and its characteristic formations has no religion, because the self-consciousness of them knows or seeks *itself* in the *immediate* present.”
8. See ¶680, p. 414, *PG*, p. 477: “The whole of spirit, the spirit of religion, is again the movement away from its immediacy toward the attainment of the *knowledge* of what it is *in itself* or immediately, the movement in which finally the *formation* in which it appears for its consciousness will be perfectly identical with its essence, and it will behold itself as it is.”
9. See ¶682, p. 415, *PG*, pp. 479–480: “Spirit is actual as absolute spirit only when it is also for itself in its *truth* as it is in its *certainty of itself*, or when the extremes into which as consciousness it divides itself are for each other in a spiritual formation (*Geistesgestalt*).”
10. See ¶684, p. 417, *PG*, p. 481: “The series of different religions which will come to view, just as much sets forth again only the different aspects of a single religion, and moreover of *every single* religion, and the representations (*Vorstellungen*) which seem to distinguish one actual religion from another occur in each one.”
11. This also distinguishes philosophy – as a form of absolute spirit – from science. Plato’s or Aristotle’s works have a kind of resonance for us that much Greek science does not and cannot have. Likewise, Newton’s science is of interest to us as science only to the extent that parts of it continue to be accepted by the scientific community. Those parts that have been superseded are no longer of scientific interest.
12. *Lichtwesen* is translated by Miller as “God as Light”.
13. See ¶686, p. 419, *PG*, p. 484: “In virtue of this determination, this formation is the pure, all-embracing and all-pervading *luminous essence* of sunrise, which preserves itself in its formless substantiality. Its otherness is the equally simple negative, *darkness*.”
14. See ¶689, p. 420; *PG*, p. 485.
15. Hegel’s understanding of the Egyptians at the time of the writing of the *Phenomenology* was completely uninformed by anything now recognizable as modern Egyptology, since the latter did not really come about until after his death. At the time of the writing of the *Phenomenology*, for example, Champollion had not yet deciphered the Egyptian hieroglyphs. His knowledge of the ancient Egyptians as evidenced in the *Phenomenology* seems to rely heavily on Herodotus. Hegel later apparently became familiar with more up to date Egyptology, including Champollion’s work. See *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion: The Lectures of 1827*, (Peter Hodgson, ed.; translated by R.F. Brown, P.C. Hodgson, and J.M. Stewart, with the assistance of H.S. Harris) (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), p. 326, note 341, editor’s comment.
16. See ¶691, p. 421; *PG*, p. 486.
17. See ¶695, p. 423; *PG*, p. 488.
18. See ¶696, p. 423, *PG*, p. 488: “Over against this outer self of the formation (*Gestalt*) stands the other formation which proclaims its possession of an *inner* side (ein *Inneres*). Nature, withdrawing into its essence, sets down its living, self-particularizing, self-entangling manifold existence to the level of an unessential husk, which is the *covering for the inner* aspect; and this inner aspect is, in the first instance, still simple darkness, the unmoved, the black, formless stone.”
19. *Aesthetics*, I, p. 111; *Werke*, 13, p. 151.
20. Greek art is distinguished from Christian art. In the latter, truths about spirit cannot in principle be captured completely in the work of art, since the simple

pursuit of beauty itself is not enough to capture the Christian truth. (A well-done, beautiful painting of Jesus loosing himself from the cross and running away cannot capture Christian “truth,” however well it is executed.) Modern art is distinct from Christian art in that it takes the principles of thought to be determinative of the truth, and hence imports itself as an external criterion into both religion and art in a similar way to which Christian religion imported itself into art. Hegel’s complex doctrine of art also had him ranking the periods of world history in terms of the categories of absolute spirit. Thus, the ancient world is best captured in its art, the medieval world in religion, and modern life (post 1789) in philosophy. An excellent and clear discussion of this theme in the mature *Aesthetics* is found in Stephen Bungay, *Beauty and Truth*. pp. 56–71.

21. See ¶707, p. 428, *PG*, p. 494: “The essence of the god is however the unity of the universal existence of nature and of self-conscious spirit, which in its actuality has the appearance of standing over and against the former. At the same time, being in the first instance an *individual* formation, its existence is one of the elements of nature, just as its self-conscious actuality is an individual national spirit. But the former is in this unity that element reflected into spirit, nature transfigured by thought and united with self-conscious life.”
22. See ¶709, p. 429, *PG*, p. 495: “The artist then learns in his work that he did not produce an essence *like himself*. From it, it is true, there comes back to him a consciousness in the sense that an admiring crowd reveres it as the spirit which is their own essence. But this animation, since it returns to him his self-consciousness only as admiration, is rather a confession to the artist that the animated work is not the same as him (*nicht seinesgleichen zu sein*). Since his work comes back to him simply as joyfulness, he does not find therein the pain of his cultivation and begetting, nor the effort of his work.” Miller’s translation of *Beseelen* and *Beseelung* as “inspire” and “inspiration” is terribly misleading in this context, since it makes the English passages suggest that what is at issue in the work of art is whether it comes from the inspiration of the artist. That is, it makes it seem as if Hegel is bringing in a romantic worry about artistic inspiration into his discussion of Greek art.
23. See ¶710, p. 430, *PG*, p. 496: “This higher element is language – an existence (*Dasein*) that is immediately self-conscious existence. Just as the *individual* self-consciousness is *immediately* present in language, so it is also immediately present as a *universal* infection; the complete particularization into being-for-self is at the same time the fluidity and the universally communicated unity of many selves; language is the soul existing as soul.”
24. Hegel expresses this as saying that “in other words, self-consciousness in the becoming-objective (*Gegenständlichwerden*) of its essence, remains immediately with itself (*bei sich*).” ¶710, p. 430, *PG*, p. 496.
25. For example, in the lectures on the philosophy of religion, Hegel says: “Here this natural will is the negation, and the human being comes to itself and is free spirit in overcoming this naturalness; one has reconciled one’s heart or natural individuality – which is other than rationality or the rational – with the rational, and so one is present to oneself.” *The Lectures of 1827*, p. 311. In the *Encyclopedia*, Hegel says: “The *subject* is the *activity* of the satisfaction of drives, of formal rationality, namely, the translation from the subjectivity of the content, insofar as it is an end (*Zweck*), into objectivity, in which the subject comes together with itself (*sich mit sich selbst zusammenschliesst*) . . . An action is the subject’s end, and it is his activity that executes this end; only in that in this manner the subject is *in even*

disinterested action, i.e., through his interest, is it an action in general . . . However, drive and passion is nothing other than the vitality (*Lebendigkeit*) of the subject, according to which it itself is in its ends and their execution." *Encyclopaedia*, §475.

26. See ¶710, p. 430, *PG*, p. 496: "It retains within itself the individuality of self-consciousness, and this individuality is at the same time taken as universally there. Devotion, kindled in all the agents, is the spiritual stream which in the multiplicity of self-conscious agents is conscious of its act as the same as the act of all and as *simple being*. Spirit, as this universal self-consciousness of all, has its pure inwardness, no less than the being-for-others and the being-for-self of the individuals in a single unity."
27. See ¶710, p. 430, *PG*, p. 496: "This language is distinct from another language of the god which is not of universal self-consciousness. The *oracle*, both of the god of the religions of art and of the preceding religions, is the necessary first form of the god's utterance; for the *concept* of the god implied that is the essence of both nature and spirit, and therefore has not only natural but spiritual existence as well. In so far as this moment is at first merely implied in his *concept* and not yet realized religion, the language is for the religious self-consciousness the language of an *alien* self-consciousness."
28. See ¶712, p. 432, *PG*, p. 497: ". . . in the religion of art because the god has taken on consciousness and hence individuality in general, the language peculiar to the god is the spirit of an ethical people is the oracle, which knows its particular affairs and what is advantageous concerning them. However, the universal truths, because they are known as that which exists in itself (*das Ansichseiende*), are claimed by *knowing thought* (*wissende Denken*) for itself, and their speech is no longer alien to it but is its own." ¶712, p. 431, *PG*, p. 497; "What is higher than both, however, is not only to make deliberation into the oracle for contingent action but in addition to know that this deliberate action is itself something contingent on account of its connection with the particular aspect of the action and of its advantageousness."
29. In his lectures on the philosophy of religion, Hegel says: "In the cultus, honor is bestowed upon the god, but revering God turns into the reverence proper to humanity itself, the reverence that makes the consciousness of one's affirmative relationship and unity with the gods valid in one's own self." *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* 1827, p. 351.
30. See ¶718, pp. 434–435; *PG*, pp. 500–501.
31. In the lectures on the philosophy of religion, Hegel notes: "Bacchus and Demeter, wine and bread, are external for the human being. The way to make oneself identical with them is to consume them, to assimilate them into oneself."
32. See ¶718, p. 434, *PG*, p. 500: "The sacrifice of the divine substance, in so far as it is an *act*, belongs to the self-conscious aspect; that this actual deed be possible, the essence must in itself have already sacrificed itself . . . This renunciation therefore which the essence has already accomplished *in itself*, is presented by the acting self in existence and for his own consciousness, thus replacing that *immediate* actuality of the essence by a higher actuality, namely, that of *himself*."
33. See ¶722, p. 437, *PG*, p. 503: "For the mystical is not concealment of a secret or ignorance but consists in the self knowing itself to be one with the essence and this therefore is revealed."
34. Hegel seems to be aware of the rather vague nature of some of the things that he says at this point in the *Phenomenology* about Greek religious life, but he also

seems to believe that such vagueness matches up with the rather abstract nature in which the religion appropriate to that form of life understood itself. The forms of self-reflection practiced by such cults are after all only *abstract* and are therefore only very general reflections on self-identity. It would falsify them to make them more determinate than they are, to give any more determinate articulation to expressions like “being one with the essence of things.”

35. In speaking of the Greek games in his lectures on the philosophy of history, Hegel noted, “If we observe now the inner nature of these games, we note above all that the game is opposed to seriousness, to dependence and need. There was no seriousness to such wrestling, running and sparring; in them lay no necessity of defense, no need of battle. What is serious is labor in reference to some need; I or nature must perish; if one is to subsist, the other must fall. Compared to this seriousness, however, the game is the higher seriousness, for in it nature is incorporated into spirit, and although in these contests the subject has not advanced to the highest seriousness of thought, yet in this exercise of his corporeality, man shows his freedom, namely, that he has transformed his body into an organ of spirit.” *Werke*, 12, pp. 297–298.
36. As Hegel puts it in his lectures on the philosophy of religion, “Thus, for example, Pallas Athena is not the goddess of the city. What is represented in Pallas Athena is the living, actual spirit of the Athenian people according to its essentiality” (*Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, p. 350); and, “Pallas is the people or nation itself; but the nation is the god imbued with life, it is this Athena who delights in herself.” (p. 352.)
37. “A major point of their mythology is the gods, with Zeus at their head, have gained the mastery for themselves by a war, by violence. The spiritual power has cast down the giants, the titans, from the throne; the sheer power of nature has been overcome by the spiritual, the spiritual has elevated itself above it and now rules over the world. Thus this war with the titans is not merely a fairy tale but is the essence of the Greek religion. The entire concept of the Greek gods lies in this war of the gods.” *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, p. 333.
38. See ¶1707, p. 428, *PG*, p. 494: “The form of the gods (*Göttergestalt*) has, therefore, its nature-element within it as a sublated element, as a dim memory. The desert-like essence and confused strife of the free existence of the elements, the unethical realm of the titans, is conquered and banished to the fringes of an actuality that has become clear to itself, to the obscure boundaries of the world which finds itself in spirit and is there at peace.”
39. “A third aspect of epic individuals may be deduced from the fact that what epic has to describe is not an action as such, but an event (*Begebenheit*). In drama what is all-important is that the individual shall actually be working for his end and shall be presented precisely in this activity and its consequences. Undisturbed concern for realizing one end disappears in epic. Here indeed the heroes may have wishes and ends of their own, but the chief thing is not the devotion of activity to their own end but what meets them in their pursuit of it. The circumstances are just as effective as their activity, and often more effective.” *Aesthetics*, p. 1069; *Werke*, 15, pp. 361–362.
40. “Here we have before us in domestic and public life neither barbarism nor the purely intellectual prose of an ordered family and political life, but that originally poetic middle stage that I described above. But a chief point in it concerns the free individuality of all the figures. For example, in the *Iliad* Agamemnon is the King of Kings, the other princes are under his scepter, but his position as overlord does

not become the dry connection of command and obedience, of a master and his servants. On the contrary, Agamemnon must be very circumspect and shrewd enough to give way, because the individual princes are not his lieutenants and generals, summoned at his call, but are as independent as he is himself; they have assembled around him of their own free will or have been induced by some other means to join the expedition. He must take counsel with them, and if they are dissatisfied they stay away from the fight as Achilles did. This freely willed participation in the struggle, or the reverse, preserves the independence of the individual unimpaired, and this is what gives the whole relationship its poetic form . . . The relation between Agamemnon and the princes is repeated in the relation between the princes and their people. The latter follow of their own will; there is no compelling law to which they are subject . . . Order prevails in the home as well, though it is not an organization of servants but a matter of disposition and *mores*. Everything looks as if it had become so immediately (*unmittelbar so geworden*).” *Aesthetics*, pp. 1053–1054; *Werke*, 15, pp. 341–342.

41. See ¶720, p. 436, *PG*, p. 502.): “This spirit confronting the self-conscious people is therefore not the luminous essence, which being devoid of a self does not contain within it the self-certainty of the individuals but is only their universal essence and the lordly power in which they disappear. The cult of the religion of this simple shapeless (*gestaltlosen*) essence therefore gives back to its dependents (*angehörige*) in general merely this: that they are the people of their god, who secures for them only their enduring existence (*Bestehen*) and their substance as such; not, however, their actual self, which on the contrary is rejected. For they revere their god as the empty depth, not as spirit.”
42. “Of course in relation to the wrath of Achilles moral pedants may very well ask us to consider what trouble this wrath produced and what damage it did, and then to draw an inference fatal to the excellence and greatness of Achilles on the ground that he could not be perfect either as hero or man when on the occasion of his wrath he had not self-mastery enough to modify the strength of his feeling. But Achilles is not to be blamed, and we need not excuse his wrath at all on the score of his other great qualities: the point is that Achilles is the man that he is, and with that, so far as epic goes, the matter is at an end.” *Aesthetics*, p. 1067–1068; *Werke*, 15, p. 360.
43. “In this sense we can maintain that what rules in epic, though not, as commonly supposed, in drama, is fate. In drama, owing to the sort of aim which a character is determined to carry out in given and known circumstances, with all the resulting collisions, he creates his fate *himself*, whereas an epic character has his fate *made for* him, and this power of circumstances, which imprints an individual formation (*Gestalt*) on his deed, allocates his lot to him, and determines the outcome of his actions, is the proper dominion of fate . . . epic poetry moves in the element of a total state of affairs necessary in itself, and nothing is left to the individual but to submit to this fundamental situation, that is, to what *is*, be it adapted to him or not, and then suffer as may or must.” *Aesthetics*, pp. 1070–1071; *Werke*, 15, p. 364. “But in epic, circumstances and external accidents count just as much as the character’s will, and what he achieves passes before us just as what happens from without does, so that his deed must prove to be conditioned and brought about just as much by his entanglement in external circumstances . . . Now when equal worth is given to external circumstances with their attendant accidents independent of the individual, it seems that indisputable

- playroom is given to that vein of accident, yet what epic should present to us is what is genuinely objective, i.e., the fundamental substance of existence. We can meet this contradiction at once by pointing out that *necessity* lies at the heart of events and happenings.” *Aesthetics*, p. 1070; *Werke*, 15, pp. 363–364.
44. See ¶729, pp. 440–441; *PG*, p. 507. The singer of the epic is the individual artist whose task is to articulate this remembrance for the community and to give it shape so that the members of the community can see their essential self-identities in it as something which was previously only taken for granted. As Hegel puts it, “[t]he *minstrel* is the individual and the actuality out of whom as subject of this world this world is produced and borne. His pathos is not the stupefying power of nature but mnemosyne, recollection (*Besinnung*) and developed inwardness, the remembrance of formerly immediate essence.”
 45. See ¶729, pp. 440–441; *PG*, p. 507. In this way, Hegel thinks, the whole thing appears as an analogy to a syllogism, with a universal term – the gods – being linked to an individual term – the minstrel – through a particular term – the heroes of legend.
 46. “Here what is especially required is that in the actions of gods and men the poetic relation of their mutual independence shall be preserved, so that neither can the gods be degraded to lifeless abstractions nor human individuals to being obedient servants.” *Aesthetics*, p. 1072; *Werke*, 15, p. 366.
 47. See ¶730, p. 441; *PG*, p. 508: “The undertaking which is the object of these general endeavors has two sides: the side of the *self*, by which the undertaking is accomplished by a totality of actual peoples and the individualities standing at their head; and the side of the universal, by which it is accomplished by their substantial powers.”
 48. See ¶732, p. 443, *PG*, p. 510: “The content of the world of representation (*Vorstellung*) freely unfolds itself in the *middle term* for itself, gathering itself round the individuality of a hero who, however, in his strength and beauty feels his life is broken and sorrowfully awaits an early death.”
 49. In the *Phenomenology of Spirit* itself, Hegel says: “This necessity, however, is the *unity* of the concept which brings under control the contradictory substantiality of the separate moments, a unity in which the inconsistency and arbitrariness of their actions receives its earnestness and worth in the actions themselves.” ¶732, p. 443, *PG*, p. 510. But in his *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, p. 339, Hegel notes: “The higher power, absolute unity, stands above the gods as a pure power. This is power is what is called destiny, fate or simple necessity. It is without content, is empty necessity, an empty unintelligible power that is devoid of the concept. It is not wise, for wisdom falls within the circle of the gods and includes concrete characteristics that belong in the sphere of the particular and pertain to single gods. Destiny is devoid of purpose and wisdom, it is a blind necessity that stands above all, even above the gods, uncomprehended and desolate. The abstract cannot be comprehended.”
 50. “For it is only the wars of nations foreign to one another that are of a genuinely epic kind, whereas dynastic battles, civil wars, and commotions are more suited to dramatic representation. Thus, for instance, Aristotle long ago recommended tragedians to select material with the war of brother against brother as its subject matter.” *Aesthetics*, p. 1060; *Werke*, p. 351.
 51. In an apparent reference to the dictum in the *Phenomenology* that “substance must become subject,” Hegel notes intriguingly in his lectures on aesthetics that the

- basic principle of drama is that the unity of substance and subject is of primary importance. This principle is basic to both tragedy and comedy. See *Aesthetics*, pp. 1193–1194 and p. 1201; *Werke*, 15, p. 520 and p. 530.
52. This becomes clear in ¶733, pp. 443–444, *PG*, pp. 510–511, and it is much more explicit in his discussion of it in his *Aesthetics*.
 53. “At its first level we find the art of the actor in Greece. Here the art of speech is bound up with sculpture: the actor comes on the stage as a objective picture in total embodiment. But this statue is vitalized; it assimilates and expresses the content of the poetry.” *Aesthetics*, p. 1186; *Werke*, 15, p. 511
 54. In speaking of music in his *Aesthetics*, Hegel explains this in terms of the distinction between artistic result and artistic activity: “In sculpture and painting we have the work of art before us as the objectively and independently existent (*für sich dastehende*) result of artistic activity, but not this activity itself as produced and alive. The musical work of art, on the other hand, as we saw, is presented to us only by the action of an executant artist, just as, in dramatic poetry, the whole man comes on the stage, fully alive, and is himself made into an animated work of art.” *Aesthetics*, p. 955; *Werke*, 15, p. 218.
 55. See ¶734, p. 444, *PG*, p. 511: “In regard to form, the language ceases to be narrative (*erzählend*) because it enters into the content, just as the content ceases to one that is represented (*vorgestellt*).” ¶733, pp. 443–444; *PG*, p. 510; “Lastly, these characters *exist* as actual human beings who impersonate the heroes and portray them, not in the form of narrative, but in the actual speech of the actors themselves. Just as it is essential for the statue to be the work of human hands, so is the actor essential to his mask – not as an external condition from which artistically considered we must abstract.”
 56. “A truly tragic suffering, on the contrary, is only inflicted on the individual agents as a consequence of their own deed which is both legitimate and, owing to the resulting collision, blameworthy, and for which their whole self is answerable.” *Aesthetics*, II, p. 1198; *Werke*, 15, p. 526.
 57. With regard to this idea of reconciliation, Hegel makes an exception for *Oedipus at Colonus*, which he characterizes as “an inner atonement (*Aussöhnung*), which because of its subjectivity, already borders on our modern treatment.” *Aesthetics*, II, p. 1219; *Werke*, 15, p. 551.
 58. Zeus is, Hegel wryly notes, only a commander of a variety of unruly gods: “They stand too under the supreme *command* (*Oberbefehl*) of the one, rather than under his supreme *sovereignty* (*Oberherrschaft*).” ¶728, p. 330, *PG*, p. 507.
 59. “. . . in fact the chorus confronts us as a higher substantial consciousness, warning against false conflicts, and weighing the outcome. Nevertheless, the chorus is not at all a moral (*moralische*) person, disengaged like a spectator, a person reflecting on the thing purely from outside, in himself uninteresting and tedious, and introduced simply for the sake of his reflections. On the contrary, the chorus is the actual substance of the ethical life and action of the heroes themselves; in contrast to these individuals it is the people as the fruitful soil out of which they grow . . . and by the existence of which they are conditioned.” *Aesthetics*, II, pp. 1210–1211; *Werke*, 15, p. 541.
 60. Hegel makes some extremely oblique references to Shakespearean tragedy in this context comparing Oedipus with Macbeth and Hamlet. Given his later thoughts on tragedy as he worked them out in his *Aesthetics*, this comparison is misleading. In Greek tragedy, the oppositions come from the form of life in its social and institutional formations. In modern life, on the other hand, tragedy comes from

oppositions found within the subjectivity of the character himself or between characters. Thus, in Hegel's mature view, whereas Antigone is paradigmatic for Greek tragedy, Hamlet is paradigmatic for the modern tragedy of internal subjective conflict. See ¶737, pp. 446–447; *PG*, pp. 513–514. See also Stephen Bungay, *Beauty and Truth*, pp. 165–178 for an insightful treatment of the difference between Hegel's view of Greek and modern tragedy.

61. See ¶738, p. 447, *PG*, p. 514: "The nether law sits with Zeus on the throne and enjoys equal honor with the god who is revealed and is knowing."
62. See ¶740, p. 448, *PG*, p. 516: "The action, in being carried out, demonstrates their unity in the natural downfall of both powers and both self-conscious characters. The reconciliation of the opposition with itself is the Lethe of the underworld in death; or the Lethe of the upper world as absolution, not from guilt (for consciousness cannot deny its guilt, because it committed the act), but from the crime; and also the peace of mind following atonement for the crime."
63. "At its plastic height in Greece, tragedy remains one-sided by making the validity of the substance and necessity of ethical life its essential basis and by leaving undeveloped the individuality of the dramatis personae (*handelnden Charaktere*) and the depths of their personal life (*subjektive Vertiefung*). Comedy on its side brings to view in a converse mode of plasticity, and to perfection, the subjective personality in the free expiation of its absurdity and its absurdity's dissolution." *Aesthetics*, p. 1222; *Werke*, 15, p. 555.
64. Hegel apparently did not conceive of a fundamentally nihilistic form of tragedy in which the characters would either not receive what was due to them by justice or in which the representation of the "eternal order of things" or "the social scheme of justice" is seen as not in and of itself consistent – that is, in which the order of things is seen as fundamentally irrational. Hegel himself clearly thought that this could not produce genuine *tragedy*: "Fate drives individuality back within its limits and destroys it if these are crossed. But an irrational compulsion and innocent suffering would inevitably produce in the soul of the spectator mere indignation instead of ethical peace." *Aesthetics*, II, p. 1216; *Werke*, p. 548.
65. ¶741, p. 449, *PG*, p. 516.
66. See ¶741, p. 449, *PG*, p. 516: "The expulsion of such essence-less representations (*wesenslose Vorstellungen*) which was demanded by the philosophers of antiquity thus already begins in tragedy in general through the fact that the division of the substance is controlled by the concept and consequently individuality is what is essential, and the determinations are the absolute characters."
67. In speaking of Aristophanes' plays, Hegel notes: "The keynote resounding in all these portrayals is the self-confidence of all these figures, and it is all the more imperturbable the more incapable they are of accomplishing their undertaking. The fools are such naive fools, and even the more sensible of them also have such an air of contradiction in what they are devoted to, that they never lose this naive personal self-assurance, no matter how things go." He also says: "Aristophanes presents to us the absolute contradiction between (a) the true essence of religion and political and ethical life, and (b) the subjective attitude of citizens and individuals who should give actuality to that essence." *Aesthetics*, p. 1222; *Werke*, 15, p. 554.
68. In his *Aesthetics* and in his *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, Hegel is a bit more wide ranging in views about tragedy and comedy, raising *Oedipus at Colonus* to almost equal status with *Antigone* and putting more value on the rest of Aristophanes' plays.

69. See ¶746, p. 451, *PG*, p. 519: “This *Demos*, the general mass, which knows itself as lord and ruler, and is also aware of being the intelligence and insight which demand respect, is constrained and befooled through the particularity of its actual existence and exhibits the ludicrous contrast between its own opinion of itself and its immediate existence, between its necessity and contingency, its universality and its commonness . . . there is exposed more immediately the contrast between the universal as a theory and that with which practice is concerned; there is exposed the complete emancipation of the purposes of the immediate individuality from the universal order, and the contempt of such an individuality for that order.” ¶745, p. 451, *PG*, pp. 518–519. “With the vanishing of the contingent determination and superficial individuality which representational thought (*Vorstellung*) lent to the divine essentialities, all that is left to them as regards their *natural* aspect is the bareness of their immediate existence; they are clouds, an evanescent mist, like those representations.”
70. See ¶752, pp. 454–455, *PG*, p. 523: “We see that his unhappy consciousness constitutes the counterpart and the completion of the comic consciousness that is perfectly happy within itself . . . The unhappy consciousness, on the other hand, is conversely the tragic fate of the certainty of self that aspires to being in and for itself. It is the consciousness of the loss of all *essentiality* in this *certainty of itself*, and of the loss even of this knowledge about itself – the loss of substance as well as of the self, it is the grief that expresses itself in the hard words, that *god is dead*.”
71. See ¶754, p. 456, *PG*, p. 524: “All of the conditions for its production are to hand, and this totality of its conditions constitutes its *becoming*, its concept, or the arising of that as *existing in itself* (*das ansichseiende Hervorgehen desselben*).”
72. See ¶755, p. 457, *PG*, p. 525: “Spirit has in it two sides which are presented above as two converse propositions: one is this, that substance externalizes (*entäußert*) itself from itself and becomes self-consciousness; the other is the converse, that self-consciousness externalizes itself from itself and makes itself into thinghood (*Dingheit*) or a universal self . . . the externalization of self-consciousness expresses this: that it is *in itself* the universal essence or – since the self is pure being-for-self which in its opposite remains with itself (*bei sich bleibt*) – that is just because substance is self-consciousness *for the self*, that it is spirit.”
73. See ¶757, p. 458; *PG*, pp. 526–527.
74. In the *Phenomenology*, Hegel does not discuss Judaism in this transition, although it forms an essential part of his later mature lectures on the philosophy of religion in Berlin. This lack of discussion is a bit puzzling, since in earlier manuscripts Hegel discussed Judaism at length. However, his earlier understandings of Judaism – for example, in his early *The Spirit of Christianity* – involved a more or less typical prejudicial attitude toward Judaism as a religion of egoism, legalism, and harshness in contrast to Christian humility and love. Later, Hegel was to characterize Judaism however as the “Religion of Sublimity,” and the earlier language dropped away altogether. Judaism becomes the mediating religion between the gods of Greece and the God of Christianity. Greek gods represent only determinate ethical powers in the form of beauty; God in Judaism is represented as one deity, as a self-determining subject, not as a deity subject to a deeper necessity. Likewise, nature is disenchanted in Judaism, and the possibility of the study of nature as a law-like structure is initiated. (“Or, the world is now prosaic, it confronts us essentially as a collection of things, it is rendered profane. Now nature is divested of divinity . . . At this stage, therefore, there are prosaic things, just as the world contains prosaic things for us also, as understanding beings –

external things in the manifold nexus of understanding, of ground and consequent, of quality and quantity, subject to all these categories of the understanding. Here then is what we call natural or necessary connection; and for that reason the category of “miracle” emerges here for the first time too, as opposed to the natural connection of things.” *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 364–365.) What is lacking in Judaism, so Hegel argues, is that it retains the concept of a transcendent God beyond appearance. Christianity, on the other hand, makes God fully present in appearance (in our hearts) and thus conceptually seems to mark a step forward. But this seems to be a way in which Hegel may have misunderstood Judaism even from within his own principles; for example, his characterization of the difference between Christianity and Judaism completely ignores the idea of the *covenant* between God and humanity in Judaism.

75. See ¶759, pp. 459–460, *PG*, pp. 528–529: “In this religion the essence is known as spirit, or this religion is the consciousness about itself that it is spirit. For spirit is the knowledge of oneself in the externalization of oneself; the essence that is the movement of retaining its self-identity in its otherness . . . Consequently, in this religion the divine essence is *revealed*. Its being revealed manifestly consists in its being known as what it is. But it is known precisely in its being known as spirit, as an essence that is essentially *self-consciousness* . . . This – according to its *concept*, to be that which is revealed – is the true formation (*Gestalt*) of spirit, and this its formation, the concept, is likewise alone its essence and its substance. Spirit is known as self-consciousness and to this self-consciousness it is immediately revealed, for spirit is this self-consciousness itself. The divine nature is the same as the human, and it is this unity that is intuited.”
76. See ¶761, p. 461, *PG*, p. 530: “Here therefore God is *revealed* as *He is*; *He is* thus *there (da)* as *He is in himself (an sich)*; He is there as spirit. God is attainable in pure speculative knowledge alone and *is* only in that knowledge, and is only that knowledge itself, for He is Spirit; and this speculative knowledge is the knowledge of the *revealed* religion. Speculative knowledge knows God as *thought* or pure essence and knows this thought as being and as existence, and existence as the negativity of itself, hence as self, as the self that is at the same time *this* individual and also the universal self.”
77. See ¶765, p. 463, *PG*, p. 532: “This form of representation constitutes the determinateness in which spirit, in this its community, becomes conscious of itself. This form is not yet spirit’s self-consciousness that has advanced to the concept as concept: the mediation is still incomplete. This combination of being and thought is therefore defective in that spiritual essence is still burdened with an unreconciled split into a here and a beyond. The *content* is the true content, but all its moments, when posited in the elements of representation, have the character of not being comprehended (*nicht begriffen*), of appearing as completely independent sides which are externally related to each other.”
78. On the whole, the illustrations are the same as in his mature lectures on the philosophy of religion, but in the latter work the details are much more worked out.
79. See ¶774, p. 467; *PG*, pp. 536–537.
80. See ¶¶775–776, pp. 467–469; *PG*, p. 537–538.
81. See ¶781, p. 473, *PG*, p. 543: “Spirit is thus posited in the third element, in universal self-consciousness; it is its *community*.”
82. See ¶778, p. 470, *PG*, pp. 539–540: “This lack of identity (*Ungleichheit*) is therefore twofold, and two relationships arise whose common moments are those

just given. In one of them, the divine essence counts as that which is essential, while natural existence and the self count as that which is unessential and which is to be sublated. In the other, on the contrary, *being-for-self* counts as that which is essential and the simple divinity as that which is unessential. Their still empty middle term is *existence (Dasein)* in general, the bare community of the two moments." Hegel also notes: "This opposition is resolved not so much through the conflict between the two moments which are represented as separate and independent essences. It lies in their *independence* that each *in itself* must in its own self (*an ihm selbst*), through its concept, resolve itself. The struggle begins where both cease to be these mixtures of thought and of independent existence and where they confront each other only as thoughts" ¶1779, pp. 470–471, *PG*, p. 540.

83. See ¶1784, p. 475, *PG*, pp. 544–545: "Besides this immediacy, therefore, the *mediation* of representational thought is necessary. *In itself* the *knowledge* of nature as the untrue existence of spirit, and this universality of the self developed in itself (*in sich gewordne*) is the reconciliation of spirit with itself. For the self-consciousness that does not think in terms of the concept, this in-itself receives the form of an *existent (eines Seienden)* and is *represented* to it. Comprehension is, therefore, for that self-consciousness not a grasping of this concept which knows sublated natural existence to be universal and therefore reconciled with itself; but rather a grasping of the *representation*, that by bringing to pass its own externalization, in its historical incarnation and death, the divine essence has been reconciled with its existence. The grasping of this idea now expresses more definitely what was previously called the spiritual resurrection in this same context, or the becoming of God's individual self-consciousness as a universal self-consciousness, or as the community."
84. This is the issue that immediately after Hegel's death split so many of his students into contending camps, somewhat misleadingly called the "left" and the "right" Hegelians. Hegel himself saw no fundamental tension between taking humanity as spirit to be self-grounding and his belief that in coming to understand spirit in this way, we would also see it as sacred. Some of his students, (for example, Feuerbach) took this instead as evidence that we should therefore discard all notions of divinity, of what is sacred, and focus instead only on the results of human practice. Others thought that in order to continue the Hegelian identification of the divine and the human, something like a more orthodox Christian position had to be maintained, and they sought to use Hegelian dialectic as a means of maintaining a more orthodox conception of God as *both* metaphysically "transcendent" and "immanent" at the same time. Both strategies depart from Hegel's own understanding, and they both remain the two most often taken interpretations of Hegel's thought. Some will no doubt suspect that it was only Hegel's own sensibility that held the doctrine together during his lifetime, that only Hegel himself was capable of maintaining *religious* awe and reverence for self-grounding, rational, human life, and that others simply could not countenance that sort of reverence or needed some more metaphysical reassurance for it than Hegel himself did. Another more "metaphysical" way of understanding Hegel's conception of the relation between the divine and self-conscious spirit would be to see them as "folding" into each other in much the same way that beauty and divinity "fold" into each in Greek art. For the Greek artist, the sculpting of a beautiful statue of a young woman was sufficient to make that statue a representation of Aphrodite; it captured perfectly what Aphrodite was. They "fold" into each other in that think-

ing correctly about one implies that one is thinking correctly about the other; as it were, hitting one target insures that you also hit the other. (After Greek art, on Hegel's conception of it, the qualities of the divine and those of beauty split apart again, since Christian truths are not exhaustively captured by a focus on beauty). Thus, Hegel might well be thinking of the divine and self-conscious spirit as "folding together" for moderns in the way that Greek religion and art "folded together" for the Greeks. For the moderns to reflect on and stand in reverence of self-conscious spirit would thereby be to reflect on and stand in reverence of the divine. The two would be different, but correct thought about one would imply correct thought about the other.

85. See *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 482–484.
86. See ¶1787, p. 477, *PG*, p. 547: "But the community is not yet perfected in this its self-consciousness; in general its content exists for it in the form of *representation*, and this duality still attaches even to the *actual spirituality* of the community, to its return out of its representational thought, just as the element of pure thought itself was burdened with it. The community also does not possess the consciousness of what it is . . . But the *positive* meaning, namely, that this negativity or pure *inwardness of knowledge* is just as much the *self-identical essence* – or that substance has here succeeded in becoming absolute self-consciousness is for the devotional consciousness another."
87. See ¶1787, p. 478, *PG*, p. 548: "Its satisfaction thus itself remains burdened with the opposition of a beyond. Its own reconciliation therefore enters its consciousness as something *distant*, as something in the distant *future*, just as the reconciliation which the other *self* achieved appears as something in the distant *past*. Just as the *individual* divine person has a father *existing in itself* (*ansichseienden*) and only an *actual* mother, so too the universal divine person, the community, has for its father its own doing and knowing, but for its mother, eternal love which it only *feels* but does not intuit in its consciousness as an actual immediate *object*. Its reconciliation therefore is in its heart, but its consciousness is still divided and its actuality is still disrupted."
88. See ¶1789–792, *PG*, p. 550–552 for Hegel's summary of the movement of the *Phenomenology* that leads up to this claim. As Hegel puts it in condensed form, "In this knowing, then, spirit has concluded the movement in which it shaped itself in so far as this shaping was burdened by the difference of consciousness, a difference now overcome." ¶1805, p. 490, *PG*, p. 561 – the phrase, "the difference of consciousness" refers to the idea that what it had taken as authoritative for itself (the "essence") was understood to be an independent *object* of consciousness, something "different" from consciousness, of which the subject only has "representations."
89. In ¶1788, , p. 479; *PG*, p. 549, Hegel uses the word "*überwinden*," "overcome" instead of his technical term, "*aufheben*" to speak of how the "spirit of revealed religion" has not "overcome" its "consciousness." Miller's various translations of *Aufheben* as "supersession," "do away with," "canceled," "not self-subsistent," "subordinated," "put aside," "stripped," "puts an end to," and "suspended" obscure this point.
90. See ¶1802, p. 488, *PG*, p. 559: "Substance as subject has the *at first only internal* necessity of presenting itself as that which it is *in itself*, as *spirit*. The completed objective presentation is at the same time the reflection of substance or the becoming of substance into self – consequently, if spirit has not completed itself *in itself*,

- has not completed itself as world-spirit, it cannot reach its completion as *self-conscious* spirit. Therefore, the content of religion expresses earlier in time than does science what *spirit* is, but only science is its true knowledge of itself.”
91. See ¶788, p. 479, *PG*, p. 549: “The spirit of the revealed religion has not yet overcome its consciousness as such, or what is the same, its actual self-consciousness is not the object of its consciousness; spirit itself in general and the self-differentiated moments within it fall into representation and into the form of objectivity (*Gegenständlichkeit*). The *content* of this representation is absolute spirit; and all that now remains to be done is to sublimate this mere form, or rather, since this belongs to *consciousness as such*, its truth must already have yielded itself in the formation (*Gestalt*) of consciousness.” Hegel also notes: “These are the moments of which the reconciliation of spirit with its authentic consciousness is composed; for themselves they are single, and it is solely their spiritual unity that constitutes the power of this reconciliation. The last of these moments is, however, necessarily this unity itself and, as is evident, it combines them all into itself.” ¶793, p. 482, *PG*, p. 552.
 92. See ¶796, p. 485, *PG*, p. 555: “Through this movement of action, spirit has stepped forth as a pure universality of knowing, which is self-consciousness, as self-consciousness that is the simple unity of knowing. It is first spirit only in that it is *there* (*da ist*), that is, when it raises its existence into *thought* and thereby into an absolute *opposition*, and out of this opposition and even through this opposition returns into itself.”
 93. See ¶795, p. 483, *PG*, p. 553: “This unification has, however, already occurred *in itself* and that too in religion in the return of representational thought into self-consciousness, but not according to the authentic form, for the religious aspect is the aspect of the *in-itself*, which stands over against the movement of self-consciousness. Consequently, the unification belongs to the other aspect which in the contrast of the two sides is the aspect of reflection into self and therefore the one that contains both its own self and its opposite, and not only *in itself* or in a universal sense, but *for itself* or in a developed and differentiated way.”
 94. See ¶795, pp. 483–484, *PG*, p. 554: “The beautiful soul is its own knowledge of itself in its pure, transparent unity . . . Through this realization, this objectless self-consciousness sticking to itself sublimes the *determinateness* of the concept with its *fulfillment*; its self-consciousness gains the form of universality and what remains to it is its true concept, or the concept that attained its realization; it is in its truth, namely in the unity with its externalization – the knowing of pure knowledge, not as the abstract *essence* which duty is – but of knowledge as *essence* which is *this* knowledge, *this* pure self-consciousness, which is therefore at the same time a genuine *object*, for the concept is the self existing for itself (*für-sich-seiende Selbst*).”
 95. See ¶796, p. 484, *PG*, p. 554: “This concept gave itself its fulfillment on one side in the *acting* spirit that is certain of itself, and on the other, in *religion*. In religion it won for consciousness the absolute content *as content* or in the form of *representation*, the form of otherness for consciousness; on the other hand, in the prior formation the form is that of the self itself, for it contains the *acting* spirit that is certain of itself. The self carries out the life of absolute spirit.”
 96. See ¶797, p. 485, *PG*, p. 556: “Thus, what in religion was *content* or a form of representing an *other*, is here the *self’s* own *act*. For this concept is, we see, the knowledge of the self’s act within itself as all essentiality and all existence, the

knowledge of *this subject as substance* and of the substance as this knowledge of its act.”

97. See ¶798, pp. 485–486, *PG*, p. 556: “This last formation of spirit – the spirit which at the same time gives its complete and true content the form of the self and thereby realizes its concept and which remains in its concept in this realization – this is absolute knowing; it is spirit that knows itself in the formation of spirit, or a *comprehensive knowing* . . . Spirit *appearing* in consciousness in this element, or what is here the same thing, brought forth by consciousness, *is science*.”
98. As Hegel puts it in condensed form, “Spirit has attained the pure element of its existence, the concept . . . The different content exists as *determinate* content in relationships (*Verhältnisse*), not in itself, and its unrest is its self-sublation (*sich selbst aufzuheben*) or *negativity*.” ¶805, p. 491, *PG*, p. 562.

Chapter Seven

1. Hegel’s shortest characterization of the three types of thought that he develops in the *Logic* (Being, Essence and Concept) is made in his Berlin lectures on aesthetics to mark the difference between poetic and prosaic thought. First, there is what he calls “ordinary thought” (“Being”), which is “content to take what is and happens as just this mere individual, i.e., in terms of its meaningless contingency . . . [This is] a mere view of a world of successive or juxtaposed accidents which may have a great range of external life but which is totally unable to satisfy the deeper need of reason.” (*Aesthetics*, II, p. 975; *Werke*, 15, p. 243) (translation altered). Second, there is “Essence,” “the restricted thinking of the understanding and its categories, such as cause and effect, means and ends, i.e., in general with relations of externality and finitude. In this way of thinking, every particular either appears falsely as independent or is brought into a mere relation with another and therefore is apprehended only as relative and dependent.” (*Aesthetics*, II, pp. 974–975; *Werke*, 15, p. 242) Hegel also calls these categories the understanding’s “representations (*Vorstellungen*) and reflections” (*Aesthetics*, II, p. 976; *Werke*, 15, p. 243). Finally, there is what he calls “speculative thinking” (“Concept”) which “does away with the understanding’s representations and ordinary intuition,” (*Aesthetics*, p. 976; *Werke*, 15, p. 244), that is, with the categories and types of thought appropriate to both “Being” and “Essence”: “Thinking, however, results in thoughts alone; it evaporates the form of reality into the form of the pure concept, and even if it grasps and apprehends actual things in their essential particularity, it nevertheless lifts even this particular into the universal ideal element, wherein alone thought is “with itself” (*bei sich selber*). Consequently, contrasted with the world of appearance, a new realm arises which is indeed the truth of actuality, but this is a truth which is not made manifest again in *actuality* itself as its formative power and as its own soul. Thinking is only a reconciliation between reality and truth within *thought* itself.” (*Aesthetics*, p. 976; *Werke*, 15, p. 244).
2. Allen Wood seems to see the result of the *Phenomenology* in this way. In his view, in the *Phenomenology* Hegel simply failed to reconcile two views that he held: “This leaves an unresolved tension in Hegel’s ethical thought: the *systematic* superiority of ethical life versus the *historical* superiority of morality. Instead of resolving the tension, Hegel provides a critique of the moral standpoint, exhibiting the limitations of finite spirit as a whole and pointing to the awareness of absolute spirit in religious consciousness. It is not until Hegel’s return to univer-

sity teaching a decade later that he attempts to present a picture of modern ethical life with which moral consciousness has been fully and positively reconciled.” Wood, *Hegel’s Ethical Thought*, p. 133. However, this way of contrasting Hegel’s earlier and later views rests on attributing to Hegel some ideas that are only controversially his. It is certainly not clear that Hegel claimed that ethical life was “systematically” superior in the *Phenomenology*. Indeed, the various contradictions in Greek ethical life, of which *Antigone* was an expression, were part of the internal incoherence in the Greek accounts of themselves which led to the downfall of the Greek form of life. If anything is systematically superior from the standpoint of the *Phenomenology*, it is that form of life governed by secularized Judeo-Christian morality. Taking Hegel as holding to the systematic superiority of ethical life runs in that stream of interpretations which see him as basically subscribing to the kind of love of ancient Greek life characteristic of his generation; however, it severely underplays the way in which he broke from that kind of blind adoration of Greece. Wood is however clear that in Hegel’s mature system he holds “morality” to designate a modern form of life that has a certain superiority to ancient forms of ethical life.

3. Hegel noted in his remarks on the proposed revision of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* in 1831 (right before his death) that the *Phenomenology* was a “peculiar (*Eigentümliche*) early work, not to be done over again (*umarbeiten*) . . . In the preface: the abstract absolute dominated at that time.” Cited by J. Hoffmeister, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, p. 578.
4. See Robert Pippin, “Kant, Hegel and Ethical Reasons,” *Philosophical Topics*, vol. 19, no. 2 (1992). pp. 99–132. Pippin points out that Hegel’s imagery here is that of “absorption, elevation and purification, rather than [that] of opposition, struggle and renunciation . . .” thus suggesting that Hegel is departing sharply here from both Christian and Kantian models of a struggle within the self for control. Instead, Hegel is using the language of the *Phenomenology*, of reconciliation with oneself rather than overcoming oneself. Pippin also points out that this is not a theory of the “true self” as opposed to the “false self.” Some of Hegel’s language is misleading in this regard, especially when he gets to the section on *Sittlichkeit* in the *Philosophy of Right*; sometimes Hegel speaks of the defining ends of modern agency as “my essence,” which might misleadingly suggest that I am thereby discovering some *given* element of myself in pursuing those ends. This has led some commentators to see Hegel’s talk of “finding one’s essence” as identical with self-determination. This can only work if one has a “true self” view – that is, as seeing self-determination as being identical with following the given dictates of one’s true self rather than following the ends dictated by one’s false self. Stephen Houlgate in his *Freedom, Truth and History: An Introduction to Hegel’s Philosophy* (London: Routledge, 1991) seems to take this strategy for reconciling Hegel’s theses about self-determination with his talk of our “essence.”
5. “Personality implies that as *this* person: (1) I am completely determined on every side (in my inner optings [*Willkür*], impulse, and desire, as well as by immediate external existence) and so finite, yet (2) nonetheless I am simply and solely a relation to myself and therefore in finitude I know myself as something infinite, universal and free.” *Philosophy of Right*, §35.
6. The contemporary and popular distinction between first-order and second-order desires was developed independently by Gerald Dworkin and Harry Frankfurt. First-order desires are those desires for some kind of object (in the most general sense), whereas second-order desires are desires for desires. Thus, to take one of

the exemplary cases, the addicted smoker may desire a cigarette (first-order) but also desire that he not have a desire for a cigarette (second-order). This has been often taken as expressing the ideal of being a person and having a capacity for freedom, the idea being that it takes a second-order desire to transform an entity into an agent (or a “person”). There is nothing particularly special, however, about second-order desires, except that they are second-order, and it is not clear why being *second-order* gives them any special authority. They may be more reflective – but then again, they may not, or their reflective character may not be a good feature of them. A squeamish professional killer who has a second-order desire that he has a first-order desire to kill people, or desires that he did not have the desire to let his victims escape is not someone whose second-order desires should carry any special moral weight for him. The Hegelian point is that it is not important that our desires are ordered as first or second in some hierarchy of desires; it is how they fit in with the system of volitions that constitutes the agent’s self-identity. The desires should be part of a justifiable inferential complex, and that means being structured by a certain type of conceptual and social space. Being first-order or second-order is not of any particular importance from the axiological or ethical standpoint; being a part of a justified nexus of practical reasoning is.

7. Hegel remarks on this process of idealization in the long Addition to §381 of his *Encyclopedia*: “*Ideality* must be designated as the differentiating determinateness of the concept of mind, that is, ideality as the sublation (*Aufheben*) of the being-other (*Anderssein*) of the idea, which out of its other is both returning and is returned into itself . . . This sublation of externality belonging to the concept of spirit is that which we have called *ideality*. All activities of spirit are nothing more than the different modes of leading the external back to interiority, which is spirit itself, and only through this leading back, through this idealization or assimilation of the external does spirit both come to be and is spirit.”
8. “A person by distinguishing himself from himself relates himself to another person, and it is only as owners that these two persons really exist for each other.” §40, *Philosophy of Right*.
9. One can contrast this with a pre-modern understanding that would see the most basic mode of self-understanding in terms of family membership (as being the son or daughter of so-and-so). In the pre-modern understanding, one finds one’s self-identity already determined and given by a given network of familial and social ties; in the modern understanding, one finds one’s self-identity more generally in the acquiring and exchanges into which one enters. The pre-modern period gives a different “social space” and the agents in it thus occupy different “points.” The modern conception of ourselves as juridical individuals gives us a basic, although very abstract sense of ourselves as self-directing in a way that the pre-modern period could not. It sees us most generally as self-directing “persons” and not primarily as the son or daughter of so-and-so.
10. There is another, “external” reason for making the transition from “Abstract Right” to “Morality” which involves the necessity of the system of rights developed in “Abstract Right” to be administered by impartial judges. To be an impartial judge, however, requires that one have the right motives, so that one abstracts away from one’s personal point of view to administer the rules of “Abstract Right” from the impersonal point of view. Thus, we need a system of *moral* agents who can take up the attitude of acting from the impersonal point of view. This is an external criticism in that it imports something from outside “Abstract Right” in

order to show its deficiencies. That is, it takes the analysis of what “we” mean by terms such as “right,” “wrong” and the like, and show that a system of abstract rights cannot do justice to the meaning of these concepts. To be sure, without such impartial principles, one cannot distinguish revenge from punishment, but the question remains as to whether the agents of “Abstract Right” are required to make such distinctions. (What about their accounts of what is authoritative for them in “Abstract Right” make it necessary to introduce such distinctions?) Hegel’s view is that it is the failure of the account of self-determination that motivates the agents to enrich their account with that of “Morality,” not the failure of their accounts to match up with the sense of “right” employed in the full blown social order. When one views a Hegelian argument backward – reading it from the end of the theory to its beginning – it does indeed appear as a form of analysis. When read from the beginning to the end, it is however a “synthetic,” dialectical argument. This kind of analytic reading (what I called the “backwards” reading) is offered in a clear form by Kenneth Westphal, “The Basic Context and Structure of Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right*,” in F. Beiser (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel*, pp. 234–269.

11. Robert Pippin discusses this as the conflict between reasons of prudence and ethical reasons in “Hegel, Ethical Reasons, Kantian Rejoinders.” Pippin is concerned there to show that ethical (*sittlich*) reasons are not reasons of prudence but involve a prior understanding of what it is for an end to be an end of a self-determining agent. Pippin’s point is that the self-identity of the agent cannot be itself a matter of “prudential choice,” and it is therefore prior to any other (at least fundamental) “prudential choice.” What counts as a prudential choice (as fitting in with an agent’s “life plan”) will depend on a prior conception of the agent’s self-identity.
12. In more contemporary terms, Gerald Dworkin develops such a “thin” view of autonomy as “a second-order capacity of persons to reflect critically upon their first-order preferences, desires, wishes, and so forth and the capacity to accept or attempt to change these in light of higher-order preferences and values. By exercising such a capacity, persons define their nature, give meaning and coherence to their lives, and take responsibility for the kind of person they are.” Gerald Dworkin, *The Theory and Practice of Autonomy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) p. 20. Dworkin does not, however, develop out of this “thin” conception of autonomy anything like the Hegelian critique of “morality” in terms of *Sittlichkeit*.
13. Hegel’s reasons for placing his discussion of autonomous action in the section labeled “morality” has to do with the modern relation between autonomy and morality brought to the forefront in Kant’s ethics. Hegel sees this as not merely an idiosyncrasy of Kant’s own thought but as expressing a deeper truth about modern life. Our conceptions of moral agency and autonomous agency are deeply bound up together, and it is part of Hegel’s concern to develop how the modern conception of being a self-determining agent leads to what he calls “morality.” Hegel wrote a series of fragmentary remarks for his own use (for example, in lecturing) to go with his copy of the *Philosophy of Right*. In one he says, apparently with regard to §123, “Because of formally abstract subjectivity – abstract determination, only the taking up of the determinations present in a natural mode. This abstract subjectivity is the same as Kantian practical reason – This formal character (*das Formelle*) is none other than interest, the activity of subjectivity in general. *Autonomy is that formal self-determination.*” (Italics added by me.) This

indicates clearly that he had a notion of self-choice, or autonomy in mind in writing these passages.

14. See *Philosophy of Right*, §105.
15. He does this in the sections of the *Philosophy of Right* called “Plans and Responsibility” (*Der Vorsatz und die Schuld*) (§§105–118) and “Intention and Welfare” (*Die Absicht und die Wohl*) (§119–128).
16. As Hegel puts it, “At the moral standpoint, the abstract determinacy of the will in the sphere of right has been so far overcome that this contingency itself is, as reflected in upon itself and as self-identical, the inward infinite contingency of the will, i.e., its subjectivity.” §104, Addition.
17. “The transition to intention (*Absicht*) lies in my acknowledging (*anerkenne*) only what my representation of the matter (*meine Vorstellung*) was.” *Philosophy of Right*, §118, Addition.
18. See §118, Addition, in which Hegel makes this point about “the self-consciousness of heroes (like that of Oedipus and others in Greek tragedy) . . .”
19. In his marginalia to his copy of the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel makes a number of notes referring to modern and classical Greek drama, providing further evidence that this is what he had in mind in his discussion of planning and intending.
20. To mark this distinction, Hegel distinguishes between a deed (*Tat*) and an action (*Handlung*). The *action* includes only what I have determined for myself (by my plan or intention); the *deed*, however, includes also what happens as a result of what I do. The modern paradoxes thus turn on the distinction between whether I am only responsible for my action or for my deed. See §118, Addition.
21. See §118, Addition: “The principle: ‘ignore the consequences of action’ and the other: ‘judge actions by their consequences and make these the criterion of right and good’ are both principles of the abstract understanding.”
22. In his lectures on the subject, Hegel says: “The action also has consequences, and the question is whether the action is to be judged according to them. As an external existence the action has the most multiple relationships; these are its consequences. On the one hand that externality is the development of the action itself; to that extent, the consequences of the action are to be imputed to me. They are nothing other than the manifestation of the nature of the action . . . The consequences have another side. Because the action is an external existence, many things external to it are bound up with it. The action can thus develop into very distant consequences, which do not any longer belong to me. On the one hand, one can lay down the rule that one ought not to trouble oneself with the consequences of actions, and, on the other hand, the opposite can as well be laid down as a rule . . . A collision arises here between the objective and the subjective, a collision which can become fearsome. The “is” and the “ought” stand here over and against each other. The noted collision cannot be absolutely overcome; on the contrary, it is enduring. Only an approximation can enter here.” *Die Vorlesungen von 1819/1820*, pp. 94–95.
23. Hegel also holds this to be true with regard to the so-called paradox of moral luck. That paradox involves the idea that there is much for which an agent is commonsensically held to be responsible, but, on this account, for which he cannot be held responsible. Thus, two people with the same intentions can produce different consequences because of bad luck. (Two hunters fire at movement in the bushes; the first one hits the target, which turns out to be another hunter, whereas the other misses.) The so-called paradox is that both willed the same thing, and thus on this account both should be equally responsible, yet we commonsensically

hold that one is more responsible than the other. Hegel holds them to be differentially responsible, and, no doubt, would also hold that this is the reflective common-sense thing to do. Each should perhaps experience regret, make atonement, and so on, but, on Hegel's account, one is nonetheless more responsible than the other (and, correspondingly, he should feel more responsibility than the other). Hegel's view thus seems to be that the modern account does not absolve the agent of responsibility for the consequences of her actions but does *mitigate* it. He says in the *Addition to Philosophy of Right*, §119: "In spite of this, however, we must not make this a distinction between good and bad luck, since in acting a man must lay his account with externality. The old proverb is correct: "A flung stone is the devil's." To act is to expose oneself to bad luck. Thus bad luck has a right over me (*ein Recht an mich*) and is an embodiment (*ein Dasein*) of my own willing."

24. See *Philosophy of Right*, §123.
25. See *Philosophy of Right*, §122.
26. See *Philosophy of Right*, §124.
27. This argument occurs in the extremely condensed line of thought in §§125–126 of the *Philosophy of Right*.
28. Hegel clearly thinks that this kind of preliminary conception of morality cannot be the last word; his marginalia to *Philosophy of Right*, §125 show this: "Happiness – there is a real boredom in with these words, well-being and happiness – because of such indeterminate, empty reflection."
29. See *Philosophy of Right*, §126.
30. See *Philosophy of Right*, §135: "But since the universal existing in and for itself, in distinction from such a particular content, has not so far been further determined than as "the right," it follows that these ends of particularity, differing as they do from the universal, may be in conformity with it, but they also may not."
31. "Right and welfare stand opposed to each other here; both can correspond to each other and also both may not. It is the question of which must yield in the collision of one with the other: right is necessarily that substantiality which lies at the basis of things, and I may not assert and further my welfare at the cost of what is right. However, the right of particular willing, placed at the highest rank, is particular existence, life . . . This right which life attains is the right of emergency (*Notrecht*). It is not a matter of equity (*Billigkeit*) which is being spoken of here but of a right." *Die Vorlesungen von 1819/1820*, p. 100. He continues, "In emergency the contradiction between the right of particularity and that of the abstract universal will appears. Both are essential moments . . . The truth of both moments is now the good in general, the identity of the universal and the particular wills." *Ibid.*, p. 101. The same point appears in the published text of the *Philosophy of Right* in the final paragraph to the section on "intention and welfare" (§129).
32. In both his lectures in 1819/1820 and in the published text of the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel brings out the potential contradiction between the two by setting up a collision between the claims of distress or emergency and the claims of right. He says in the lectures, "Right and welfare stand opposed to each other here; both can correspond to each other and also both may not. It is the question of which must yield in the collision of one with the other: right is necessarily that substantiality which lies at the basis of things, and I may not assert and further my welfare at the cost of what is right. However, the right of particular willing, placed at the highest rank, is particular existence, life . . . This right which life attains is the right of emergency (*Notrecht*). It is not a matter of equity (*Billigkeit*) which is being spoken of here but of a right." *Die Vorlesungen von 1819/1820*, p. 100. He

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33. “The right of particularity is thus a very essential right. That my welfare is my intention (*Absicht*) constitutes the concrete sphere of particularity. The principle of particularity is in general the principle of modernity (*neueren Zeit*) and constitutes the principle of higher quality compared with the older periods. This counts for all directions of life, for science, for the state and for religion. The principle of antiquity is plastic in thought and in action; the principle of modernity is romantic. Consequently the principle of love as belonging to particularity has a much higher significance in modernity than in antiquity.” *Die Vorlesungen von 1819/1820*, p. 98. Compare this with the similar extended remark to §124 in the published *Philosophy of Right*.
 34. In his lectures on the philosophy of history, Hegel argues that in an ironic sense the Athenians were correct to try Socrates for corrupting the youth of Athens because Socrates was trying to introduce a concept of reflective morality into a form of life that could not both allow for it and maintain itself. Socrates, Hegel says, “is celebrated as a teacher of morality, but we should rather call him the *inventor* of morality. The Greeks had an ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*), but Socrates wished to teach them which moral virtues and duties they had. The moral person is not merely the person who wills and does the right, not the innocent person, but he who has the consciousness of his action.” *Werke*, 12, p. 329.
 35. See *Philosophy of Right*, §130.
 36. See *Philosophy of Right*, §129.
 37. See *Philosophy of Right*, §132.
 38. Hegel makes this point in his lectures on the history of philosophy: “It is a great determination of the highest importance in the Kantian philosophy that self-consciousness has led back into itself what counts as its essence, as law, as what it is in itself (*Ansich*) . . . It is a great advance when the principle is established that freedom is the last hinge on which man turns, this final point that allows nothing to be imposed on it; thus man allows nothing, no authority to count for him, insofar as it goes against his freedom.” *Werke*, 20, p. 367.
 39. See *Philosophy of Right*, §135, Remark.
 40. Perhaps the most influential contemporary statement of a version of Kantian ethical theory that distances itself from Hegel’s characterization of Kant is that represented by John Rawls. See his “Themes in Kant’s Moral Philosophy,” in Eckart Förster (ed.) *Kant’s Transcendental Deductions: The Three Critiques and the Opus postumum* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), pp. 81–113.
 41. See *Philosophy of Right*, §137. (Knox translates “*an und für sich*” somewhat misleadingly in that passage as “absolute.”)
 42. See *Philosophy of Right*, §136.
 43. Robert Pippin in his “Idealism and Agency in Kant and Hegel,” *The Journal of Philosophy*, makes an extended argument to the effect that the Kantian conception of agency, despite Kant’s immensely sophisticated efforts to ameliorate it and defend it, cannot account for why anyone would on Kantian grounds do anything. “It is widely claimed now that Kant maintains that I am certainly free and responsible in nonmoral actions, that the mere experience of an intensely experienced

desire or aversion need not motivate an action unless I “let” it, unless I “elect” to regard that desire *as* a determining ground of action, or take it to be worthy of acting on, “incorporate” it into a maxim . . . Suppose that I am inclined to pursue a policy generally aimed at my own happiness. Suppose that this happiness is not viewed in a crudely hedonistic sense . . . , and I am not determined . . . by the mere presence of some inclination, to adopt that policy. In that case, what sorts of considerations, on Kant’s view, *could* be relevant to the adoption of such a policy (and preserve the Kantian conditions of free agency)? . . . Indeed, if nothing about our empirical character could count as a reason for acting unless already incorporated into a maxim, it is hard to see the possibility of an *original* rationale for any such maxim or policy.” pp. 538–539.

44. Hegel thinks that all forms of casuistry, of learning how to apply general principles in particular cases, are forms of such hypocrisy and dissemblance. In the *Philosophy of Right*, he discusses probabilism, a doctrine mostly associated with the Jesuits of the eighteenth century, which teaches that an action is permitted if it has some authority for it can be found (for example, in some text); the authority then is said to give the desired action a “greater probability” of being right. In his lectures, Hegel is much more caustic, referring simply to “casuistry” in general as a form of hypocrisy. Hegel sarcastically refers to a “lifeboat case” in which we are supposed to decide which of the various valuable people get thrown overboard and argues that it is unjustified to expect that any moral theory could provide determinate answers to such cases. It is up to the individual (“particularity”) to decide such cases, and “[t]he decisive particularity is in general that which one calls character; a person can only act insofar as he is a particular. The demand for casuistry of that kind contains the assertion that the person want to be spared the trouble of having a character . . . Mature, substantial action demands a forgetting of oneself in respect to one’s particularity. The reflection that always wants to know whether one here and there acts admirably leads to flabbiness and self-conceit.” *Die Vorlesungen von 1819/1820*. p. 119. The overall charge is thus that such casuistry simply presents such “hard cases” in a way so that the individual can then simply take the option he wanted in the first place (for example, which person he throws overboard) and cover the whole thing up with a patina of morality. This will be the case since a variety of authorities can always be found, each of whom contradicts the other, and the individual is simply left to choose which of the authorities he prefers. This is a form of hypocrisy, Hegel argues, because it presents what is really a matter of private choice as being based on objective reasons.
45. “Self-consciousness, in the vanity of all otherwise valid determinations and in the pure interiority of willing, is just as much the possibility of making the universal existing in and for itself into the principle of its action and then realizing it in its actions, as it is of making mere “opting” (*Willkür*), its own particularity over and above the universal, into a principle and realizing it in its actions – that is, to be *evil*.” *Philosophy of Right*, §139.
46. Socratic irony “. . . consisted for the first part in this, that a false, one-sided assertion is granted, and then the person who has proposed such an assertion is led through the development of the assertion to the point where its nothingness is demonstrated.” *Die Vorlesungen von 1819/1820*.
47. “You respectfully accept a law as existing in and for itself. So do I, but I go further than you, because I am above this law and can make it this or that (*so oder so*). It is not the thing which is excellent, but I who am excellent; as the master of law and

thing alike, I *only play* with them as my whim; in this ironical consciousness, in which I let the highest perish, I only enjoy myself (*nur mich genieße*).” *Philosophy of Right*, §140, Remark.

48. In a somewhat elegiac sense, Hegel notes that, “Only in times where actuality is an empty, spiritless and unstable existence may the individual be permitted to flee back out of the actual into his inner life. Socrates arose in the time of the decay of Athenian democracy: he sublimated the existing and fled back into himself in order to find the right and the good there. Also in our times it is more or less the case that the reverence for that which is existing (*dem Bestehende*) is no longer at hand and the person wants to have what is valid as *his* will, as that which is recognized (*Anerkannte*) by him.” *Philosophy of Right*, §138, Addition.
49. This is the point of Hegel’s often misunderstood dictum that “The actual is the rational, and the rational is the actual.” Rather than being a call to quietism or just a philosophically decorated form of smug conservatism, it is the claim that if there is to be a fully rational form of self-understanding, then it must be one that is anchored in *actual* social institutions which provide the agent with a non-contradictory form of self-understanding. A philosophical theory of *ethical ends* cannot therefore appeal to institutions that do not or cannot exist, nor can it appeal to an idealized self-understanding that has no institutional support. Purely “moral” theories typically appeal to something like that, but such theories only end up as exhortations to people to become what they ought to be, generally without any concrete prescription for how they are to do that and which are often at odds with the prevailing real possibilities for people.
50. “In the whole of ethical life the objective, as well as the subjective, is present; both are however only forms of the same thing.” *Philosophy of Right*, §144, Addition. (my translation.) “Ethical life is just as well *in itself*, objective, as it is *for itself*, or subjective.” *Die Vorlesungen von 1819/1820*, p. 122.
51. “That which is right and that which is moral cannot exist for themselves; they must have the ethical as their support and foundation, for the right lacks the moment of subjectivity, while morality in turn possesses for itself that moment alone, and consequently both moments lack actuality by themselves (*für sich*) . . . Right exists only as a branch of the whole or like the ivy which twines itself round a tree firmly rooted in and for itself.” *Philosophy of Right*, §141, Addition.
52. The “Idea” is Hegel’s term for a “rational whole,” a kind of “conceptual map” of the world through which we *articulate* to ourselves what it is that we hold to be authoritative reasons for ourselves and why we hold them to be authoritative.
53. “The difference of this presentation from that taking the form of a *doctrine of duties* lies only in that in the following, the ethical determinations are demonstrated as necessary relationships (*Verhältnisse*) . . . An immanent and consistent doctrine of duties can consist in none other than that of the development of the *relationships* which are necessary to the idea of freedom and which consequently are *actual* to their whole extent in the state.” *Philosophy of Right*, §148, Remark.
54. Michael Inwood in his *Hegel* argues that “There are, then, two distinct ways in which intellectual autonomy can be won, firstly by retreating from the apparently alien world into pure thinking, and secondly by advancing on the world and imposing one’s thoughts upon it or, rather, discovering them in it.” (p. 480) Because of this, Inwood concludes that self-determination for Hegel cannot reside in desire but only in thought. Hegel solves this problem, Inwood concludes, by seeing that thoughts are embedded in social phenomena: “When a man adheres to the laws and customs of his own society, he is in a sense “willing his own will,”

following the autonomous dictates of his own will, since the institutions of his society embody the thought which he at bottom is.” (p. 486) This sees Hegel, however, in terms of a more “Augustinian” picture, that is, as understanding desire and thought to be antagonistic to each other. Hegel’s project, however, is not couched in terms of the *subjugation* of one element of human nature by another but in terms of their *reconciliation* with each other.

55. In his lectures on aesthetics, Hegel notes that the peculiarly modern problem seems to be the clash between the moral point of view, with its claims to universality, and the personal point of view, both in regard to its desires and plans but also with regard to ordinary ethical virtues. He notes, “These are oppositions which have not been invented at all by the subtlety of reflection or the pedantry of philosophy; in numerous forms they have always preoccupied and troubled the human consciousness, even if it is modern cultivation (*Bildung*) that has first worked them out most sharply and driven them up the peak of harshest contradiction. Spiritual culture (*Bildung*), the modern understanding, produces this opposition in man which makes him an amphibious animal, because he now has to live in two worlds which contradict one another. The result is that now consciousness wanders about in this contradiction, and, driven from one side to the other, cannot find satisfaction for itself in one or the other . . . But for modern culture and its understanding this discordance in life and consciousness involves the demand that such a contradiction be resolved . . . If general culture (*allgemeine Bildung*) has run into such a contradiction, it becomes the task of philosophy to sublate the oppositions, i.e. to show that neither the one alternative in its abstraction, nor the other in the like one-sidedness, possesses truth, but that they are both self-dissolving; that truth lies only in the reconciliation and mediation of both, and that this mediation is no mere demand, but what is in and for itself accomplished and is ever self-accomplishing.” *Aesthetics*, I, pp. 54–55; *Werke*, 13, pp. 80–82.
56. On this point, see also Pippin, “Hegel, Ethical Reasons, Kantian Rejoinders,” p. 111.
57. *Die Vorlesungen von 1819/1820*. p. 125
58. It is of course open to Kantians to allow social roles to supply determinate ends for action, but for the Kantians these social roles will themselves be just as “given” as anything coming from inclination. Now, it might be open to the Kantian to select out those roles as essential to modernity that can meet the procedural test of the categorical imperative. Thus, being a classical warrior or a medieval monk might not (by hypothesis) pass the test, but other things (like being a Prussian *Bürger*) might. We would then *identify* with those roles that pass the testing procedure of the categorical imperative, since they would conform to our nature as rational agents. However, this would still only provide a wide assortment of roles as *permissible* but not *obligatory* (for example, being a German professor would be permissible, a role that Hegel happily assumed, even though he obviously did not think it essential to being a rational agent in modernity). Kant thought that he could show that justice and beneficence were in fact such obligatory ends, but without some empirical assumptions, so the Hegelian argues, he can do no such things. To use the language of John Rawls, the Kantian smuggles in conceptions of the *reasonable* into his conceptions of the *rational* in order to get the obligatory ends. Rawls distinguishes the two in the following way: the Reasonable involves a shared notion of fair terms of cooperation, whereas the Rational involves each participant’s rational advantage, what they are trying to advance. The former is

shared, but the latter may not be. Rawls makes this distinction in his “The Basic Liberties and Their Priority,” in Sterling M. McMurrin (ed.) *The Tanner Lectures* (Salt Lake City: the University of Utah Press, 1982). pp. 3–87. In “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory: the Dewey Lectures,” 1980, *The Journal of Philosophy*, vol. LXXVII, No. 9, pp. 515–572, Rawls argues that the Reasonable presupposes the Rational because it presupposes that each person is moved by a specific conception of the good and that the Reasonable also subordinates the Rational because the Reasonable puts limits to the final ends that can be pursued (see p. 532). Reasonable principles correspond to the principles of justice, whereas rational principles correspond to the more formal principles of rational choice. For the Hegelian, reasonable principles will be derived from the basic kinds of self-identities that we must as rational agents assume in modernity. If the “Reasonable” is to count for us as reasonable, as something that can be affirmed in the face of skepticism about it, then it must be shown to derive its authority from the way it avoids or answers the dilemmas involved in earlier historical conceptions. A Rawlsian theory of justice thus presupposes something like Hegelian *Sittlichkeit* in order for it to count as a “reasonable” conception.

59. See *Philosophy of Right*, §120, §132.
60. Thus, Hegel cannot be content simply to describe and compare various types of goods within the modern form of life, such as the contemporary political thinker, Michael Walzer, does in his *Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality* (New York: Basic Books, 1983).
61. In the addition to §158 in the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel says, “The first moment in love is that I do not wish for myself to be an independent person and that, if I were, then I would feel defective and incomplete. The second moment is that I reclaim (*gewinne*) myself in another person, that I count for something (*gelte*) in her, and which she in turn achieves in me. Love, therefore, is the most tremendous contradiction; the understanding cannot resolve it since there is nothing more stubborn than this punctuality of self-consciousness which is negated and which nevertheless I ought to possess as affirmative. Love is at once the propounding and the resolving of this contradiction.”
62. Hegel makes it clear that he does not consider marriage as having only one determinate purpose to it (such as the raising of children or the social channeling of sexual desire): “Marriage, as a concrete, substantial relationship, contains multiple moments in itself, of which no one alone constitutes the single end of marriage.” *Die Vorlesungen von 1819/1820*. p. 130.
63. “The natural relation is transfigured into a spiritual relation, without its being thereby given up . . . On the other hand this natural relationship is however not to be viewed as something wrong and debased, to which one merely would be subjugated due to the imperfection of human nature. There are two extremes of looking at the matter, which could come forth here. The latter point of view appears under the title of platonic love; Plato by the way did not speak of this love. Certainly he spoke of an incorporeal love, which is other than that of which we are speaking here.” *Die Vorlesungen von 1819/1820*, pp. 131–132.
64. “What the person ought to be he does not possess from instinct; rather he must first acquire it for himself. On this is founded the child’s right to become educated. People under patriarchal (*väterlichen*) governments are in the same position as children; they are fed from central stores and are not regarded as independent and as adults (*Majorenn*). The services which may be demanded from children should therefore have education as their sole end and be related to that.”

Philosophy of Right, §174, Addition. “It is to be noted that on the whole children love their parents less than the parents love their children, for the children are facing their independence and are growing stronger and are thus leaving their parents behind, whereas the parents have in the children the impartial objectivity (*objektive Gegenständlichkeit*) of their bond.” *Philosophy of Right*, §175, Addition.

65. There are plenty of passages in which Hegel could be said to express what would now be regarded as sexist ideas, but this one should suffice: “Women are capable of education, but they are not made for activities which demand a universal faculty such as the more advanced sciences, philosophy and certain forms of artistic production. Women may have ideas, taste and elegance, but they cannot attain to the ideal. The difference between men and women is like that between animals and plants. Men correspond to animals, while women correspond to plants because their development is more placid and the principle that underlies it is the rather vague unity of feeling. When women hold the helm of government, the state is at once in jeopardy, because women regulate their actions not by the demands of universality but by arbitrary inclinations and opinions. Women are educated – who knows how? – as it were by breathing in ideas, by living rather than by acquiring knowledge. The status of manhood, on the other hand, is attained only by the stress of thought and much technical exertion.” *Philosophy of Right*, §166, Addition.
66. In his marginal comments to his copy of the *Philosophy of Right*, one finds the following entries for §167, in which Hegel is obviously struggling to bring this view of family life in line with his thoughts on freedom and equality: “Free undivided love – the honor of personality – the man according to his individuality – the woman to be *respected as equal to himself* (*sich gleich achten*) and placed – not higher – as in chivalry as it were having its religion in the woman . . . Equality, self-sameness (*Dieselbigkeit*) of rights and of duties – The man should not count for more than the woman.” He also goes on to lambast here as he does elsewhere any form of polygamy as equivalent to the slavery of women, and he has a note to the effect that women in the orient are slaves because they cannot direct the affairs of the house. For Hegel, only the modern *Hausfrau* is free in that she has a determinate sphere over which she reigns.
67. “One is not incidentally thinking here of the normal psychology, according to which the individual powers of the soul are viewed as indifferently lying next to each other. According to this point of view it can appear as if women would be denied certain spiritual capacities. In no way should one think in terms of such a bad segmentation. The difference can only concern the mode and manner of expression. One sex presents the spiritual form in its simple purity, while the other sex presents the opposite, the coming apart of the unity.” *Die Vorlesungen von 1819/1820*, p. 137.
68. “Men can be thus in general more one-sided than women . . . The women do not content themselves on the other hand with such abstract knowledge. The same holds for the French, who in general have more femaleness (*Weibliches*) in their characters than do the Germans.” *Die Vorlesungen von 1810/1820*, p. 138. Despite Hegel’s protestations that he is arguing for an equality between the sexes, one does not get the impression that he is exactly praising the French here, nor does he seem to be seeing them simply as different but equal to the Germans in their possession of more “femaleness” in their characters.
69. In his *Hegel’s Ethical Thought*, Allen Wood points out that “[t]he implication of

this solution may be more radical than we would like to realize. Hegel's remarks about the alleged natural incapacities of the female sex are easy to deride, and it is easy to agree with the platitudes that men should be more sensitive, women more self-confident. But we have never really seen what human personalities would be like if they were not socialized through the traditional system of gender stereotypes. We do not know what role gender differences might play in personalities balancing the substantial principle with the reflective. Moreover, the modern social order as it actually exists is not one in which such personalities could develop or thrive. It is understandable, if not admirable, that many fear the unknown path to new possibilities than the present contradictions they are living." p. 246. (Wood also makes some very illuminating comparisons between Hegel's thought and some contemporary feminist thought.)

70. A similar point is effectively made by Allen Wood who sees Hegel's views as ineffectively trying to combine three ideas: (1) reconciling "substantive" and "reflective" principles by the division of the sexes, (2) the principle of the modern world being that of subjective freedom, (3) everyone's being equally persons and subjects. Wood points out that these three ideas conflict with each other since subjective freedom clashes with women's being confined to the home, yet taking women out of the home (stressing the second and third points) would leave the "substantive" principle undervalued. See Allen Wood, *Hegel's Ethical Thought*, pp. 244–246.
71. Indeed, the attempt to keep women confined to a certain realm of the household may be seen by Hegelians to involve an attempt by men to create and maintain social ("spiritual") divisions on the basis of *natural* characteristics that women have. The struggles between men and women are thus like those of the master and vassal, with each struggling for recognition, the "masters" in this case trying to keep the "vassals" as parts of nature instead of letting them see themselves as self-determining agents, understanding the "vassals" personal projects as having validity only to the extent that they fit into the "master's" projects (and getting the "vassals" to accept that as a definition of themselves).
72. Kant claims that "Sexual community (*commercium sexuelle*) is the reciprocal use which a person makes of another's sexual organs and faculties (*usus membrorum et facultatum sexualium alterius*) . . . The natural sexual community is either that of merely animal nature (*vaga libido, venus vulgivaga, fornicatio*) or according to law – the latter is marriage (*matrimonium*), i.e., the combination of two persons of different sexes to a life-long reciprocal possession of each other's sexual properties." Immanuel Kant, *Metaphysik der Sitten* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1922), §24.
73. The person of "[b]ourgeois (*Bürgerliche*) freedom ought to be so: to become unlimited in his inclination, his choice (*Willkür*), in the practice of his skills, etc." *Die Vorlesungen von 1819/1820*, p. 150.
74. "These different agents (*diese Differenten*) are after all at the same time identical; however they are not conscious of this identity. For the unity and universality is only an inner one; the relationship of the individuals is not a relationship of freedom but rather of necessity. They are related to each other against their knowledge and against their will . . . I must accommodate myself, for I can not satisfy my needs without the help of the others, and I am in that way in dependency on others. This is in general the sphere of dependency and exigency (*Not*)." *Die Vorlesungen von 1819/1820*, pp. 147–148. "If one calls that freedom, one is on the one hand correct, for it is freedom but only the freedom of particularity; on

the other hand, one does not know that this freedom is also at the same time the highest dependency.” Ibid., p. 150. Hegel says something similar in the *Philosophy of Right*, §186, but does not put as much stress on this matter as he does in the lectures, where he repeats the point again and again.

75. “There are two moments in this mediation: I attend to my welfare, attain my interests in mediation with others, who just as well attend to their welfare; at the same time there enters the moment of universality as the seeming-to-be (*Schein*) of rationality. This universality constitutes the moment of return, the seeming-to-be of freedom; this is the reconciling side of this sphere. According to the aspect of particularity, it is in general the sphere of mere choice (*Willkür*) and of contingency – of ethical, moral as well as external contingency. In this way, at the same time this is the sphere of exigency (*Not*) in that each individual is dependent on others. This is here the sphere in which everything particular has its appearance (*Ergehen*) and its free play; beneficent and malevolent inclinations find their place here in the same manner. Here poverty and corruption can break through. In this sphere of dependency and exigency is accordingly that which is reconciling in the seeming-to-be of rationality.” *Die Vorlesungen von 1819/1820*, pp. 148–149.
76. “A difference of the estates is in general necessary; the difference is grounded on the needs and the manner of their satisfaction mutually specifying each other.” *Die Vorlesungen von 1819/1820*, p. 163.
77. See Gianfranco Poggi, *The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1978). Chapter III: The *Ständesstaat*, pp. 36–59.
78. Mack Walker argues that in making this distinction, Hegel accurately captured the historical status of German society in the post-Napoleonic period and the way that it had been transformed by the Napoleonic wars of that time. In particular, Hegel saw how the new *mobile* class of intellectuals and merchants challenged the old order which had been rooted in a sense of place, of “hometowns” from which few wandered and into which few came. Intellectuals, merchants and the kind of person filling in the bureaucratic posts of the state in the post-Napoleonic period had both the tools and inclination to move from place to place, and they brought their more cosmopolitan mores with them rather than adapting to the mores of the new place. This made them “universal” rather than “particular” – that is, a group of people whose mores and outlooks were themselves mobile, that is, capable of being taken from place to place and were thus not tied in to the more particular ethos of particular hometowns. Interestingly, Walker himself arrives at the same thesis on independent grounds. See Mack Walker, *German Hometowns: Community, State and General Estate, 1648–1871* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971). p. 197.
79. “Ethical life (*das Sittliche*) insofar as it is reflected into the individual through his naturally determinate character is *virtue*, which, insofar as it points to nothing more than the simple fitness of the individual to the ethical relations to which he belongs, is integrity (*Rechtsschaffenheit*).” *Philosophy of Right*, §150. *Rechtsschaffenheit* is often translated as “rectitude.” It also has the nineteenth century connotations of “righteousness.”
80. Hegel notes in his “Remark” to §128 of the *Philosophy of Right* that agriculture, particularly in England, has come in his own day to adopt factory modes of production, but he argues that this will not change the fundamental virtues of the agricultural estate. Some of what he says shows that he did not perhaps understand just how much work went into agriculture – he sometimes speaks as if the

peasants just planted things and waited for nature to do the rest. The overall argument, though, is that the kinds of dispositions that *naturally* come from working with the land and with animals are those that involve a certain amount of patience, trust in nature to provide and so on. These natural dispositions become virtues when they are linked to a set of ethical ideals tied in with that estate. He also remarks on this in *Die Vorlesungen von 1819/1820*, p. 164.

81. See Mack Walker, *German Hometowns: Community, State and General Estate, 1648–1871*, p. 197.
82. It is perfectly natural to translate *Polizei* as “police,” but this has some rather unfortunate connotations. Mack Walker explains the function of the “police” in Hegel’s day in the following way: “. . . police, meaning not just public discipline and security – the American blue-uniformed arm – but sanitation, foodstuffs, public amusements, economic regulations, information media, perhaps the maintenance of roads . . . trade guilds too were apt to become involved in preparing and enforcing police decisions.” *German Hometowns*, pp. 45–46. Thus, the phrase *Polizeistaat*, which we would translate as “police-state,” has some rather different connotations for us than it would for a reader in Hegel’s day.
83. “The individuals must first of all thus acquire the skills to satisfy their desires through participation in the universal capital.” *Die Vorlesungen von 1819/1820*, p. 192.
84. “Further, a totally different schism appears in the poor, a schism between them and the general temper (*des Gemüts*) of civil society. The poor person feels himself excluded and mocked by all, and out of this there necessarily arises an inner indignation. He has the consciousness of himself as infinite and free and with that arises the demand that external existence should correspond to this consciousness. It is not a natural distress (*Naturnot*) in civil society with which the poor person must struggle; the nature that the poor person has over and against them is not a mere being but my will. The poor person feels himself being related to arbitrariness (*Willkür*), to human contingency, and in the last analysis, this is what gives rise to indignation, that he is put in this schism because of arbitrariness. Because the freedom of the individual has no existence, the recognition (*Anerkennung*) of universal freedom vanishes. Out of these conditions comes that shamelessness which we find in the rabble.” *Die Vorlesungen von 1819/1820*, p. 195.
85. See also Stephen Houlgate, *Freedom, Truth and History: An Introduction to Hegel’s Philosophy*, pp. 109–114.
86. “The rich person sees everything as purchasable on its own (*käuflich für sich*), because he knows himself as the power of the particularity of self-consciousness. Wealth can therefore lead to the same kind of derision and shamelessness that goes with the poor rabble . . . Both sides, poverty and wealth, constitute the decay of civil society.” *Die Vorlesungen von 1819/1820*, p. 196.
87. This insistence on international commerce is not made very sharply by Hegel in his published *Philosophy of Right* (although it is there in §§246–247 if one looks for it). In some of his other lectures, Hegel apparently noted some of the problems attendant to international trade. Stephen Houlgate (in *Freedom, Truth and History: An Introduction to Hegel’s Philosophy*, p. 114) sees these remarks as indicating that Hegel did not think that international trade was any long-term solution to the problem of poverty; Houlgate takes Hegel’s talk about international trade to be only offering a pragmatic solution to the problem. However, Hegel quite clearly thought that international trade was more than just a stopgap measure for a

distinct social problem. In his 1819/1820 lectures, Hegel goes into much more detail on the matter. There he also sees it as improving on colonization (definitely a stopgap measure) as a means of fulfilling the teleology of civil society construed as an ethical end. “Civil society strives thus in general to go beyond itself, at first in the external manner of establishing colonies. This going-out-of-itself has a passion for gain as its ground. The higher element in all this is that trade is the way in which nations come into relation with each other in a rightful, legal (*rechtliche*) manner. Barbarians at first stand in the relation to each other of being enemies; they are for themselves and constitute themselves as single points excluding others from them. Those who come into relations of trade first come to know (*erkennen*) each other as legal persons, as property owners. In this external empirical way, people arrive at universality and recognition (*Anerkennung*). Becoming acquainted with other nations is one of the most important moments in the education (*Bildung*) of the modern world. Through it, people are brought out of their narrow-minded representations (*Vorstellungen*) . . . The sea and the navigation of it constitutes, as it were, the poetry of trade; in it there arises a kind of bravery to which trade in itself progresses. There arises through trade the representation of the universality of mankind; the particularity of nations, their mores (*Sitten*) and their culture vanish. There remains only the universal thought that all these foreigners are people . . . Through trade and need there arises a world-interest; world history shows the aspect of the ethical whole in all this, whereas world trade shows that aspect of the way in which people are related as such (*Seiten des Verhältnisses*). At the same time bourgeois society transcends its principle because it puts its own gains, its own property into danger. In that way, the drive for gain turns into its opposite, bravery.” *Die Vorlesungen von 1819/1820*, pp. 199–20.

88. Roland Mousnier, *The Institutions of France under the Absolute Monarchy 1598–1789* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979). p. 129.
89. Because of this, Hegel would probably think that “fraternity” – or, for that matter, “sorority” – would be an inadequate metaphor for the kind of communal self-identity at stake here. “Solidarity” or “camaraderie” would be the better terms.
90. “Without being a member of an authorized corporation (and it is only by being authorized that a communality is a corporation), an individual is without the honor of an estate (*Standesehre*), and because of his isolation is reduced to the self-seeking side of his business, and his subsistence and enjoyment are not fixed. Consequently, he must seek to gain *his recognition* through external statements of success in his business, statements which are unlimited. He cannot live in according to his estate, for there is no estate for him – for in civil society something exists as a communality only if it is legally constituted and recognized. Therefore, there can be for him no universal way of life fit for him.” *Philosophy of Right*, §253, Remark.
91. Historically, as Hegel notes, many states have arisen out of the agreements among corporate (and other) groups, although not in the peaceful, deliberative way so dear to the social contract theorists; rather they have arisen out of bloody religious conflicts, wars of conquest, and disputes among dynasties. The binding agreements that formed the basis of these states were more like treaties or suits for peace than they were like contracts.
92. Because of all the false lore about Hegel that has been passed down from textbook to textbook about Hegel’s philosophy of the state, it is unfortunately still almost *de rigueur* to begin any discussion of Hegel’s theory of the state with a set of

disclaimers: Hegel was not a proto-Nazi, he did not encourage mindless worship of the state, he was not a proto-communist, he did not call for the abolition of individualism in the face of the state and so on. At one time, such ridiculous views of Hegel were rampant. Although there are still a lot of things like this being taught about Hegel in courses covering the history of political theory, there is a mountain of scholarly work that shows that the popular authoritarian, proto-Nazi, German nationalist, state-worshipping Hegel is a creature purely of myth. As a representative sample of such work in English, see Shlomo Avineri, *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972); Robert Pippin, *Modernism as a Philosophical Problem* (Oxford: Blackwell's, 1991); Steven Smith, *Hegel's Critique of Liberalism: Rights in Context* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989); Jacques d'Hondt, *Hegel in His Time: Berlin, 1818–1831* (translated by John Burbridge with N. Roland and J. Levasseur) (Peterborough: Broadview, 1988); Terry Pinkard, *Hegel's Dialectic: the Explanation of Possibility* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988); Stephen Houlgate, *Freedom, Truth and History* (London: Routledge, 1991); Peter J. Steinberger, *Logic and Politics: Hegel's Philosophy of Right* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988). The classic study of how the patently false view of Hegel-the-authoritarian-Nazi got its roots is found in Walter Kaufmann's, "The Hegel Myth and its Method," *Philosophical Review* LXIII (1954), pp. 3–18.

93. The term, "state," unfortunately conjures for us the more modern sociological idea of a territorial unity possessing a monopoly on power. Hegel, however, thinks that there can be states (in his sense) that have no power (*Macht*). "With constitutions it is further a matter of a people's becoming completely independent so that their independence can maintain itself by itself. There can be different kinds of combinations through which a state, which does not have power, can maintain itself as independent and still endure (*Bestehen*). In such weak states, which live on political sufferance (*politische Gnadenbrot essen*), such deficient constitutions can endure. Such a state can particularly hold out at the level of civil society. If the state actually holds together with such constitutions, then one cannot say that it does so only through other states. The main thing is that in such states an orderly and rightful private economy (*Privathaushaltung*) is conducted." *Die Vorlesungen von 1819/1820*, pp. 236–237.
94. "The question can be raised as to who is to make the constitution. This question seems fully meaningful and to be of the highest importance. Looked at more closely, however, it is meaningless. It bases itself on the view that there could be a people (*Volk*) without a constitution. Such a people would be only an abstract multiplicity. But such a thing does not exist." *Die Vorlesungen von 1819/1820*, pp. 228–229.
95. "The state in its constitution must permeate all relationships. Napoleon, for example, wished to give the Spaniards a constitution *a priori*, which went badly enough. A constitution is not just something manufactured (*Gemachtes*); it is the work of centuries, it is the idea, the consciousness of rationality to the extent that this rationality is developed in a people. No constitution is therefore simply made by its subjects. What Napoleon gave the Spaniards was more rational than what they had earlier had, and yet they recoiled from it as from something alien, since they were not yet educated up to its level. With regard to their constitution, a people must have a feeling for their rights and their condition, for otherwise there may be a constitution externally present at hand for them, but it has no meaning and no value." *Philosophy of Right*, §274, Addition.

96. Hegel compares it to Rousseau's general will, noting, however, that Rousseau's conception suffers from the defect of making the general will some kind of mysterious compound out of a collection of individual wills. This makes it seem as if the political community is somehow something to which individuals in, say, civil society consent in order to protect their property or their liberties. That would completely undermine the legitimacy of the political community, since it would make the political community's legitimacy contingent on how well it served those functions – it makes it, that is, a means to an end, rather than a common pursuit. Indeed, it is "social space" organized as ethical life – the collection of social practices and institutions that comprise the "ethical ends" – that makes individual willing possible in the first place, and thus the ethical end of the political community cannot be said to be the result of such independent willings. See *Philosophy of Right*, §258.
97. Hegel speaks in many places about how one should not confuse the issue of the legitimacy (or, in his words, validity, *Gültigkeit*) of the state with its historical origins. The legitimacy of modernity in general can only be understood in terms of how it makes up for the insufficiencies of its historical predecessors. That issue, however, is treated in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, which shows us how we came to the standpoint where something like the "system" and in particular, the *Philosophy of Right* is possible for us. Hegel does say of the modern state: "It cannot be merely rigid, inherited rights through which the whole is held together. These are historically feudal states. The grounds which count in them are of a wholly positive kind: it has been valid and thus it is valid. Since civil society took shape within the feudal states, the universal has been made to count as such." *Die Vorlesungen von 1819/1820*, p. 209.
98. Shlomo Avineri, who is otherwise a reliable reporter of Hegel's views, seems to get this point wrong. For Avineri, Hegel "opposes any system which would like to achieve a separation of powers by investing each political *institution* with a separate and exclusive *function*." *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State*, p. 186. Avineri relies on Hegel's statement in §272 that "... each of these powers is in itself the totality of the constitution, because each contains the other moments and has them effective in itself, and because the moments, being expressions of the differentiation of the concept, simply abide in their ideality and constitute nothing but a single individual whole." But Hegel is only intending to say here that each moment *implies* the other. You cannot have a legislative power without some power to enforce the law, you cannot have an executive without some law to execute, and so on, and that the legitimacy of each moment comes out of its being a moment of the whole that is the political community – the state – not in its being simply a pragmatic stopgap measure to keep government working.
99. It is in his lectures of 1819/1820 that Hegel refers to a kind of *Schadenfreude* as connected with the separation of powers. See *Die Vorlesungen von 1819/1820*. p. 233
100. Compare, for example, the statement in the *Philosophy of Right*, §209: "A person [*Mensch*] counts as such only because he is a person, not because he is a Jew, Catholic, Protestant, German, Italian, etc."
101. Compare, for example, his comment: "The superficial and empty point of view and interpretation of the concept of a constitution has provoked much mischief. If one inquires in the individual German states (*Ländern*) whether the bourgeois (*Bürger*) and peasants want to belong to one Germany, in most cases the question will simply not be understood." *Die Vorlesungen von 1819/1820*. p. 230.

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- This occurs in the context of speaking of how a people must be “ready” and “formed” for a rational constitution and how the Spanish were not yet ready for the constitution which Napoleon gave them. The idea that “Germans” ought to belong to a unified German state simply because they are ethnically Germans is thus for Hegel simple irrationality. What is important is not their “Germanness” but whether they have developed an appropriately modern *self-consciousness*.
102. See Shlomo Avineri’s discussion of this, *Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State*, pp. 168–171.
 103. *Philosophy of Right*, §318.
 104. Shlomo Avineri does a nice job of showing how little this charge has to do with Hegel’s actual proposals. See *Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State*, pp. 161–167.
 105. “The particular conceptual determination of the estates is thereby to be seen in that in them the subjective moment of universal freedom, the sphere’s own insight and own will, which in this exposition is called civil society, comes into *existence in relation to the state*. That this moment is a determination of the idea developing itself to totality, is an inner necessity not to be confused with *external necessity and utility*, follows, as everywhere, from the philosophical point of view.” *Philosophy of Right*, §301.
 106. For this reason, in his lectures on aesthetics, Hegel argued that the appropriate form of drama for modern life is neither pure tragedy nor pure comedy but *tragicomedy*, in which there is both the seriousness of purpose present in tragedy and the free play of subjectivity present in comedy, and in which the tragic and comic elements serve to “balance” (*ausgleichen*) each other. He notes, “Instead of acting with comical perversity, the individual is filled with the seriousness characteristic of solid concerns and stable characters, while the tragic fixity of will is so far weakened, and the depth of the collisions so far reduced, that there can emerge a reconciliation (*Aussöhnung*) of interests and a harmonious unification of individuals and their aims. It is in a conception like this that particularly our modern plays and dramas have the basis of their origin. The depth of this principle is the intuition that, despite all differences and conflicts of characters and their interests and passions, human action can nevertheless produce an actuality fully harmonious within itself. As long ago as their day the ancients had tragedies like this, in that individuals were not sacrificed but saved . . . But in these cases the accommodation (*Ausgleichung*) comes from outside by command of the gods, etc., and does not have its source within the parties themselves, while in modern plays it is the individuals themselves who are led in the course of their own action to this cessation of strife and to the mutual reconciliation (*Aussöhnung*) of their aims and characters.” *Aesthetics*, II, pp. 1203–1204; *Werke*, 15, pp. 532–533.
 107. In speaking of the development of the “principle of thought” (which for him is the basic idea of self-determination, since only thought is fully self-determining), Hegel says, “With this formally absolute principle we arrive at the *last stage (Stadium) in history, at our world, at our time (Tage)*.” *Werke*, 12, p. 524. This is of course ambiguous, since the “last stage” might be taken to refer always to “our time,” whenever our time happens to be.
 108. *Werke*, 12, p. 134. (The formula occurs in several places; this is from the lectures on the philosophy of history.)
 109. This rests on Hegel’s seeing all non-Western cultures as lacking a properly *reflective* form of life, that is, as failing to develop the kinds of reflective institutions which give rise to “spirit” and thus in principle offering no kind of alternative

account of our reason-giving activities. Hegel does not argue that the Chinese and the Indians, for example, do not engage in reason-giving activities, but only that they have not developed the kinds of reflective institutions that would be necessary in order to generate the kinds of skepticism that are necessary to move history forward. Thus, although China and India change over time, they cannot, in Hegel's view, have any *history*. That Hegel may be charged with simply misunderstanding the complexity of Chinese and Indian culture and expressing a kind of nineteenth century hauteur and arrogance toward non-Western cultures is for us later readers something that goes without saying. But Hegel was also drawing on the available literature of his day, which was scanty and was itself certainly colored by these, shall we say, somewhat ethnocentric views of the relation between Western and non-Western cultures. (What Hegel says, for example, about Africa displays the astounding ignorance possessed by almost all Europeans of his time towards that continent.) A more serious consideration of the alternative accounts given by Chinese and Indians (or whether they really are *alternative* accounts) would obviously require a rewrite of the Hegelian philosophy of history, but it would not require a rewrite of the Hegelian thesis that from the dialectical standpoint, what we are interested in are the ways in which forms of life come to give accounts of what they take to be good reasons for belief and action and the ways in which those accounts generate their own forms of skepticism.

110. The famous and influential interpretation of Hegel's philosophy by the Franco-Russian philosopher, Alexandre Kojève, mistook this point. Kojève used "History" in the same way in which the early moderns used "Nature." Kojève takes "History" to be that background of human action and passion that ensures through its own mechanism that the various actions humans take will automatically balance out so as to produce the best result. (See Alexandre Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel* (translated by James H. Nichols, Jr.) (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969). This corresponds to the idea of "Nature" in early modern thought as a beneficent, self-correcting background. This idea of "Nature" grows out of the way in which God was used in medieval ethical thought. God made the universe for a purpose, and every part has a purpose. We are conscious of our part, even though we cannot perhaps fathom exactly how we are contributing overall to divine purpose. God has given mankind a set of determinate, absolute duties; moreover, God in his supreme wisdom has given us these duties in the knowledge that if each person performs the duties of his station, the result will be good (even if we limited finite creatures cannot discern that good.) The seeming disorder in the world may thus be understood as mere appearance; the divine plan has ordained things so that the greater good is achieved, even if we cannot see it. Later moralists replaced God's plan for the world with the idea of Nature working itself out so as to give individuals certain desires and passions, the overall arrangement of which is supposed to produce an overall harmony among humans, provided that we learned to listen to the "voice of nature" in ourselves. (On this transition in the development of modern ethics, see Jerome Schneewind, "The Divine Corporation and the History of Ethics," in *Philosophy in History: Essays in the Historiography of Philosophy*, edited by Richard Rorty, J.B. Schneewind and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). pp. 173–191.) Kojève used "History" in much the same way. "History" was a self-correcting enterprise that ensured that the right outcome would be ordained even if we limited humans could not see how it was

working out. The mechanism by which history worked was the struggle for recognition, but Kojève took this to be the result of a “natural” desire within humans to gain such recognition from others. Kojève quite consciously used this idea of “History” in order to avoid being a complete relativist. Michael S. Roth in his *Knowing and History: Appropriations of Hegel in Twentieth Century France* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), pp. 81–146 (his chapter on Kojève) also discusses how the views of later French thinkers such as Foucault were attempts to avoid such a conception of “History” as a self-correcting enterprise in favor of a more thoroughly relativist position. (See Roth, pp. 189–224.) Kojève’s naturalization of the Hegelian conception of history has been revived by Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: The Free Press, 1992). Like Kojève, Fukuyama posits a basic desire in “human nature,” the desire for recognition, and then argues that the institutional setups of modern liberal democracies satisfy that desire in a rational way that avoids the kinds of irrational conflicts embodied in earlier, alternative setups. Both Kojève and Fukuyama therefore transform Hegel’s project into a version of pre-Hegelian attempts at locating some fixed, transcendent standard to use for evaluating different historical phenomena.

111. There is an often-cited passage from Hegel’s lectures on the philosophy of history that shows that Hegel entertained the possibility that world history might now begin a different story than it has up until now. The passage concerns his reflections on North America: “North America will be comparable with Europe only after the immeasurable space which that state offers is filled up and its civil society will be pressed back on itself . . . America is therefore the land of the future, where, in the times that lie before us, a world historical significance will reveal itself – perhaps in a conflict between North and South America. It is a land of longing for all those who are weary of the historical armory of old Europe . . . *It is for America to break off from the basis (Boden) on which until today the history of the world has set itself out . . .* and as a land of the future, it is not of concern to us here, for, as regards history, we only have to regard that aspect of history which has been and that which is.” *Werke*, 12, p. 114. (italics added by me.) Were Hegel writing today, perhaps he would be instead talking about Asia.
112. Dieter Henrich claims on the basis of reading unpublished manuscripts that Hegel’s thesis concerning the “end of art” apparently did not appear in his lectures on the subject until 1828, three years before his death. See Dieter Henrich, “Art and Philosophy of Art Today: Reflections With Reference to Hegel,” in Richard E. Amacher and Victor Lange, *New Perspectives in German Literary Criticism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). p. 114, note 1.
113. “Thought and reflection have spread their wings above fine art. Those who delight in lamenting and blaming may regard this phenomenon as a corruption and ascribe it to the predominance of passions and selfish interests which scare away the seriousness of art as well as its cheerfulness; or they may accuse the distress of the present time, the complicated state of civil and political life which does not permit a heart entangled in petty interests to free itself to the higher ends of art . . . consequently, the conditions of our present time are not favorable to art . . . the point is that our whole spiritual culture is of such a kind that [the artist] himself stands within the world of reflection and its relations, and could not by any act of will and decision abstract himself from it; nor could by special education or removal from the relations of life contrive and organize a

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special solitude to replace what he has lost. In all these respects art, considered as its highest vocation, is and remains for us a thing of the past.” *Aesthetics*, pp. 10–11; *Werke*, p. 25.

114. For Hegel’s relation to his own time, see John Edward Toews, *Hegelianism*, which draws out the various tensions and social forces that occupied the Hegelian school during Hegel’s Berlin period and immediately thereafter.
115. “Preface” to the *Philosophy of Right*, p. 11 and p. 13.
116. Hegel speaks of objective spirit as a “second nature” in *Philosophy of Right*, §4.
117. In his lectures on the philosophy of history, Hegel made this point in the following way: “A principle of thought was thus found for the state . . . the principle of certainty, which is the identity with my self-consciousness, but not yet with that of truth, from which it must be differentiated. This is a great discovery about that which is most inner (*das Innerste*) and about freedom. The consciousness of the spiritual is now essentially the foundation and *philosophy* has come to be dominant.” *Werke*, p. 527. Here Hegel distinguishes the “certainty” that one finds in willing the ethical ends of family, civil society and state from the kind of reflection on whether this kind of “social space” is subject to the same kinds of skeptical attacks as were earlier forms of life. That reflection belongs to absolute spirit, which is concerned with what he calls in this passage, “truth.”